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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Impact of Contextual Political Factors on Personnel, Rulemaking, and Partisanship
by
Emily H. Moore
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2018
Professor John Patty, Chair
Professor Justin Fox, Co-Chair
The context in which an institution operates structures the way political actors respond to
it. Broadly, this dissertation explores these contextual variables. The first chapter provides
an overview of the arguments I will make in the dissertation and the results I find. The
second chapter considers political context as it relates to excepted political appointees. I
argue that presidents utilize Schedule C appointees more frequently in ideologically proximate
agencies and when ideological conflict in the Senate is high. I show some evidence for these
arguments using an original OPM dataset on Schedule C appointees from 1998 through 2013.
The third chapter shifts to a discussion of public participation on federal rulemaking activity.
Looking at an original dataset of all regulations on regulations.gov from 2004-2016, I show
preliminary evidence that several contextual political factors impact the number of comments
agencies receive on their rules. Agency expertise requirements and rules with legal deadlines
are negatively correlated with comments while congressional attention on the producing
agency and more significant rules tend to receive greater public attention. In the fourth
chapter, John Patty and I consider the presidential appointment decision. We present a
theory of bureaucratic staffing which allows staffers to affect agency policy priorities. To our
knowledge, it is the first paper to consider the impact of structural characteristics like agency
xii
productivity and policy breadth on the appointment decision. The fifth chapter, coauthored
with Jon Rogowski, examines the relationship between partisanship and voting behavior
in the antebellum Congress. We show that the effect of partisanship varied over time in
conjunction with institutional changes. Partisanship was stronger in the House than the
Senate and the relationship exhibited three distinct periods. The sixth chapter provides an
overview of an original dataset of all final rules produced by agencies from 2000 through 2014.
These data are unique in that previous studies utilize the Unified Agenda, an incomplete
data source. I overview the purpose of these data, describe the variables, and show a number
of interesting descriptive statistics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Broadly, my work focuses on the contextual political variables that impact institutions–
whether how agency and rule characteristics affect public participation in rulemaking or how
historical events impact the development of the relationship between partisanship and voting
behavior over time.
One hallmark of this dissertation project is the introduction of new and original
data to study foundational questions about responsiveness and accountability in the federal
bureaucracy. As polarization and gridlock have become the norm in American politics,
presidents have increasingly sought alternatives to the legislative process. This focus has
made research on non-legislative policymaking like agency rulemaking all the more important.
Most of my research explores these alternative policymaking sources. My research on personnel
advances our understanding of how presidential administrations utilize appointments to pursue
policy, especially in ways that are less politically accountable.
Chapter 2, which is published in Presidential Studies Quarterly, considers the rela-
tionship between congressional polarization and the use of Schedule C appointees, a type of
political appointment which is exempt from advice and consent and traditional competitive
hiring processes. The essay has two main findings. First, presidents utilize Schedule C
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appointees in larger numbers when they encounter greater polarization in the Senate. I argue
that Schedule C appointees are not substitutes for agency heads, but they can provide greater
support to understaffed agencies. Thus, presidents are able to support the agency’s work
when it is more difficult to staff agencies through advice and consent. Second, I find that
presidents tend to utilize Schedule C appointees more frequently in ideologically proximate
agencies. I argue that presidents utilize Schedule Cs in ideologically proximate agencies
because they are typically advisers best able to support bureaucrats already in alignment
with the president’s plans for an agency.
My research on agency rulemaking in chapter 3 considers how agency design and
structure affect the tendency for those agencies to receive public feedback in the notice and
comment period. Because bureaucrats are unelected, critics have long labeled the federal
bureaucracy undemocratic. Yet unlike legislation, bureaucrats are required by law to solicit
public feedback on their policymaking activities. For this project, I collected an original
dataset including every final regulation available for comment between 2004 and 2016, more
than 20,000 regulations in total. From these data we learn that rules produced by more
expert agencies tend to receive fewer comments overall, implying that removal from political
overseers is associated with less public interaction. In addition, I find some evidence that
more significant rules and rules from agencies that receive greater congressional attention
receive more public comments.
Chapter 4 is co-authored work with John Patty. Besides collaborative discussions
on the direction of the paper, my contribution to the paper included writing most of the
section on how presidents choose appointees and all of the section on appointment dynamics
as well as presenting the work at the American Political Science Association. This chapter
explores both ideological and non-ideological factors impacting the appointment decision. We
model the president’s appointment decision based on the characteristics of appointees and
agencies given that appointees can affect the policy priorities (and by extension, the output)
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of agencies. This model is unique in that it is the first theory of political appointments to
demonstrate how agencies’ structural characteristics might affect appointment incentives
when the number of appointees is limited. We arrive at several important findings. We find
that presidents should consider appointee ideology, but that the quality of a staffer matters
more than ideology when staffers are of low quality. When presidents are appointing a high
quality staffer, they should consider the agency’s ideological bias and the staffer’s quality.
As an example, leftist presidents should appoint high quality leftist staffers to more rightist
agencies than lower quality staffers. We also show that presidents should place misaligned
staffers in less productive agencies than aligned staffers. In addition, we show that presidents
will sometimes prioritize lower quality but more ideologically similar staffers over higher
quality but less aligned staffers when appointees are able to influence agency policy priorities.
Chapter 5 is co-authored work with Jon Rogowski. Apart from our collaborative
discussions, I researched a subset of our various historical sources on party development. I
wrote a function to generate the agreement scores and set up and ran most of the various
models (including the breakpoint models) and created versions of most of the plots. This
chapter focuses on party development in Congress before the Civil War. Though it does not
focus on the bureaucracy, this article also considers contextual factors impacting political
institutions. Considerable literature has documented the emergence of parties in the United
States, but few have considered the evolution of partisanship in the antebellum period once
it was established. Using roll call votes from the first 36 Congresses, we establish a few
findings. First, we show that partisanship was significantly related to voting behavior in
both chambers through the period, but this relationship was about 50 percent stronger in
the House than in the Senate. We also find three distinct party regimes across the period.
In short, we show that the relationship between partisanship and voting behavior was more
variable and evolutionary than previous accounts might suggest.
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Chapter 6 details my collection of all final rules in the Federal Register from 1998
through 2014. I first explain the motivation behind the data collection, the advantages of the
dataset, a description of the variables included, and any work that needs to be done to clean
the data. It also includes several descriptive tables to give a sense of what these data look
like. The Federal Register data will be a valuable source of information for future researchers
because it is a superior data source compared to previous data sources on rulemaking.
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Chapter 2
Polarization, Excepted Appointments,
and the Administrative Presidency
Few topics have received as much popular and scholarly attention as the rise of congressional
polarization and its impact on government performance. Scholars and journalists have often
blamed partisan conflict within Congress for low congressional approval ratings (Binder
2003), understaffed courts and agencies (Binder and Maltzman 2009; Viser 2013), and an
inability to act on key issues (Weisman 2013) or simply run the day-to-day operations
of the government (Helderman 2011). Within the Senate, critics have long blamed the
filibuster for fueling obstructionist tendencies and holding up meaningful reforms (Binder and
Smith 1997; Smith 2014). In 2013, Democrats resorted to using the nuclear option following
frequent, prolonged Republican obstruction via filibuster on the president’s lower-level judicial
nominees. Frustration with this obstruction was especially apparent prior to the November
2016 election as Republicans in the Senate refused to consider Merrick Garland’s Supreme
Court nomination. In an era of increasingly polarized congressional parties, presidents have
faced greater obstacles to filling key vacancies in both the executive branch and in the
judiciary.
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Given the rise of congressional polarization, presidents have sought alternative ways
of filling government positions. One quarter of recent presidents’ appointments to the federal
bureaucracy have failed to receive Senate confirmation (O’Connell 2015) and non-cabinet
vacancies may take anywhere from two months to over one year to fill (O’Connell 2008). Thus,
it is not surprising that presidents have sought flexibility in the use of their appointment
powers, especially by exercising greater control over lower level appointees through the Office
of Presidential Personnel (Lewis 2008; Patterson and Pfiffner 2001). Another way presidents
have attempted to gain control is through the use of recess appointments (e.g. Black et
al. 2007, 2011; Hein 2008; Miller 2015). Yet due to considerable constraints on their use,
recess appointments provide only a partial solution to the president’s problem of staffing and
more generally, governing the bureaucracy, when the Senate is polarized (Ostrander 2015).
Indeed, more than two-thirds of the president’s available political appointees are not subject
to Senate confirmation but nonetheless perform important functions within the government
(Government Accountability Office 2012).
Though they lack the glamour and intrigue of their Senate-confirmed counterparts,
excepted appointees allow the president to continue to staff agencies when conditions in the
Senate make it difficult to do business. Moreover, excepted appointees tend to take on added
responsibilities during leadership vacuums. Thus, I argue that as partisan conflict within the
Senate increases, presidents will increasingly utilize excepted authorities. I also argue that
due to the unique nature of Schedule C appointees specifically, they are more likely to be
placed in ideologically similar agencies. To test these relationships, I introduce a new dataset
of all Schedule C appointments from 1998 to 2013. These data show that presidents use
Schedule C appointments more frequently when conflict within the Senate is high and that
presidents tend to place Schedule C appointees in ideologically similar agencies. These results
show that Schedule C appointees offer presidents flexibility to fill administrative positions
quickly (particularly in ideologically aligned agencies) and provide an important means of
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achieving their policy goals when conditions within the Senate make using the appointment
power more difficult.
2.1 Political and Policy Importance of Excepted Ap-
pointees
Excepted appointees are those appointees who do not undergo competitive hiring processes
or advice and consent. Most serve as advisers situated in between the top-level advice and
consent officials and lower-level careerists with excepted non-career Senior Executive Service
(SES) appointees senior to Schedule Cs. SES and Schedule C appointees are explicitly political
and Schedule C appointees are specifically selected for “confidential and policy-determining”
reasons. I describe some history of this selection process in a later section. Because they
mainly serve as advisers to presidents and cabinet officials or as liaisons between the agency
and other stakeholders, they remain largely invisible to the public.
Excepted appointees often serve in key policy-relevant capacities and have occasionally
been the subject of media attention. For example, Linda Tripp and Monica Lewinsky were
both Schedule C appointees in the Pentagon. Elizabeth Warren served as Assistant to the
President and Special Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury under Secretary Geithner so
she could create the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.1 Phillip Cooney served in an
excepted position as Chief of Staff at the Council of Environmental Quality and purposefully
edited expert-prepared government climate reports to downplay scientific climate change
findings (Revkin 2005a; 2005b). In short, several newsworthy officials have served as excepted
appointees. Though some high-profile excepted appointees do occasionally end up in the
spotlight, they are not the only excepted officials that have policy relevance. For example, one
1According to Lewis (2011), Warren had been appointed as a “czar” because Obama believed Warren
could never survive advice and consent. Warren herself (2014) confirms this notion and states Obama had
also refused to appoint her as head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau via recess appointment
because of the outrage it may have caused.
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Schedule C appointee in the Obama administration’s USDA, Jamal Habibi, described himself
as a “point-man” for international trade. Though he was a low-ranked “special assistant,” he
described himself as spending a significant amount of time communicating with stakeholders
and advising senior officials on trade agreements. A Schedule C appointee who served as
chief of staff in the same department (and who preferred not to be named) held a variety
of other tasks in the department. He briefed deputy undersecretaries on policy, filled in for
them in their absence, controlled their schedules, approved rules created by career staff, and
resolved disputes between political and career officials. This appointee was also entrusted
with deciding how and when critical loan rate information would be released to the public.2
In addition to their role as policy advisers and gatekeepers between top political
and career staff, excepted appointees can also be used to support cabinet secretaries in new
agencies before the remaining career staff and second-level PAS appointees come to office.
For example, President Bush filled a myriad of excepted positions in the DHS headquarters
in the first few months of the newly created Department of Homeland Security.3 According
to OPM, in 2003, forty percent of the DHS headquarters was staffed via Schedule C with 12
Schedule C appointees arriving in January of 2003. The proportion of Schedule Cs in the
agency declined over time as the agency became established. Importantly, the president was
able to fill these positions with the people of his choosing and do so without the fanfare that
typically accompanies high-profile nominations.
Despite the usefulness of excepted appointments, few studies have included, much
less focused on them. This is surprising given that “arguably the most important trends in
2I provided two examples of Schedule C appointees, but they can perform a wide array of services within
agencies. Some serve as scheduling assistants while others serve as speech writers or important policy advisers.
For example, according to the Plum Book, Schedule C appointees serve as senior advisers to secretaries and
undersecretaries in cabinet agencies, White House offices like OMB or independent agencies like the Small
Business Administration, the Export-Import Bank or even NASA. They serve as policy analysts in agencies
like the EPA or the cybersecurity office of Homeland Security.
3I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that agencies that were in other cabinet departments
that moved into DHS (like FEMA and the Coast Guard) largely retained their previous staff and hiring
practices.
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the administrative presidency include increases in lower-level appointees and more careful
selection of appointees at these lower levels” (Lewis and Waterman 2013, 37). In one treatment
of excepted appointees, Lewis and Waterman (2013) focus on Senior Executive Service (SES)
and Schedule C appointees to the Department of Labor. They present evidence that Schedule
C appointees are significantly more likely than non-career SES and PAS appointees to have
worked for a political party or have other political experience and also more likely than PAS
appointees to have worked on a presidential campaign.
Schedule C positions provide an opportunity for less experienced, young partisans to
gather valuable government experience (Bonafede 1987; Ingraham, Thompson and Eisenberg
1995; Lewis 2008). Schedule C jobs allow presidents to develop a pool of individuals who
may someday become non-career SES or eventually PAS appointees in their own or a future
co-partisan’s administration. Bonafede (1987) confirms that Reagan used this strategy in
his administration, writing that Reagan specifically created a cadre of young conservatives
throughout low-level positions that would be promoted later within the administration. In
fact, Nathan (1983) praised Reagan’s administrative strategy as effective in pursuing his policy
agenda because Reagan selected loyal cabinet officials, sub-cabinet officials, SES and Schedule
C appointees. Nathan specifically praised Reagan’s attention to Schedule C appointees, which
previous presidents had frequently ignored. Though cabinet officials played a role in selecting
the excepted political appointees, Reagan insisted that the White House be consulted on all
SES and Schedule C appointees. This administrative strategy is consistent with the general
pattern presidents have taken toward expanding and protecting their administrative powers.
Scholarly evidence suggests that presidents think carefully about hiring decisions at
both the top and lower levels and significant work is dedicated to unearthing this process (e.g.
Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014; Lewis and Waterman 2013; Patterson 2008; Patterson
and Pfiffner 2001; Tolchin and Tolchin 2010). For example, much scholarly work is devoted
to the president’s tradeoff between competent “experts” and political loyalists (e.g. Heclo
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1977; Hollibaugh 2015; Lewis 2008; Moe 1985; Moynihan and Roberts 2010; Parsneau 2013).
Additional work considers the politicization of presidential appointments (e.g., Burke 1992;
Hart 1995; Heclo 1975; Lewis 2005, 2008, 2009; Wayne et al. 1979). In particular, Lewis
(2008) points out that politicization is “a vital tool for controlling the bureaucracy” (6).
Presidents have several means of politicizing. For example, presidents can replace career
managers with political appointees, layer the career manager to limit careerist influence,
or utilize reduction-in-force techniques. In addition to these strategies, presidents can also
add ministerial staff like special assistants. Lewis points out that these special assistants
(usually Schedule Cs) have limited formal authority, but they “acquire substantial informal
authority as experts, gatekeepers and public spokespeople” (36). Lewis goes on to argue that
“Schedule C appointees gain power from being primary advisors to higher-level appointees
and from speaking with the implied authority of the appointee” (37). He also notes that
staff like these are sometimes tasked with special projects and budget or legal review. Thus,
excepted appointees fit into the larger phenomenon of politicization, which presidents have
often utilized in an attempt to gain political control.
Presidents care about all of these staffing decisions—whether at the top of an agency
or at the mid and lower levels—because they recognize the importance of personnel for
pursuing their agendas. In an interview, President Ford argued for greater appointment
power at the lower levels of the bureaucracy, stating, “if he [the president] cannot reach
into the bowels of a department his decisions way up at the top will seldom be adequately
implemented out in the grass roots” (Lewis 2008, 57). As Moe (1987, 489) described, “The
president’s personnel decisions are strategically important to the realization of his interests as
a political leader, and the White House jealously guards its powers and flexibility in putting
them to best use.” Thus, presidents care about expanding not just the scope but also the
flexibility of their appointment powers. Indeed, Lewis (2011) shows that presidents bolster
their administrative control by increasing the number of appointments available to them and
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expanding appointment power in key management positions. Though they are lower profile
than advice and consent officials, presidents can use these positions to fill agencies with
key personnel. Studying these unique and relatively invisible appointees provides important
insight into bureaucratic management, especially when presidents face challenges in the advice
and consent process.
2.2 The Politics of Presidential Nominations
Given the difficulties of the advice and consent process, it is easy to imagine why presidents
desire flexibility in their appointment powers. The delay and failure of presidential nominations
in the Senate have only worsened in recent years. The length of time to confirmation has
increased substantially since the 1980s (O’Connell 2015). Obama’s nominees waited twice as
long to be confirmed as Reagan’s. Furthermore, over 25 percent of presidential nominations
failed since the 1980s with greater failure rates for Bush and Obama than their predecessors.
Reagan appointed 86 percent of his top officials in his first year, but Obama could not
complete two-thirds (Pfiffner 2015). The increasing failures and confirmation delays mean an
increase in vacancies, which happen often given the relatively short amount of time appointees
stay in their positions (O’Connell 2008; Pfiffner 2015). Recently, top positions in cabinet
and executive agencies are vacant or filled by an acting official 15 to 25 percent of the time
(O’Connell 2008).
Partisan conflict within the Senate seems to exacerbate these problems (McCarty and
Razaghian 1999). At times, a minority in the Senate may oppose the president’s nominees for
political reasons or the Senate may be too polarized to agree on a nominee. Indeed, senators
work to strategically delay nominations by, for instance, refusing to hold hearings on or vote
to confirm a nominee for so long that the president is eventually forced to withdraw the
nomination (Bond, Fleisher and Krutz 2009; Ostrander 2016). Moreover, partisan Senators
may use nominees as bargaining chips in political conflicts. Kenneth Kopocis, a nominee
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for the EPA, had waited more than 1,000 days because Republicans did not support one of
the EPA’s proposed rules and used his nomination as leverage to revoke it (Eilperin 2014).
The nuclear option implemented in 2013 did not seem to solve the problem. While these
filibuster reforms decreased wait times for judicial nominees, they increased wait times for
other nominees (O’Connell 2015).
Lengthy confirmation ordeals can hinder the president’s agenda (Lewis 2011; McCarty
and Razaghian 1999). The long and uncertain confirmation process limits the president’s
options and deters talented people from working in the administration (Eilperin 2014).
Alternatively, the excepted service allows the president to select talented individuals who are
unwilling or unable to undergo advice and consent, co-partisans who are not yet experienced
enough to serve as top-level officials, and more diverse individuals.4
2.3 Toward a Theory of Schedule C Appointments and
Senate Conflict
In November 2014, President Obama nominated Antonio Weiss, head of investment banking
for independent financial management firm Lazard, as the Undersecretary for Domestic
Finance. Led by Elizabeth Warren, a number of progressive Democrats in the Senate opposed
Weiss’ appointment. To avoid a confirmation showdown, Obama withdrew the nomination
and instead appointed Weiss to an excepted position as Counselor to the Secretary of the
Treasury. While he had fewer formal responsibilities as Counselor than he would have as
Undersecretary, Weiss affected policy immediately in a short-staffed agency instead of risking
a lengthy and potentially unsuccessful confirmation battle.
4For example, data show that SES and Schedule C appointees are more likely to be women than PAS
appointees. The Washington Post, using Ann O’Connell’s data, reported that of the 80 PAS appointees who
responded to their survey, over 35 percent were women. By comparison, as of 2016, over half of all Schedule
C appointees in the Obama Administration were women and 48 percent of non-career SES appointees were
women. Obama similarly appointed a high number of racial minorities to excepted positions. According
to OPM’s Fedscope tool, in September 2016, 37 percent of non-career SES appointees and 56 percent of
Schedule Cs were a racial or ethnic minority.
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This episode illustrates one of the important aspects of excepted appointees that
make them powerful weapons in the president’s administrative arsenal. Because excepted
appointees do not undergo advice and consent nor competitive hiring processes, they offer
the president incredible versatility. In particular, they allow presidents to staff agencies when
conditions within the Senate make confirmations and the pursuit of presidential agendas
more difficult.
I theorize that presidents normally view their subordinates as teams made up of
members who have different functions. That is, cabinet officials and agency heads work
with second-level PAS appointees, SES appointees, Schedule Cs and career staff to keep
the executive branch running smoothly. As such, excepted appointees in a well-functioning
executive branch complement the functions performed by PAS appointees. At the beginning of
their terms, presidents work with the Office of Presidential Personnel (PPO) and their cabinet
secretaries and draw upon party and campaign knowledge to identify possible candidates for
excepted positions. In deciding where to put appointees within the bureaucracy, PPO takes
into account the president’s interest in the agency, its policy importance, and the need to do
favors for campaign workers and donors. When presidents observe Senate conflict, however,
they face two staffing problems. They seek to overcome these problems, as described in the
previous sections, by relying on more flexible aspects of their appointment powers.
First, as described in the previous section, Senate polarization is related to difficulty in
filling vacancies. While cabinet officials are quickly confirmed, the next level of appointees may
take from a few months to more than a year to select, vet, and confirm if they are confirmed at
all (O’Connell 2008). This leaves presidents and their cabinets without advisers that provide
vital information to the department and president. Moreover, delay can lead to a lack of
political staff who help keep the day-to-day operations of the government running—approving
regulations produced by career staff and advising them on future regulations or conveying
the president’s message to stakeholders. Second, Senate polarization disrupts a president’s
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legislative agenda. This frustration results in presidents pursuing administrative strategies.
This administrative agenda also requires political staff to advise and approve rulemaking
activity and to work with interest groups in pursuing regulations. This need for staff exists
outside of any vacancies which may exist within the department.
In the former case, presidents may directly circumvent advice and consent as with
the Warren and Weiss examples (among other so-called “czars”), appointing individuals they
do not believe will make it through Senate confirmation. However, this need not be the
president’s motivation. Presidents may simply wish to provide more support to agencies as
they wait for leadership by assigning them to existing staff or they may appoint officials
a majority of members prefer but cannot confirm due to Senate polarization. Moreover,
second-level PAS appointments, when vacant, are frequently filled by an acting career official.5
Presidents prefer to have these career officials supported by loyal political supporters, even
if indirectly. Advice and consent vacancies allow excepted appointees to exercise greater
influence over policy than they normally would (O’Connell 2010). Antonio Weiss benefited
from just this phenomenon. After losing out on the undersecretary position and becoming
an appointed adviser, Antonio Weiss took on many responsibilities he would have held as
undersecretary including heading a meeting with Wall Street officials and serving as an
adviser to Treasury Secretary Lew on issues such as debt management and global market
developments. Due to several high-level vacancies in the Treasury department, Weiss’s
role seemed to take on added importance (Katz 2015). Indeed, former Treasury officials
5Traditionally, cabinet officials have some say over the SES and Schedule C staff under them. For this
reason, the Schedule Cs I interviewed indicated that they believed many excepted appointees would leave if a
cabinet secretary departed the agency. They indicated that this would not be the case for second-level PAS
appointees, however. Most delay time in appointment and confirmation of PAS appointments occurs in this
second-level. These undersecretaries and deputy undersecretaries with whom Schedule Cs work directly are
positions frequently filled by acting career officials when they are vacant.
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suggested that given his excepted position and these vacancies, Weiss was likely to take on
an “influential, if low-profile, function shaping policy” (Katz 2015).6
Given the increasing difficulty of passing nominees through the advice and consent
process and the increasing length of time to confirmation for nominees that are confirmed,
I expect the president to find a way of augmenting (but not replacing) advice and consent.
Excepted appointees are one means of doing this. They serve as important advisers that
can communicate and ensure the president’s wishes are followed by career staff when advice
and consent officials are in short supply. They are also frequently hired to serve in liaison
agencies where they communicate between agencies and congressional staffers and interest
groups. Moreover, Schedule C appointees specifically allow presidents not just to fill a position
with who they want, but allows them to create the position they want as well. Thus, while
excepted appointees are always useful to the president, I expect the president to utilize the
flexibility of Schedule C appointees more frequently when conflict within the Senate is high.
Since polarization within the Senate can occur even when the president and Senate majority
share the same party, I expect to see this relationship regardless of which party controls the
Senate.
H1: Presidents will utilize greater numbers of Schedule C appointments as conflict
within the Senate rises.
There are limitations on the president’s use of the excepted appointment power,
however. Excepted appointees typically lack the statutory authority given to Senate-confirmed
officials. As such, excepted appointees are imperfect substitutes for high-level officials. While
this is true of excepted officials more generally, it is especially true of Schedule C appointees.
Because of this, I argue that Schedule C appointees are used more frequently in ideologically
6Conversations with Schedule C appointees confirm this notion. These appointees suggested that when
vacancies occurred among top officials they took on a more active role in the agency.
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proximate agencies because the president places them where their advice is most likely to be
heeded.
Schedule C appointees must have a Senate-confirmed (PAS) appointee, a career or
non-career Senior Executive Service (SES) appointee or fellow Schedule C appointee as their
immediate supervisor (House of Representatives 2012, 203). Schedule Cs may serve in a
variety of different roles, but they tend to be advisers who do not have the authority to
decide policy directions on their own. Rather, they work for and advise the people who
do have the ability to decide an agency’s direction. Presidents realize that giving valuable
political advisers to agency decision-makers inclined to listen to their advice is more profitable
than assigning them at random or worse, to agencies with decision-makers who actively
disregard them. Importantly, appointees both to PAS and non-career SES are at least partly
chosen by someone other than the president; the Senate has a say on who gets appointed to
PAS appointments and competitive service processes make career SES staff less politicized.
Schedule C authority allows presidents to cultivate advisers absent these limitations. As such,
I expect Schedule C appointees to be utilized in greater numbers in agencies ideologically
aligned with the president.
H2: Presidents will utilize greater numbers of Schedule C appointees in ideologically
proximate agencies.
2.4 A Brief Overview of the Schedule C Selection Pro-
cess
President Eisenhower created Schedule C appointments when he first reached office. According
to Gailmard and Patty (2012), Eisenhower instituted Schedule C because he was faced with
the political realities of being the first Republican to win the presidency in twenty years
(leaving him with few trusted advisers) and because the post-World War II era left him
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with an expansive administrative state, which reached further into the economy and society
than had previously been conceived. Schedule C was designed to exist between other classes
of appointments—appointees beholden directly to the president, but who did not undergo
advice and consent or competitive service processes. Today, Schedule Cs make up about 37
percent of the president’s total political appointments (Government Accountability Office
2012).
Most jobs in the bureaucracy are filled through a competitive process open to the
public just as industry jobs are filled. Exemptions from the competitive process occur for a
variety of reasons.7 Earlier I described Schedule C appointees as being excepted for political
reasons. OPM specifically describes two conditions when Schedule C authority is permitted:
when “the work of the position can be performed successfully only by someone with a thorough
knowledge of and sympathy with the goals, priorities, and preferences of an official who has a
confidential or policy determining relationship with the President or the agency head” or
when ”the position involves making or approving substantive policy recommendations” (U.S.
House of Representatives 2012, 203).
Presidents control political appointments (including Schedule C) via the Office of
Presidential Personnel (or previously, the Presidential Personnel Office/PPO). Patterson and
Pfiffner (2001) report that while modern cabinet secretaries often brag about the level of
personnel control afforded to them, the reality is that PPO retains considerable control over
who can and cannot serve. With respect to Schedule Cs, this White House selection process
has particularly evolved. Schedule C appointees were traditionally chosen by and served at
the pleasure of agency heads and cabinet secretaries. However, believing that his predecessors
had left too much control over personnel to agency heads, Reagan instituted White House
control over SES and Schedule C appointees, which has largely continued (Patterson and
7Some excepted service appointments are reserved for positions for which the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM) does not or cannot provide a test or standard (professionals such as lawyers are one example).
Other excepted service appointments are reserved for those with disabilities or are set aside for interns.
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Pfiffner 2001). That said, the president’s personal involvement in selection differs by position
and agency. Lewis (2008) notes that agencies off the president’s agenda tend to be staffed at
PPO’s discretion. As a result, they are often filled with appointees PPO was obligated to
place such as campaign donors or managers (Patterson and Pfiffner 2001). As such, individual
presidential priorities and agency dynamics play a role in the number and type of appointees
an agency may receive.
Often PPO’s appointee selections are based on demonstrated loyalty to the president.
For example, under President George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush was placed in charge of
a special committee tasked with making a list of those who had demonstrated loyalty to the
president over his entire career. Chase Untermeyer, head of PPO, then used this list to fill the
allocated positions of Schedule C appointees in various departments and agencies (Patterson
and Pfiffner 2001). However, the process for selecting Schedule Cs does exhibit some variation
by president. Jamal Habibi, the Schedule C appointee in Agriculture I described before, had
worked on the Obama re-election campaign, but his selection process was competitive. He
was chosen as part of a large interview day, which included many campaign workers among
others with experience in government and industry. Though many of those who received
the Schedule C jobs had worked on the campaign, the competitive process suggested that
other criteria were also utilized. For example, Jamal Habibi’s educational background was in
international affairs and he worked on international trade issues. Others were chosen because
of their connections with the Secretary of Agriculture. The chief of staff l I had spoken
with served as a career appointee and had worked for a senator. He was sought out by the
Obama administration because of the connections and expertise he had developed in these
positions along with his demonstrated loyalty to the Democratic party. Thus, while loyalty
to the president and the administration’s goals are an important criterion for becoming a
Schedule C appointee, campaign work is not the only way to demonstrate this loyalty, and
while Schedule C appointees have frequently been connected with patronage in the literature
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(Lewis 2008; Lewis and Waterman 2013), this does not preclude Schedule C appointees from
having important policy roles or from having an effect on the agency itself.
2.5 Data: Schedule C Appointees 1998-2013
Throughout the article I have considered both excepted appointees generally and Schedule C
appointees specifically. Even though they are just one of several types of excepted appointment,
I focus on Schedule C appointees for the analysis because they are the most flexible type
of excepted appointee. Because presidents can create and dissolve these positions when
and where they please, the Schedule C appointee is ideal for testing theories about how the
president uses the flexibility of the appointment power to overcome the challenges of Senate
polarization. The federal employment and accessions data on the appointees come from
the FedScope tool through the Office of Personnel Management. From the FedScope tool, I
collected static data on employment statistics for September 1998-2013. These data are a
picture-in-time of employment in federal agencies, representing the total employment to each
included agency for September of the given year. These data show counts of every type of
non-PAS appointment in every agency through the time period representing the more than
30 million total employments and over 22,000 Schedule C appointments that occurred from
1998 through 2013.
Over the period, there were 692 agency units, some of which were created or disbanded
during the time period. These are counted based on which agencies have unique agency codes
(given by OPM) in the data. In order to include agency ideology as a control and to create a
more readily understandable level of aggregation, I collapsed the data into 59 units to match
the Chen and Johnson (2015) ideology scores.
Figure 2.1 displays the number of Schedule C appointees from 1998-2013 and the
number of Schedule C accessions (new hires and transfers) from 2005-2013. Unfortunately,
FedScope does not currently report accessions data prior to FY2005.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Schedule C Appointees and New Hires Over Time.
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Overall, President Bush used Schedule Cs more frequently than either Clinton or
Obama. In general, the number of Schedule Cs decreases and then increases when a new
president takes over. As is visible, the number of accessions in 2009, when Obama takes
office, is extraordinarily high—almost matching the total number of appointees in that year.
While there is always some turnover during a presidential transition, this turnover is higher
for political positions. The number of Schedule C accessions as a percentage of Schedule C
employees is typically between 20 and 35 percent. For the Obama transition, the number of
accessions as percentage of employees was over 96 percent. This suggests that 96 percent
of all appointees serving in 2009 were hired under Obama and were not holdovers from the
Bush administration.
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The outcome variable I use for the model is the number of Schedule C appointments
in an agency in a given year. The number of Schedule C appointees in an agency-year ranges
from 0 to 211. The mean number of appointees is about 25 with a standard deviation of
about 37.
There is wide variation in the number of Schedule C appointees both within and across
agencies over time. Figure 2.2 shows the pattern of Schedule C appointees in six selected
agencies. As is visible, the Department of Agriculture and the State Department have a very
large number of Schedule C appointees relative to the mean. Both of these departments had
relatively stable levels of Schedule C appointees through the Bush and Obama administrations.
The Department of Agriculture saw a decrease in appointees from Clinton to Bush while
the Department of State experienced the opposite pattern. The EPA and Small Business
Administration (in the second row of plots) had moderately larger numbers of Schedule C
appointees than the average agency. The EPA saw a large increase in appointees under
President Bush (reaching a high of 40 appointees) but higher levels under Obama than under
Clinton (with a low of seven appointees). The Small Business Administration also experienced
wide variation in its level of Schedule C appointees ranging from 16 to 45 appointees over the
period. The Office of Personnel Management and Consumer Product Safety Commission had
a moderately lower number of Schedule C appointees relative to the mean agency. However,
these agencies still experienced variation. OPM had between 11 and 24 appointees over the
period with higher levels between 2002 and 2005. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
had between three and 16 appointees, hitting a low in Bush’s second term and a high in the
Obama administration.
2.5.1 Key Variables
Within-Senate Conflict is measured using the absolute common space distance between the
median member of both parties in the Senate. This is a departure from some previous
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Figure 2.2: Number of Schedule C Appointees Over Time in Selected Agencies.
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literature, where divided government is frequently an independent variable. The distance
between party medians has ranged from 0.72 to 0.98 between 1998 and 2000, with an average
distance of .810. Distance Agency-President is measured as the absolute ideological distance
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between an agency and the president. Agency Ideology is measured using common space ideal
points created by Chen and Johnson (2015). The president’s ideal point comes from the Poole
and Rosenthal common space measures. The agency ideology scores are unique for each term
from Clinton through Obama’s first term based on federal employee campaign contributions.
Importantly, these scores are scaled in common space, allowing for a comparison between the
ideology of agencies and the president. Thus, the ideology measure is simply the absolute
distance between an agency and the president for a given year. For example, observations in
1998, 1999, and 2000 are based on Chen and Johnson’s ideal point estimates for Clinton’s
second term and Poole and Rosenthal’s estimates for Clinton. Similarly, 2001-2004 is based
on the ideal point estimates for Bush’s first term, 2005-2008 on his second and so on.8 Chen
and Johnson report 79 agencies scores. Due to differences in data coverage, the models cover
59 agencies and departments.
2.5.2 Controls
I control for several potential confounding factors, including agency size, which is measured
as the total level of employment (in thousands) in an agency as reported by Fedscope. I
expect agency size to be positively related to numbers of Schedule Cs because these agencies
have more employees overall. I also include an indicator for the first (2001 and 2009) and
last (2000 and 2008) years of a presidency because overall levels of employment are lower just
before and after presidential transitions. I also include a measure for the distance between
the president and the 60th senator and indicators for each president. Based on the figure,
President Bush appears to have used a higher number of Schedule Cs than his Democratic
colleagues, so I expect indicators for both Obama and Clinton to be signed negatively.
8Chen and Johnson did not provide estimates for 2013, so I used the estimates from Obama’s first term.
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2.6 Results
The results of the negative binomial regression model with standard errors clustered on
agency are reported in Table 2.1. The results support the hypothesis that presidents utilize
Schedule C appointees more frequently as Senate polarization rises. As the distance between
the party medians in the Senate increases, the number of Schedule C appointees also rises.9
These main results for within-Senate conflict are visualized in Figure 2.3. These plots
show the predicted number of Schedule Cs for all values within the range of the variable
of interest for each president, holding all other variables at their mean or default values.
The shaded regions are the 95 percent confidence intervals around the prediction. Bush and
Clinton’s confidence intervals overlap, showing that for the within-Senate conflict variable,
the two presidents were not significantly different from each other. However, Bush utilized
statistically larger numbers of Schedule C appointees than Obama, all other variables constant.
To put these results into more substantive terms, an agency in the Bush administration could
expect to receive 46 appointments with all variables set to their mean or reference levels. A
one standard deviation increase in conflict within the Senate would result in an agency going
from 46 to 62 (a difference of 16) Schedule C appointees. This is a substantively large result
considering that the mean number of Schedule C appointees in all of the included agencies in
all years was about 25 (with the 3rd quartile around 35 appointees).
In addition to support for the main hypothesis, I also found support for the secondary
hypothesis about Schedule C appointees and agency ideology. Presidents utilize Schedule C
appointees more frequently in ideologically proximate agencies, reflecting Schedule C’s nature
9This result is robust to specification as a zero-inflated negative binomial model, using an indicator for
divided government instead of the distance between party medians (with and without a measure for the
distance between the president and the filibuster pivot), and by using an alternative measure of agency
ideology. Results also hold when running the model on just Obama and Bush’s first terms and eliminating
each year in turn from the model.
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Table 2.1: Negative Bimonial Regression Model with Clustered Standard Errors.
Dependent variable: Number of Schedule C Appointees
Distance Agency to President −2.765∗
(0.682)
Distance Between Party Medians 4.064∗
(1.181)
Distance President to 60th Senator −1.390∗
(0.359)
Size (Thousands) 0.010∗
(0.002)
First Year of Presidency −0.337∗
(0.053)
Last Year of Presidency −0.026
(0.023)
Obama −2.048∗
(0.462)
Clinton −0.707∗
(0.212)
Constant 2.443∗
(0.425)
N 854
Agencies 59
Log pseudolikelihood -3292.8257
∗p<0.05
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Figure 2.3: Results of Schedule C Model.
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as advisers. Moving an agency one standard deviation closer to Bush ideologically would
result in an increase from 19 to 41 Schedule C appointees on average.
The distance between the president and the 60th senator is negative and significant,
indicating that greater distances between the president and the 60th senator are associated
with fewer Schedule C appointees in agencies. At first glance, this would seem to run counter
to the idea that presidents utilize Schedule C appointees as a way to augment advice and
consent. After all, we might expect conflict between the Senate and the president to result in
the president utilizing Schedule C authority more frequently. However, while the Senate does
not have a say on individual excepted appointments, Congress does control the Schedule
C authority as a whole. In the 1980s and 1990s, presidents had used Schedule C authority
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to create details to the White House within individual departments and agencies. The
Government Accountability Office released several reports urging OPM to establish guidelines
that would prohibit this practice. OPM refused to do so and Congress ultimately passed a
law prohibiting the use of Schedule Cs as White House details (Government Accountability
Office 1992). Presidents, while given considerable leeway in the use of Schedule C appointees,
must nonetheless be careful not to go too far. Much as presidents must take care not to
overstep their bounds with executive orders lest they be curbed by Congress or the courts,
presidents also must take care not to abuse their Schedule C authorities. Moreover, presidents
need not disagree with the 60th Senator in order to face the difficulties of Senate conflict.
When Congress is plagued by greater levels of polarization, the president can con-
tinue to staff (especially ideologically similar) agencies through other means by increasing
the number of Schedule C appointees. Considering the increasing levels of congressional
polarization and worsening conditions for achieving legislation that modern presidents face,
Schedule Cs may become increasingly important to the president’s agenda as time goes on.
Given unfavorable conditions for staffing in the Senate, increasing wait times for advice and
consent, and a shrinking pool of talent for traditional appointees because of these problems,
the ease with which Schedule Cs can be appointed certainly makes them a desirable tool.
This practice has important implications for public management. Schedule C appointees are,
on average, younger and less experienced than other appointees, yet the use of Schedule C
appointees to offset the polarization dilemma affords them increased influence over policy
outcomes.
2.7 Conclusion
When presidents reach office, they are met with the difficulty of managing an expansive
bureaucratic state. Increasing polarization can have significant negative ramifications on
government performance—not just in terms of the laws Congress passes, but also the ability
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of government agencies to carry out tasks. Because of the increasing length of time to
confirmation and rising failure rates for advice and consent appointees, agencies are frequently
left without important staff and presidents are left without trusted policy advisers and
advocates. These vacancies often result in diminished agency capacity.
Faced with difficulty pursuing their agendas with Congress, presidents have found
administrative strategies for solving major problems. Nathan (1983) points out that Nixon
planned a sweeping administrative strategy in response to his legislative struggles before
he resigned. Reagan too achieved success pursuing administrative strategies in addition to
legislative ones. Like Nixon, Obama came to office seeking a legislative agenda and ended up
with an administrative one (Appelbaum and Shear 2016). Administrative strategies require
agency personnel to carry them out—both people writing and implementing regulations and
those advising the president on policy matters or advocating for the president’s policies with
Congress, industry, and the public. Presidents work with the Senate to fill leadership positions
in hundreds of agencies, but there are thousands of political appointee positions to fill. With
the increasing focus on administrative strategies in addition to or even at the expense of
legislative ones, it is no surprise that the president would find means of staffing agencies
without relying on an increasingly polarized Senate. Though excepted appointees are an
imperfect solution, they nonetheless offer presidents a means to fill positions in understaffed
agencies with the advisers of their choosing and most importantly, keep agencies moving.
Importantly, these results indicate just how necessary it is for scholars of bureaucratic
management to consider a wider range of appointment types in their theories of staffing. Given
how many appointees are not subject to Senate approval and given that these appointees
are often involved in important decision-making within agencies, it is surprising they have
not been given more scholarly attention. These results have merely skimmed the surface of
how Schedule C appointees might be studied, however. Little is known, for example, how
appointees like these might be related to tangible bureaucratic outputs such as rulemaking
28
activity or how they are affected by transitions in agency leadership. These results also
have important implications for the administrative presidency. As presidents increasingly
seek control over the expansive bureaucratic state, pursuing further control over presidential
personnel, we may see excepted appointees take on added importance.
These results do have some limitations, however, which could be improved in future
research. First, the data for Obama and Clinton’s terms are truncated, with only the last three
years of the Clinton administration and the first five of Obama’s administration. Covering a
wider timeframe in the future would provide more variation in political structure and control.
In addition, 1998-2013 is a highly polarized time period. In less-polarized eras, the nature
and use of Schedule C appointees would likely be different. Future work should also go
further to account for how the underlying structure of agencies affects presidential personnel
decisions, especially with regard to excepted appointees. For example, some agencies are on
the president’s agenda and others are not. Understanding these agency dynamics will help
shed more light on the strategic use of excepted appointees. Finally, significant qualitative
work (e.g. Patterson and Pfiffner 2001) has focused on the importance of PPO for the
selection and placement of political appointees, and future work should incorporate these
insights into new empirical models (especially as PPO interacts with agency structure).
As Lewis and Waterman (2013) state, it is important to “lift the veil from the presi-
dent’s invisible appointments” (53). A deeper understanding of how excepted appointments
fit into the broader bureaucratic system and how they are affected by the outside winds of
political forces is an important step in developing a more comprehensive understanding of
federal bureaucracy. This study contributes to the lifting of the veil by better understanding
how these appointees can be used as part of the president’s administrative strategy.
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2.9 Appendix
The following tables and figures were included in the published version of this article as an
appendix.
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of Number of Schedule Cs in Agencies.
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Table 2.2: Results Using Divided Government instead of Distance Between Party Medians
Dependent variable: Count of Schedule Cs
(1) (2)
Distance Agency to President −2.712∗ −2.655∗
(0.666) (0.655)
Divided Government 0.361∗ 0.071∗
(0.090 (0.029)
Distance President 60th Senator −2.476∗
(0.619)
Size (Thousands) 0.010∗ 0.010∗
(0.004) (0.004)
First Year of Presidency −0.425∗ −0.361∗
(0.071) (0.056)
Last Year of Presidency −0.101 0.030
(0.022) (0.030)
Obama −1.918∗ −1.250∗
(0.416) (0.313)
Clinton −1.264∗ −0.928∗
(0.313) (0.257)
Constant 6.396∗ 4.447∗
(0.967) (0.561)
N 854 854
Agencies 59 59
Log pseudolikelihood -3293.6942 -3295.6629
∗p<0.05
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Table 2.3: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Model with Clustered Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Number of Schedule C Appointees
Distance Agency to President −2.554∗
(0.589)
Distance Between Party Medians 3.897∗
(1.007)
Distance President to 60th Senator −1.527∗
(0.329)
Size (Thousands) 0.007
(0.004)
First Year of Presidency −0.312∗
(0.055)
Last Year of Presidency −0.035
(0.026)
Obama −1.885∗
(0.393)
Clinton −0.692∗
(0.191)
Constant 2.811∗
(0.376)
Inflation Model (Logit)
Size -0.274∗
(0.104)
Constant -0.703
(0.519)
N 854
Agencies 59
Log pseudolikelihood -3246.847
∗p<0.05
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Table 2.4: Results Using Clinton Lewis Scores During the Bush Years
Dependent variable: Count of Schedule Cs
(1)
Agency Ideology −0.202
(0.188)
Distance Between Party Medians 2.243∗
(0.616)
Distance President 60th Senator −4.514∗
(0.616)
Size (Thousands) 0.017∗
(0.005)
Constant 4.140∗
(0.875)
N 609
Agencies 77
Log pseudolikelihood -2110.5142
∗p<0.05
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Chapter 3
Public Participation in Rulemaking
2004-2016
Rulemaking is one of the most important and prolific forms of policymaking in American
government. As Kerwin and Furlong (1992) put it, “few developments in the way Americans
govern themselves have proven more significant than the rise of rulemaking [because it]
has become the most common and instrumental form of lawmaking” (113-114). In this
unproductive era for Congress, regulations are becoming an increasingly relevant aspect of
policymaking, whether Obama’s use of executive powers to work around a hostile Congress
or Trump’s renewed interest in de-regulation. After all, public policy is more often created
through regulation than through legislation. In 2001, Congress passed 24 “major” statutes
while government agencies promulgated nearly three times the number of “significant” rules
at 70 (O’Connell 2008, 892). Put another way, while federal agencies have promulgated
between 2,500 and 4,500 regulations each year for the last two decades, Congress has not
passed more than 300 public laws since 2000 (Resume of Congressional Activity).
Despite the large volume of regulations produced each year, rules produced by agencies
typically receive much less fanfare than laws passed by Congress. In an article about interest
groups upsetting Dodd Frank regulations, journalist Haley Sweetland Edwards refers to the
rulemaking process as “shadowy, Byzantine” and “the seventh circle of bureaucratic hell”
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(Edwards 2013). She argues that many activists and especially citizens work hard to see
legislation passed in Congress but often fail to participate in the regulatory process. As
such, rulemaking often gets a reputation for being confusing at best and deceptive at worse.
However, some scholars think of rulemaking as refreshingly democratic (as quoted in Yackee
and Yackee 2006). After all, the Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to notify
the public of their rules, give adequate time to comment, and then respond in their final rule
to the substance of those comments. Moreover, it appears that agencies desire comments
(Regulations.gov 2017) and that policies change in response to comments (e.g. Yackee and
Yackee 2006). Despite the importance of regulation and the significance of public comment
within that process, we know little about the contextual factors related to participation in
rulemaking. In particular, we know little about how agency features like expertise as well
as rulemaking characteristics like significance impact the level of participation a rule will
receive.
To better understand the relationship between these contextual factors and public
participation in the rulemaking process, I utilize a new, original dataset comprised of
comment counts on nearly 21,000 final rules promulgated between 2004 and 2016. These
comment counts represent the 24 million comments provided to government agencies over
the period. I show that agencies with greater expertise requirements receive less public
participation on average while agencies with greater congressional salience receive greater
participation. I also show that rule significance and legal deadlines are associated with more
and less participation respectively. This study offers a first step forward at understanding
public commenting behavior and has important implications for studies of agency design,
bureaucratic management, and responsiveness.
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3.1 Public Participation in Rulemaking
The federal rulemaking process offers a unique opportunity for the public to provide input
on government action. Unlike Congress or the president, the Administrative Procedure Act
requires agencies to provide notice of and solicit public feedback about their policymaking
efforts. In addition, agencies must respond to citizens’ substantive concerns. For this reason,
and despite the fact that the civil servants who oversee it are unelected, the rulemaking process
has sometimes been called “refreshingly democratic” (as quoted in Yackee and Yackee 2006).
Of course, while required to solicit and respond to public feedback, agencies generally are not
required to substantially alter drafted regulations on the basis of it. As a result, criticisms
against the federal regulatory process take a variety of forms—some blaming bureaucrats,
others blaming interest groups. Much of the previous research on public participation in
rulemaking studies who participates and who is influential in the process, with a particular
focus on whether or not special interests exert a disproportionate amount of influence.
Scholars disagree about whether or not interest groups (especially corporate interests
as opposed to public interests) actually have undue influence over the content of regulations.
Some researchers argue that most influence over the regulatory process occurs outside the
traditional notice and comment framework. For example, interest groups may employ former
bureaucrats, increasing their access with current agency leadership through the revolving door.
Similarly, interest groups may meet with regulators privately before a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking is even published, allowing these special interests to monopolize agency resources
(Wagner, Barnes, and Peters 2011). Elizabeth Warren noted that Wall Street interest groups
made up 93 percent of meetings with federal regulators as they considered how to implement
the Volcker Rule in Dodd Frank (Warren 2016). Apart from the revolving door and informal
meetings, groups may skip agencies altogether and lobby the executive branch directly through
40
OMB. Haeder and Yackee (2015) show that groups can be influential over the content of
regulations coming out of regulatory review through their OMB lobbying efforts.
Because of potential influence at other points in the process, some studies suggest that
commenting behavior generally does little to influence agency rulemaking or that business
interests have no undue influence (e.g. Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington 1986; Nixon,
Howard, and DeWitt 2002; West 2004) despite the fact that business interests tend to be
better represented in comments than non-business interests (Golden 1998). Some anecdotal
evidence suggests that regulators focus on more technically astute comments and ignore
more simple value judgments even when they are numerous. For example, in a National
Park Service rule concerning jet skis, the overwhelming number of comments (7,300 out of
7,600) supported a full ban of jet skis and opposed the rule (Mendelson 2011). The National
Park Service chose to focus on other concerns rather than address the overwhelming desire
to ban jet skis. Others suggest that influence occurs when there is a strong consensus but
not at other times (Golden 1998). Some studies find that comments do matter regularly and
often favor business interests (e.g. McKay and Yackee 2007; Yackee 2006; Yackee and Yackee
2006). Yackee (2006) looks at 1,444 comments on 40 rules and finds that interest group
participation in rulemaking alters the content of final regulations. Building on this, Yackee
and Yackee (2006) look at 1,700 comments on 30 rules. They find that business participants
in rulemaking (but not non-business participants) can influence the content of regulations.
They also find that as the proportion of business commenters increase, business influence
also increases.
A handful of studies consider counts of comments rather than rule content. One of
the few studies of rulemaking volume that currently exists (Balla and Daniels 2007) studies
the volume of comments on 500 Department of Transportation rules but does so for the
purpose of assessing the effect of online rulemaking. They find that participation did not
change much before and after the Department of Transportation’s online rule system was
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implemented. Balla (2000) also considers comment volume but as a case study of a single
rule to determine whether “losers” from legislation comment at greater rates on regulation
implementing the legislation. They use a sample of 5,000 out of the 95,000 comments on that
particular regulation and break down participation rates from various industries.
Despite a large number of studies on regulatory activity (e.g. Green and O’Connell
2009; Lavertu and Yackee 2014; O’Connell 2008; Potter 2017; Yackee and Yackee 2009; 2010;
2012) and several excellent empirical studies of public commenting discussed above, no studies
to my knowledge have been able to provide a broad picture of public commenting on a wide
swath of regulations from many different agencies. While the studies that focus on a few
dozen rules have the benefit of going into great detail concerning the substance of public
comments, we have very little idea of how comments on rules are distributed across agencies
and how contextual factors influence participation in the process.
3.2 A Brief Overview of the Regulatory Process
Federal agencies administered legislation created by Congress even in the earliest years of the
United States. Congress routinely relied on executive branch agencies to provide information,
especially before the creation of standing committees (Gailmard and Patty 2012). The late
19th century into the turn of the 20th century began the “birth of modern regulation” (62).
Agencies began publishing documents during this period laying out their standard operating
procedures and responding to public concerns about abuses of power (Center for Effective
Government 2017). Through the early decades of the 20th century, agencies (and newly
created independent regulatory commissions) began to produce more and more regulations.
As Congress tasked agencies with producing more regulations, it became difficult for regulated
industries to keep up with current laws and practices. Arising out of conflict in the Schechter
case which struck down the NIRA in 1934, the Federal Register Act of 1935 established
the Federal Register as a single publication which would publish all of the regulations the
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federal government had produced (Carey 2013). In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act
established a process for “informal” notice and comment rulemaking (Carey 2013). Since
then, the regulatory process has undergone a number of important changes.
Many of the most politically important changes occurred during the Reagan admin-
istration. Reagan increased presidential control over the regulatory process by mandating
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review the regulatory actions of all
agencies except independent regulatory commissions. It also required that agencies conduct
impact analyses on “major” rules (those what have an expected impact on the economy
of $100 million or more). Reagan later required agencies to submit regulatory plans that
covered current or planned significant regulations. President Clinton dialed back some of
these measures by mandating that OIRA review only “significant” actions produced by the
agencies—those which had a $100 million impact, contradicted other agencies’ actions, or
raised novel policy issues. Clinton also required that OIRA complete reviews within 90 days
and identify the changes being made and any potential alternatives that might be produced.
In 2002, President Bush instituted his e-rulemaking initiative which led to the eventual
launch of regulations.gov in 2003 and in 2011, President Obama issued guidance to agencies
requiring them to give timely public access to rules via regulations.gov (Carey 2013).
In general, the textbook regulatory process proceeds as follows: first, agencies publish
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) signaling that they plan to create a regulation.
They publish this NPRM (or occasionally an advance NPRM or ANPRM) in the Federal
Register. The public then has a period of time afterward to comment on rules (typically
about 60 days). After this, the agency reads through comments. They choose whether to
change the rule and then respond to the substance of criticism in the preamble of the final
rule. Some rules may not go through notice and comment. For example, some minor rules
that recur frequently are promulgated via direct final rules. These rules automatically remain
in place but may be withdrawn if sufficient adverse comments are presented. Other rules
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are substantively important but the agency believes the situation is an emergency which
warrants an interim final rule. These rules may also be withdrawn or changed with adverse
public comment. Most rules also undergo regulatory review with OMB through OIRA before
an NPRM is released and again before a rule is finalized. Agencies designate a particular
importance level to their rules and reports this to OIRA. OIRA may choose to amend the
significance levels provided by the agency and then reviews rules that it believes to have a
large economic impact (over $100m) or large policy issue before an NPRM or final rule is
released.10
The advent of e-rulemaking in January 2003 has increased interest in public par-
ticipation in rulemaking. Specifically, scholars have considered how e-rulemaking might
affect who participates and the level of participation as well as bureaucratic workload and
policy outcomes. One argument is that e-rulemaking has made the regulatory process overly
democratic, causing agencies to ignore technical comments in favor of simple tallies of value
judgments from regular citizens in mass comment campaigns (Lubbers 2010). According
to a small survey of federal regulators, rulemaking bureaucrats believe that, compared to
the paper system, e-rulemaking is the same or easier for producing rules than their previous
paper-based systems. They also reported an increase in the participation they received and
generally felt that the system had provided more and better information to the public. On
the other hand, regulators also reported a decrease in the proportion of substantively helpful
comments and generally concluded that e-rulemaking helped the public much more than the
agency. As one regulator put it “E-rulemaking is better at letting the public know what
the agencies are doing than it is at providing thoughtful input into the decisions themselves”
(Lubbers 2010). On the other hand, some research suggests e-rulemaking does not have a
meaningful effect on participation (Balla and Daniels 2007; Coglianese 2006). For example,
10For more information on OIRA review, see Potter (2017) and Wiseman (2009).
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Coglianese (2006) argues that cognitive and motivational factors seem to impact citizen
participation more than technological ones.
3.3 Contextual Factors and Regulatory Participation
Comments on federal regulations are important to study for several reasons. First, commenting
on a regulation is the most obvious way to participate in the regulatory process, much as
voting is the most obvious way to participate in an election and is therefore a natural point of
interest. Second, though mixed, most studies detailed above find that comments affect policy
at least some of the time. Third, even if one takes the view that agencies are ultimately
self-interested, they stand to benefit from outside participation. Participation may reduce
litigation and increases compliance (Coglianese, Kilmartin and Mendelson 2008). It gives
agencies information not just about making better policy, but about the public’s mood about
the regulation. Despite this, we know very little about the contextual (and particularly,
institutional) determinants of public participation. In this article, I consider two agency
factors: expertise and congressional salience and two rule-level factors: rule significance and
legal deadline.
3.3.1 Expertise and Congressional Salience
Expertise is one of the most important characteristics of bureaucracies. Indeed, agency
expertise is the typical justification given for why policy implementers should remain separated
from the electoral process. However, traditionally, expertise is a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, expertise is needed to create and implement sound policy. On the other, expertise
creates informational asymmetries that insulate bureaucrats from their political overseers
and (indirectly) the public. Without the same information, members of Congress worry that
bureaucrats lead them astray with ideologically biased information, counter to the interests of
their constituents. Still, expertise, if it is exchanged for good policy, is worthy of congressional
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investment. Indeed, Bawn (1995) shows that expertise leads to policy drift and Gailmard and
Patty (2012) show that Congress is incentivized to invest in agency expertise in exchange for
greater policy deference despite this policy drift because it can lead to better policy outcomes.
Notwithstanding the benefits of expertise, Congress must still overcome the problem
of informational asymmetries if it wishes to maintain a happy constituency. Fire alarm
oversight is one way to accomplish this (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The public has
an opportunity to complain to Congress (usually through interest groups) about agencies
and Congress has the opportunity to be the white knight coming to the rescue of voters. In
general, if agencies both care about good policy and prefer not to undergo oversight (whether
due to the opportunity costs of hearings, budget threats, or other sanctions), we should
observe that agencies generally welcome feedback on their regulations. As a regulations.gov
report shows (Regulations.gov 2017), agencies do seem to value public feedback for several
reasons. Apart from actually valuing the information the public can provide for making
better policy and improving compliance, public feedback allows agencies to get a sense of the
public’s feelings about their regulations.
I argue that agency expertise, however, may actually be negatively related to the
public feedback the agency receives on its regulations. In this case, I refer to expert agencies
as agencies that are required to invest in expertise. That is, some agencies’ authorizing
statutes legally require bureaucrats to have qualifications for their jobs, a point which I will
discuss at greater length in the data section. There are two main avenues by which agencies
with unusual levels of expertise could end up with fewer comments on their regulations—one
from the perspective of the agency (a top-down perspective) and one from the perspective of
potential commenters (a bottom-up perspective).
From the agency-side, agencies with expertise requirements have less reason to seek
public comments on their own relative to less-expert agencies. For one, expert agencies
do not require as much information as less expert agencies so they do not need to rely on
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public commenting as often for informational purposes. That is, they come to the game with
information and require less effort to obtain it. In addition, because of the insulating aspect
of expertise, Congress is less likely to incentivize agencies to solicit feedback. In other words,
Congress may provide greater deference to expert agencies.
Finally, when agencies are filled with bureaucrats with professional accomplishments,
they likely also have professional attachments to their disciplines outside of the agency. This
allows them to solicit feedback outside of the typical notice-and-comment system.11 It is
worth noting, that many agencies have restrictions on “ex parte” meetings, or meetings
between members of industry or the public, that take place outside of the typical process.
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) released recommendations
suggesting agencies publicize policies about ex parte lobbying, particularly in reference to
lobbying that takes place following the issuance of the NPRM (Sferra-Bonistalli 2014). Two
agencies with expertise requirements, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), have restrictions on ex parte communications taking place after
the NPRM. However, the report mentions a few useful tidbits of information about how
agencies like these might seek feedback. For example, the report notes “in airspace related
rulemakings, FAA will host ad hoc committee meetings and face-to-face meetings with public
stakeholders in the early stages of proposal development, and then address all issues raised
during these meetings in the NPRM.” Similarly, the ACUS report notes that the Coast Guard
sometimes seeks out ex parte meetings with industry and other contacts to “get clarification
of submitted comments or if it needs additional information” (Sferra-Bonistalli 2014).
From the commenter’s side, there are also several possible reasons for a negative
relationship between comments and expertise requirements. First, agencies with expertise
requirements work in more complex subject areas. The higher barrier to understanding the
11It is worth noting that these contacts need not necessarily be secret or nefarious. Indeed, it may be that
bureaucrats with professional contacts are better able to get into contact with stakeholders and encourage
them to attend public meetings.
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regulation limits those capable of participating meaningfully in regulation, shrinking the
pool of possible respondents. Second, interest groups are often responsible for providing
information to their members about both executive and legislative policymaking. Given the
complex topics, there may be both fewer interest groups able to pass on this information to
constituents and the ones that do exist may comment on behalf of constituents rather than
encourage members to submit comments for themselves.
This mixture of disincentive for people to comment based on a lack of expertise or
experience on their own, disincentive for expert agencies to seek public comment on their
own, and disincentive for Congress to encourage agencies to seek the comments will amount
to a reduction in the number of comments in these agencies relative to less expert agencies.
This argument also has implications for the level of congressional salience of an agency.
Insofar as agencies with greater expertise are better at escaping congressional ire, we might
expect agencies that receive greater congressional attention are incentivized to seek out public
feedback. Moreover, congressional salience may well mean the agency is more salient to
interest groups and the public as well. Thus, we would expect greater participation in salient
agencies.
3.3.2 Rule Significance
Rule significance is arguably the most important correlate with participation. As mentioned
above, rules going through the traditional notice and comment process receive a significance
designation indicating whether the rule has a significant economic impact (greater than $100
million) or significant legal consequences. We would expect rule significance to be highly
correlated with participation in rules for one or both of two reasons. First, insofar as rule
significance designations actually denote importance, we expect more important rules to receive
greater public attention. Second, however, significance designations may themselves induce
participation whether because the individual participant sees the significance designation
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when he or she goes to comment or because interest groups and media sources mainly only
track regulations reported as significant. Regardless, we would expect more significant rules
to receive greater levels of participation.
3.3.3 Legal Deadlines
Delay is one of the most commonly cited complaints about bureaucratic processes. For
example, in a hearing by the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management,
ranking member and Democratic Senator Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota argued that
regulatory delay had greatly affected her constituents in North Dakota. Citing the EPA’s
failure to set renewable volume obligations in accordance with the renewable fuel laws,
Heitkamp claimed that biodiesel plants in her district had to shut down production (U.S.
Congress 2015). Though delay is a common complaint, it need not be negative. Ensuring
that new rules are consistent with previous regulations and incorporate as much information
as possible takes time. Regulations may benefit from some delay if the public is able to
provide meaningful input on the process. Sometimes Congress or the courts will impose
legal deadlines on rulemaking activity that agencies must follow. Several studies (Gersen
and O’Connell 2008; Potter 2017; Yackee and Yackee 2010) show that legal deadlines are
associated with rules moving through the system more quickly. Legal deadlines are also
often seen as a solution to the problem of regulatory delay (e.g. Kerwin and Furlong 1992),
but these deadlines can also negatively impact the regulatory process (Lavertu and Yackee
2014). Because it shortens the process, legal deadlines may also shorten the available time for
public comment. Alternatively, legal deadlines may also reflect greater congressional or court
involvement in the process, eliminating the “need” for public comment on these regulations.
Either way, we would expect legal deadlines to be negatively associated with comments.
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3.4 Public Comments 2004-2016
I obtained rule comments and identifying information from regulations.gov for all dockets
(comprised of rules and their accompanying information and comments) from 2004-2016.
This covers nearly 21,000 unique rule dockets throughout the time period, representing the
rulemaking activity of 96 different agencies.12 Adding the comment counts on all regulations
posted to the site throughout the period, agencies received over 24 million comments on
regulations. The number of comments varies widely. Between 2004 and 2016, comments on
rules ranged from 0 comments to over four million with a mean of about 1,100 comments, but
over half of the rules received no comments. Table 3.1 shows the average number of comments
per rule and the total number of rules produced by each agency that promulgated at least
20 rules. As is visible, agencies differ in terms of the average number of comments received.
For example, while they produced a similar number of rules in the period, the IRS and
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) differed widely, with the IRS receiving over 100 comments
per rule on average and the FWS receiving nearly 12,000 comments per rule on average.
Over 250 regulations received more than 1,000 comments and six regulations received more
than a million comments. Thus, these data provide broad information on a wide variety of
regulations from many different agencies across two different presidencies.
Direct rules, interim rules, and traditional notice and comment rules are included
in the data. In addition, these data include comment information for rules that are not
published in the Unified Agenda, representing a more complete picture of regulatory activity
than many previous studies have provided.13
12Most regulatory commissions are not required to post rule information on regulations.gov. For a com-
plete list of agencies covered in regulations.gov see https://www.regulations.gov/docs/Participating_
Agencies.pdf. Though regulations.gov does have some rules prior to 2004, better coverage of agencies and
regulations begins that year.
13It appears to be the case that rules which do not appear in the Unified Agenda or receive RINs are rules
that are produced and finalized quickly enough to fall out of the semiannual reporting periods of the Unified
Agenda or are otherwise exempt.
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Table 3.1: Average Comments and Total Rules in the Regulations.gov Comments Data
Agency Average Comments/Rule Total Rules
Fish and Wildlife Service 11,942 403
Employee Benefits Security Administration 10,021 41
Food and Drug Administration 5,468 118
Food and Nutrition Service 5,044 87
National Park Service 4,408 42
Environmental Protection Agency 3,550 4,577
Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services 2,432 253
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement 1,458 83
Transportation Security Administration 717 21
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 597 60
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 454 40
Employment and Training Administration 335 28
Federal Highway Administration 318 46
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 246 1,831
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 167 331
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 158 68
Bureau of Indian Affairs 119 26
Food Safety and Inspection Service 117 44
Internal Revenue Service 115 485
Natural Resources Conservation Service 97 25
Small Business Administration 79 84
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 75 341
Comptroller of the Currency 73 80
Federal Transit Administration 70 25
Social Security Administration 70 123
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 62 160
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 59 41
Department of Energy 47 52
Consumer Product Safety Commission 44 87
Federal Prisons Bureau 38 23
Customs and Border Protection Bureau 38 149
Mine Safety and Health Administration 34 26
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 23 23
Federal Acquisition Regulation 21 207
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 20 78
Drug Enforcement Administration 17 68
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 16 196
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 11 22
Federal Railroad Administration 10 64
Federal Emergency Management Agency 10 76
Federal Aviation Administration 9 6,609
Department of State 4 68
Coast Guard 4 2,858
Farm Service Agency 4 20
General Services Administration 4 71
Office of Personnel Management 3 90
Patent and Trademark Office 2 63
Bureau of Industry and Security 2 180
Corps of Engineers 2 43
Navy Department 2 37
Army Department 1 23
Office of Thrift Supervision 1 31
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 0 35
Agricultural Marketing Service 0 90
Federal Trade Commission 0 27
To participate in notice and comment rulemaking via regulations.gov, a potential
commenter may simply click a direct link to a rule provided by an interest group directly or
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search for the rule by name, keyword, RIN, docketID, and more. The potential commenter
may then enter text for a comment in the box provided and/or upload an attachment. Prior
to this system, commenters had to mail, fax, or email any potential comments to the agency.
After its implementation, regulations.gov has seen participation in rulemaking increase over
time. For example, participation via the online system more than doubled between the last
eight months of 2007 and the first eight months of 2008 (Mendelson 2011).
The nature of comments on regulations differ significantly, and the regulations I read
typically received both supportive and opposing comments. For example, the Fish and
Wildlife Service produced a regulation in 2013 which restricted the interstate commerce and
export of ivory except for some antiques and also limited the number of hunting trophies
allowed per trophy hunter. The regulation received over one million comments. Some
organizations commented on the rule directly. For example, the Global March for Elephants
and Rhinos produced a statement commending the progress the agency made but urging
it to protect elephants further while the Safari Club (a pro-trophy hunting group) raised
concerns over how the new rule would affect hunters. Similarly, a large number of citizens
commented on the proposed rule on both sides of the issue. These comments ranged from
simple statements like “Stop ivory trade!” to longer, more drawn out explanations. Musicians
and craftsmen, among others, raised concerns over how the regulation would affect their
businesses while many citizens commended FWS for its work to protect elephants. Still
others criticized the agency for not protecting elephants enough. In general, the Fish and
Wildlife Service’s regulations on endangered species are the subject of considerable public
interest, much like the National Park Service’s rules regarding conservation and hunting.
Common interest rules like endangered species and hunting regulations are not the
only rules that garner wide public attention, however. For example, the rule with the largest
number of comments (receiving over four million) was produced by the EPA in 2014 to create
greenhouse gas emissions standards for existing power plants based on direction from one of
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Obama’s memoranda. In 2015, the Wage and Hour division produced a regulation raising
the overtime pay minimum salary from $23,000 to $50,000 which received nearly 300,000
comments both from workers supporting the regulation and business owners opposing it. The
FAA’s 2015 rule requiring registration and marking of aircraft, including model airplanes,
received nearly 5,600 comments, many of them disgruntled members of the Academy of Model
Aeronautics upset that the FAA was “asserting its authority” over model airplanes.
Often, regulations like these are the subject of public interest group campaigns
encouraging members to comment. Sometimes mass commenting campaigns are not even
orchestrated directly by interest groups, which can bring in a large, public audience. A U.S.
Copyright Office study on fair use and the DMCA takedown provisions received considerable
attention from Youtube stars. Some like Youtuber Doug Walker used their considerable
audience to encourage viewers to comment on the study.14 Following this and similar appeals
by other internet celebrities, the study ultimately received over 90,000 comments. Similarly,
internet comic Matthew Inman, of “The Oatmeal” encouraged his internet audience to
comment on an environmental impact statement produced by the Department of Interior in
support of a plan to bring Grizzlies back to the Northern Cascades. The comments poured in
at over 1,000 comments per hour, resulting in more than 100,000 comments as a result of his
campaign (Brulliard 2017).15 Far from an empty forum, there is considerable participation in
the regulatory process from interest groups, citizen members, and business owners across a
wide array of regulations covering nearly every subject on which agencies might regulate.
3.4.1 Variables and Model
To consider the impact of agency decisions regarding rule coding and comment opportunities,
I ran a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. The model includes (but does
14Walker’s video encouraging support is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoIL5qUI1p8
15Information about Inman’s campaign here: http://theoatmeal.com/blog/grizzlies_north_
cascades.
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not report) year fixed effects and controls in the zero inflated portion of the model. Due
to differences in data coverage between sources, the analysis covers 85 unique agencies.
An observation is a final rule and the dependent variable is the number of comments on
regulations promulgated by agencies.
Expertise comes from Selin (2015) and is an indicator for whether or not both leaders
and lower level agency employees have expertise requirements. Some agencies require a
particular position to be filled by someone with a particular type of degree or experience.
For example, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board requires that board members be
“respected experts in the field of nuclear safety” (Selin 2015, 973).
The Significance variables are the agency-reported level of significance assigned to a
rule. For those agencies and rules that undergo OMB review, agencies report a significance
level in the Unified Agenda. Rules and agencies that are not published in the Unified Agenda
do not receive any designation. In the model, there are indicators for each significance type (
“Economically Significant”, “Other Significant”, “Substantive, Non-Significant”, “Adminis-
trative”, “No Significance Designation”, and “Administrative”). A breakdown of rules by
significance is shown in Figure 3.1. About half of the rules did not receive any significance
designation. About one percent of the rules were economically significant and about four
percent were other significant. About 11 percent were substantive but not significant and
about 30 percent were routine and frequent. Lastly, under 1 percent of the rules were coded
administrative or informational.
Economically significant rules are those rules that are estimated to have a yearly
impact on the economy of $100 million or more. For example, the rule with the largest number
of comments was a rule promulgated by the EPA that covered greenhouse gas emissions from
state power plants. Other (substantive) significant rules are those rules that may impact
the activities of other agencies or raise novel legal considerations. For example, in 2014,
the Administration for Children and Families produced a substantive significant regulation
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Figure 3.1: Rule Significance Categories.
producing standards that would reduce sexual abuse and harassment of unaccompanied
children of illegal immigrants in custody facilities. Substantive non-significant rules do have
a substantive impact but are less likely to raise the same sorts of legal issues and tend not to
impact the activities of other agencies. For example, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau finalized a rule in 2008 that created new certification requirements for imported wine.
Routine and frequent rules are those rules that the agency promulgates on a frequent basis or
that cover routine regulatory matters. For example, the FAA produces a set of airworthiness
directives for various companies and aircraft models as they come to market. Administrative
or informational rules are rarely-produced, minor regulations, which are usually used for
housekeeping purposes such as updating job titles or incorporating new legal authorities into
rule descriptions.
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Legal Deadline is simply an indicator for whether or not Congress or the courts
imposed a deadline. Business Effect is an indicator for whether or not the agency reported
that the rule had an effect on businesses. There is also an indicator for each of the following:
NPRM, Interim Rule and Rule Identification Number (RIN).
Employees, meant to capture agency size, is the number of all employees (appointees,
careerists, etc) in the designated agency. Congressional Salience, meant to consider congres-
sional attention on the agency, looks at the number of hearings in which the agency was the
subject and/or a witness employed by the agency delivered testimony in the given calendar
year. These data come from the Congressional Proquest database.
3.5 Results
The results of the negative binomial portion of the zero-inflated negative binomial model
are visible in Table 3.2. The results of the complete model as well as a standard negative
binomial model are available in the appendix.16 As expected, agency expertise has a strongly
negative relationship with public participation in rulemaking while congressional salience had
a positive relationship. In terms of rule characteristics, more significant rules received greater
numbers of comments while rules with legal deadlines received fewer comments overall.
In terms of robustness, I ran the model using Selin’s policy independence measure
instead of expertise and received a similar negative result for the expertise variable.17 To
ensure that using rule-level data to assess agency characteristics is not the reason for the
significant results on the expertise variable and congressional salience variable, I ran two
aggregated models. First, I ran a standard negative binomial model using one observation
per agency with the average number of comments per rule as the dependent variable and
16I ran the model with expertise in the zero-inflated portion of the model and the results were substantively
similar.
17I use Selin’s policy independence rather than personnel independence because few agencies in my dataset
possess the characteristics used to create the measure. That is, most of the personnel characteristics apply
to independent regulatory commissions. Also, the policy independence measure seems more relevant to the
theoretical story I tell for expertise.
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Table 3.2: Comment Model Results
Variable Negative Binomial Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial
Expert Agency −3.87∗ −3.80∗
(0.42) (0.29)
Has Deadline −0.97∗ −1.05∗
(0.36) (0.37)
Total Hearings 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.004) (0.01)
Has RIN 0.08 0.76
(0.96) (0.66)
Has Interim −1.58∗ −1.92∗
(0.51) (0.42)
Has NPRM 0.05 −0.36
(0.76) (0.38)
Business Effect −0.73 −1.09
(0.45) (0.42)
Size (Thousands) 0.03∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.004)
Economically Significant 6.10∗ 6.30∗
(0.82) (0.61)
Other Significant 4.73∗ 4.83∗
(0.72) (0.50)
Substantive Non-Significant 3.42∗ 3.47∗
(0.77) (0.69)
No Significance Designation 0.40 1.27
(0.93) (0.74)
Informational/Administrative −1.20 −0.80
(0.85) (0.85)
Constant 3.72∗ 3.39∗
(1.50) (1.23)
Zero-Inflated (Logit)
Has RIN 1.00
(0.41)
Has Interim −38.05∗
(1.14)
Has NPRM −26.70∗
(0.61)
Business Effect −27.44∗
(0.96)
Size (Thousands) 0.001
(0.01)
Constant −0.28∗
(0.55)
Ln(Alpha) 2.61 2.14
(0.27) (0.32)
(N) 20,441 20,441
Log Pseudoliklihood -45,524 -44,711
Note: *p< .05
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average employment as a control. I included only agencies that produced at least one rule
per year on average. The expertise variable is still negative and significant. The average
hearings variable is positive but only significant at p=.11. This may be because there are
only 50 observations. Second, I ran a standard negative binomial model using agency-year
averages as the dependent variable. The model included year fixed effects. Both the expertise
and congressional salience variables were significant and retained the negative and positive
relationships respectively.
Because GLMs are not natural to interpret, it is useful to consider the substantive effect
of these variables. Holding all other variables at their means, the effect of a legal deadline is
a reduction of 38 comments. A one standard deviation increase in hearings yields an increase
of about 60 comments while the effect of expertise is a reduction of about 360 comments.
Given that the median number of comments is zero, these effects are reasonably large. The
98th percentile of comments is 350 with zero observations included. When excluding zero
observations, 350 comments is at the 95th percentile. Because the model is a GLM, the effect
differs based on the value of the covariates, so for some rules, the effects are even larger.
Consider, for example, a substantively significant rule going through the standard notice and
comment process with no business effect. The expected number of comments for an agency
without expertise requirements is 23,560 comments. For a similar rule at an expert agency,
the expected number of comments is just 525 comments—a difference of more than 23,000
comments. For an economically significant rule with a business effect, the expected difference
between expert and non-expert agencies is more than 33,000 comments. Of course, for rules
with lower significance levels, the effect of expertise is much smaller.
These results have several important implications. The first is for agency design.
Designing an agency to utilize greater expertise may hinder participation in the agency. To
the extent that we wish to encourage public comment as a form of participation, this is
problematic, especially when combined with results from the literature that tell us the process
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is biased in favor of business interests and survey evidence that public commenters perceive
this bias. Of course, whether or not expert agencies actually receive comments may not
be worrisome. We might think that agencies with lots of expertise need fewer comments
because they have better information about what makes good policy, and maybe we want
expert agencies to be insulated from the masses, but it is important to note that to the
extent expertise insulates agencies from Congress, it may simultaneously insulate from the
public. It is also important to note that agencies which receive greater attention through
hearings also receive more participation. Whether because the agency is more salient to both
the public and Congress or because Congress can actually raise the salience of an agency
through hearings, the public seems to participate more with some agencies than others. Thus,
raising the profile of agencies that tend to drag in participation may be an effective means of
increasing public feedback. At the same time, congressional attention on an agency may also
encourage agencies to seek out feedback more often or differently than agencies that do not
receive the same attention from Congress.
Similar to agency characteristics, rule design may also be associated with participation.
While delay is an important problem in agency policymaking, a longer regulatory process
might also allow more time to gather information and draft the best possible policy. When
used to slow down meaningful policies, delay is problematic, but to the extent that policies
can be made better by a lengthened notice and comment process, it may be worth trading
some delay for better feedback. Beyond a shortened process, it is also possible that legal
deadlines discourage participation from the public because they believe that Congress or the
courts have already acted on the rule and their feedback is unnecessary. More work is needed
to clarify the impacts—both positive and negative—of legal deadlines on the regulatory
process.
Participation in rulemaking also has important implications for democratic account-
ability and bureaucratic responsiveness. Considerable complaint, especially in the current
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administration, has been lodged at unelected bureaucrats and yet, the rulemaking process
offers an opportunity for the public to work directly with these bureaucrats to make better
policies. In order to give bureaucrats a chance to be responsive, it is important for people to
participate in the regulatory process. Still, as always with the bureaucracy, we must balance
the considerations of democratic accountability with the benefits of insulation and expertise
for which bureaucrats are valued.
There are important implications too for the study of public participation more
generally. We know from the literature so far that businesses are likely to be influential
in the regulatory process, but we know little about the contextual factors that motivate
participation broadly, particularly among the members of the public. Though some research
has made headway in understanding the benefits of citizen participation in rulemaking, we
know little about the institutional and design features of rules and agencies that might
encourage or dissuade participation. To the extent that participation in rulemaking leads
both to better policies and citizens that feel more efficacious and positive about government,
we must consider how to mitigate all of the potential barriers to participation.
3.6 Conclusion
Unlike other forms of policymaking, notice and comment rulemaking requires agencies to
announce the policies they plan to make, give adequate time for comment, and respond
to the substance of comments in their regulations. In this way, rulemaking might well be
considered surprisingly democratic. Indeed, agencies have worked to innovate in the area
of public participation, experimenting with new technologies (Administrative Conference of
the United States 2013) to invigorate the process and overcome technological, informational,
and motivational barriers as well as distrust in government. However, despite research on
both public participation in other areas of government and a growing literature examining
rulemaking, we know relatively little about the broad, institutional factors associated with
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participation in the public comment period. Given that agencies seem to welcome feedback
and given that evidence suggests that comments matter at least some of the time, participation
in public comment is a meaningful area of study. Of course, it is nonetheless important
to consider the proper place of public participation—maximizing the helpful information
agencies receive both about policymaking and about implementation and compliance with
the separation from the electoral process that allows bureaucrats to act on their information
and expertise as opposed to just ideology.
Though this article does make a contribution to the understanding of institutional
factors associated with participation, more work is needed to fully lay bare the contextual
factors affecting commenting behavior. Importantly, this study only develops a circumstantial
account of public commenting, and more work is needed to tease out the causal relationship
between these agency and rule characteristics and the participation a rule receives. Secondly,
without more comprehensive individual-level data, it is difficult to determine if the correlation
between expertise requirements and congressional salience and public participation is mainly
a result of the individual-level decision to participate or agency-level decisions. For example,
it is difficult to know whether potential commenters pass up the opportunity to comment
on certain agencies simply because they are not aware of the agency’s work or because they
perceive regulations from expert agencies as overly complicated.
This study offers a first step at understanding how contextual factors affect participa-
tion in the modern notice and comment system. More work is needed to understand how
agency design and internal agency policies (such as restrictions or allowances of ex parte
communications) might impact both the decision to participate in rulemaking for citizens
and how to solicit more and better feedback on the part of agencies.
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Chapter 4
Personnel, Politics, and Policymaking
The complexity and sheer size of the US federal government over the past century has led to the
emergence of the “administrative presidency” (Nathan 1983) in which the president’s principal
sources of influence over policy and politics have transitioned from coarse constitutional tools
such as the veto and treaties to the various (imperfect) tools for managing the government’s
finances, regulations, and staff. Indeed, given the size of the modern executive branch, it is
arguable that the president’s most potent power is indirectly exercised through appointment of
men and women to pursue the president’s agenda in the various federal agencies (e.g. Edwards
III 2001; Aberbach and Rockman 2009). Specifically, essentially all policy implementation—
whether it be through spending, enforcement, or rulemaking—is accomplished through the
efforts of various federal employees. Some of these individuals are political appointees but, in
most cases, the vast majority of them are career civil servants.
Accordingly, any president can staff only a small portion of any agency and, for various
reasons, the impact of these staffers will depend on the characteristics of the agency to
which they are assigned. Put simply, even the highest level political appointees—cabinet
secretaries and independent commissioners—are constrained by the structure and personnel
of the agency within which they are working. In addition, of course, the president is often
constrained as well: some of the most important positions are subject to Senate confirmation,
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some positions are subject to statutory restrictions (such as partisan balance requirements
and/or fixed term lengths), and outside actors, including political parties, interest groups,
and electorally salient constituencies exert pressure on the president with respect to both the
ideological and demographic composition of the president’s administration (e.g., Mackenzie
1981; Lewis 2011). Finally, in addition to these constraints, and in spite of the fact that the
president can staff only a small portion of the positions within the executive branch, there
is reason to suspect that presidents are also constrained by the pool of known, willing, and
acceptable individuals to appoint to these positions (Aberbach and Rockman 2009; Dewan
and Myatt 2010).
These constraints imply that the president’s staffing challenge is a two-dimensional
problem. In addition to choosing which individuals to appoint, the president must also
choose to which agency they should be appointed. When the pool of known, willing, and
acceptable individuals is outstripped by the number of positions that need to be staffed, the
president must consider in what positions (and, by implication, in what agencies) each of the
acceptable staffers will have the most beneficial impact. In this article, we present a theory of
appointments in this situation. Specifically, we construct a model of a president choosing how
to assign a staffer to an agency based on the exogenous characteristics of the agency (such as
its statutory mandate, productivity, and the ideological tendencies of its career staff) and
those of the staffer (his or her ideological predispositions and ability to successfully influence
the agency’s ultimate decision-making (what we refer to as the staffer’s “quality”). Once
assigned to an agency, the staffer will, with some probability, influence the policy produced
by the agency. Prior to presenting and analyzing the model, we first discuss what is known
about how presidents choose who to appoint, and to what positions to appoint them.
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4.1 How Presidents Choose Appointees
As discussed above, the president’s appointment power is central to achieving his policy
goals. For that reason, as well as a desire to avoid embarrassments and to be or appear
responsive to constituents’ interests, president pay careful attention to their appointment
power and staffing decisions. As Terry Moe described, “The president’s personnel decisions
are strategically important to the realization of his interests as a political leader, and the
White House jealously guards its powers and flexibility in putting them to best use” (Moe
1987, 498).
Considerable scholarly research has examined the tradeoff between appointing “experts”
or political loyalists to the bureaucracy.18 In the classic dichotomy, neutrally competent
experts help agencies create better-informed policies but presidents cannot trust these expert
bureaucrats to act in their political interests. Similarly, presidents trust political loyalists
to pursue their political interests but these loyalists may have little expertise, resulting in
inefficient or even disastrous policy creation and implementation. Classically, scholars have
bemoaned the deterioration of the “neutral competence” ethos, which presidents have, at
least since Richard Nixon, traded in favor of politicizing the bureaucracy.19
While most work on the president’s political appointees has focused on the characteris-
tics of the appointees and their relationship with the president, a subset of the literature has
considered the effect of agency characteristics. For example, Bertelli and Feldmann (2007)
provide a nuanced view of agency and appointee political characteristics. They argue that
presidents wish to offset outside influence on bureaucratic agencies, showing that presidents
18For example, see Heclo (1977), Moe (1985), Edwards III (2001), Moynihan and Roberts (2010), Lewis
(2008, 2009), Parsneau (2013), Hollibaugh (2015a,b) and Krause and O’Connell (2015).
19For example, see Heclo (1975), Hart (1995), Burke (2000), and Lewis (2005,2008). It is also worth
noting that the classic quest for neutral competence may ultimately be in vain. For example, Gailmard and
Patty (2007, 2012) show that bureaucrats are incentivized to gain expertise in exchange for policy discretion.
Without policy discretion, bureaucrats would prefer to take their talents elsewhere. As a result, if political
principals want bureaucrats with expertise, they must offer policy discretion. Thus, when principals offer
discretion to incentivize expertise, they create a setting that retains policy-motivated bureaucrats.
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may appoint bureaucrats who share their viewpoints when appointees have great influence
over an agency. When influence is more limited, presidents will seek to offset agency ideology.
For example, a conservative president may select an even more conservative appointee to
combat an exceptionally liberal agency.
Lewis (2008) presents theoretical and empirical evidence that presidents funnel more
political appointees into ideologically distant agencies. He also finds that presidents utilized
politicized Schedule C appointees in both ideologically distant and ideologically similar
agencies, though the effect was somewhat higher for ideologically similar agencies. Lewis
explains this effect, arguing that Schedule C appointees can serve as patronage appointees
and presidents are more likely to place patronage appointees in ideologically similar agencies.
Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis (2014) extend the patronage argument, showing that President
Obama placed patronage appointees into agencies off his agenda, in agencies where appointees
would least be able to affect agency performance, and in ideologically similar agencies. In the
first six months of the Obama administration, for example, agency conservatism was positively
related to appointees with previous agency or government experience and appointees with
doctoral degrees and negatively related to “patronage” variables, such as campaign experience
and appointees whose last job was in politics. Moore (2018) finds that Schedule C appointees
are utilized more often when Senate polarization is high and in more ideologically similar
agencies. She argues Schedule C appointees are better placed in ideologically similar agencies
because of their function as avisers without signing authority.
The literature has surprisingly little to say about how bureaucratic structure affects
the president’s incentives when making appointment decisions or, more generally, when setting
policy priorities. Somewhat related to our own theory is the work of Huber and McCarty
(2004), which demonstrates how agency “capacity” can affects the president’s incentive to
staff an agency. Their theory includes some factors that ours does not and ours includes
some that are absent from theirs. However, the theories are speaking to the same types of
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incentives. As they say, “as bureaucratic capacity declines, bureaucrats recognize that their
ability to take actions that comply with legislation also declines, diminishing their incentive
to try to do so,”20 implying that the president would have a smaller incentive to staff a
low capacity agency, just as we find in a setting in which capacity is represented in a very
different, but not incompatible, fashion.
Also related is the work of McCarty (2004), where he demonstrates how the separation
of legislative and executive powers affect the president’s incentives when staffing bureaucratic
agencies: the separation of budgetary control and appointment powers between Congress and
the president induce a collective preference for either the president or Congress to possess the
power to make credible commitments with respect to the match between agency ideology and
agency resources (a point foreshadowing the more general conclusions of Crombez, Groseclose,
and Krehbiel (2006)). Though not the main point of McCarty’s analysis, these findings
indicate that presidents have an incentive to prioritize recruitment for, and staffing of, agencies
that have some degree of budgetary or policy independence.21
One important difference between our theory and that developed by McCarty is that
our theory ignores the confirmation process and, indeed, omits Congress entirely. This is
partly motivated by a desire for parsimony, but it is also justified on empirical grounds: most
political appointee serve in positions that are exempt from advice and consent.22 Furthermore,
these appointees serve important roles in government agencies. According to Lewis and
Waterman (2013), “arguably the most important trends in the administrative presidency
include increases in lower-level appointees and more careful selection of appointees at these
lower levels’ (Lewis and Waterman 2013, 37). Nathan (1983) affirmed the presidential strategy
20Huber and McCarty (2004), p. 491.
21This point is particularly poignant in light of the recent battles over staffing—and budgetary authority—of
“independent” agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board, Federal Communications Commission,
and Securities and Exchange Commission.
22In addition, advice and consent positions can on occasion be filled through recess appointments (Black,
Madonna, Owens, and Lynch 2007, O’Connell 2009).
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of utilizing political appointees, particularly at the lower-level, to drive policy change in
agencies. He argues that Reagan was successful at pushing for his policies because he had a
strong cadre of political loyalists among the middle and lower appointment ranks. President
Ford echoed these considerations, arguing that a president needs to be able to “reach into
the bowels of a department” because otherwise “his decisions way up at the top will seldom
be implemented out in the grassroots” (Lewis 2008, 57). These lower-level appointees are
important to presidents for several reasons.
First, excepted political appointees (including non-career SES, PA, and Schedule C
appointees) do not undergo advice and consent or competitive hiring processes. This allows
president and their cabinets choices over the officials who serve under them without gaining
approval from the Senate and without the public intrigue associated with the advice and
consent process. In particular, this allows presidents to utilize officials who are unwilling
or unable to go through the advice and consent process. For lower-level excepted positions,
presidents also have an opportunity to cultivate less experienced advisors for their own and
future administrations (Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg 1995). In line with Nathan
(1983), Bonafede (1987) notes that Reagan used just this strategy for Schedule C appointees
in his administration, appointing young partisans who would gain experience and eventually
be promoted into higher level positions.
Excepted appointments also serve as valuable liaisons between career officials and
advice and consent officials. Excepted appointees frequently serve as chiefs of staff or as
deputy undersecretaries tasked with advising secretaries and undersecretaries. They often
report on specific policy areas (such as the Deputy Undersecretary for Food Safety in the
Department of Agriculture) and serve as gatekeepers between career staff and the highest
level officials. Many excepted officials, particularly at the higher levels, ensure the president’s
vision for agency policy is adequately represented in rulemaking activity before passing the
rules on to top level officials.
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Related Theoretical Literature on Quality and Ideology. Our model is related to
an emerging body of work that considers the role of quality (or, in models of electoral politics,
“valence”) for spatial policy making.23 Closely related in terms of the operationalization of
policy preferences, Callander and Martin (2017) present a theory of policymaking that shares
our focus on policies being characterized by both ideology and quality. Their interest is
in dynamic policymaking in a Romer-Rosenthal style bargaining environment rather than
agenda setting from an exogenous set of feasible proposals and, accordingly, they address
different issues than we do in this article. That said, the two theories are complementary
and, ultimately, it would be fruitful to explore the implications of combining them. Similarly,
Turner (2017) presents a theory of bureaucratic policymaking in which the ultimate impact of
a policy is a function of both the policy’s ideological location and the level of effort—treated as
a valence characteristic—exerted by the agency in the implementation of the policy. Turner’s
focus is on the impact of ex post review on policymaking within such settings, which can be
characterized by both moral hazard and adverse selection.24
4.2 Appointment Dynamics in the Obama and Trump
Administrations
Senate confirmation of advice and consent appointees has taken longer and resulted in
more failures for presidents in the last few decades than under previous administrations
(O’Connell 2015). Though cabinet positions are typically filled quickly, other advice and
consent appointees may take nine months or longer (O’Connell 2009). Up to a quarter of
nominees fail confirmation. When advice and consent positions are vacant, the political
decisions of agencies, at least in part, are made by appointees that do not go through the
confirmation process. Whether or not advice and consent positions are filled, excepted
23For example, Groseclose (2001), Schofield (2005), Jo and Rothenberg (2012), Hirsch and Shotts (2013,
2014, 2015), Hirsch (2015), Carter and Patty (2015), and Bonatti and Rantakari (2016).
24See also Patty and Turner (2017).
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political appointees run the day-to-day business of government and take on the lion’s share
of advising officials.
Figure 4.1 shows the number of Schedule C and SES appointees from 1998 through
2017.25 Typically, political appointees like Schedule C and SES see significant turnover in
preparation for a presidential transition and the numbers have not fully recovered nine months
into the new administration. According to Fedscope, Obama increased the levels of Schedule
C and SES appointees in 2014 and 2015 well beyond any previous year since 1998. In 2017,
however, the level of Schedule Cs was at the lowest it has been in two decades and the level
of SES appointees was at its second lowest, just after September 2001.
Critics accused the Obama administration of relying on unconfirmed policy “czars”
like Elizabeth Warren to further its policy goals, in part because of the difficulty modern
presidents have in getting their nominations confirmed. Moore (2018) provides the example
of Antonio Weiss—an appointee who failed the confirmation process for a Treasury position
only to take on a key role in the Treasury Department via an excepted position. By contrast,
the Trump administration has filled positions at a much slower rate than his predecessors.
Though the speed of confirmations bears part of the blame, Trump had been much slower
to nominate candidates than his predecessors. Twenty-five weeks into office, Obama had 41
vacancies in top positions (deputy secretaries and undersecretaries) while Trump had 114
(Yourish and Aisch 2017). According to the Partnership for Public Service, of 636 top-level
positions they track, 225 had no nominee as of February 15, 2018.26 However, Trump also does
not appear to have supplemented vacant top positions with a larger number of unconfirmed
nominees as the graph below shows.
25The data for this plot come from OPM’s Fedscope tool. It shows the number of appointees of each type
as of September of the given year.
26See the tracker at: https://ourpublicservice.org/issues/presidential-transition/
political-appointee-tracker.php
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Figure 4.1: Number of Schedule C and Non-Career SES Appointees 1998-2017.
Certainly, ideology of president, appointee, and agency are an important part of the
appointment decision as the ally principle would suggest. At the same time, ideology does
not provide a complete accounting of a president’s appointment decision. With a limited
personnel supply, presidents consider the bureaucratic landscape—how likely is an appointee
to change the direction of the agency (good or bad) and how productive is an agency likely
to be going forward?
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4.3 The Model
In this article, we model the assignment of personnel as a strategic decision by a policy-
motivated president, focusing focus on the relationship between agency characteristics (such
as the agency’s ideological orientation, its workload, and the agency’s organizational capacity)
and the president’s incentives to allocate scarce talent between various agencies. It is sufficient
for our purposes to consider a president either choosing what agency to assign a staffer to, .
The Sequence of Choices. The basic sequence of our model is as follows.
1. The president observes the agencies’ characteristics, which we define and discuss below.
2. The president assigns a staffer, s, to one agency.
3. Staffer chooses a policy within his or her agency to work on.
4. Agencies make policy choices.
5. Players receive their payoffs and the process concludes.
Agency Characteristics and Policymaking. Each agency A is characterized by three
numbers: an ideological bias, βA, a productivity, mA, and a policy breadth, σA. Given its
characteristics, agency A produces policy as follows. The agency is presented with mA + 1
policy ideas, the set of which we denote by FA (for “feasible”). We assume that mA is
exogenous and fixed, but can vary across agencies. We represent each policy idea, p, as a
number, (bp, qp), where bp ∈ R represents the “bias” of the policy idea and qp represents the
“quality” of the idea.27 We assume that qp = 0 for every policy idea unless the staffer works
on (or, “promotes”) the policy, as we discuss in more detail below.28
27As discussed earlier (p. 71), qp is analogous to the notion of “valence” in models of electoral competition.
28Allowing for policy ideas to have heterogeneous initial qualities is an interesting avenue to extend this
model, but space constraints leads us to leave this for future work. As an aside, such an extension seems
likely to provide substantively interesting results above what we obtain here only if there is some relationship
between qp and bp, perhaps as the result of strategic forward-looking behavior by bureaucrats with the agency
in question.
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We assume that, for each agency A, there is a policy pˆA ∈ FA which is ideologically
identical to the agency’s bias: that is, bpˆA = βA and qpˆA = 0.
29 We refer to this policy
as agency A’s default policy. The remaining mA policies in FA are assumed to drawn
independently from a Normal(βA, σA) distribution. 30
Assumption 1. For all mA policies in FA other than pˆA,
bp ∼ Normal(βA, σA) and
qp = 0.
Staffing. The president’s staffing decision involves choosing which agency, a ∈ A, to assign
a staffer, denoted by s. The staffer is characterized by a policy bias, βs ∈ R, and a quality,
qs > 0, each of which is known by the president.31
Payoffs. Our model is essentially based on three types of players: the agencies, the president,
and the staffer. All players are assumed to be policy-motivated and prefer higher quality
policies to lower: formally, given a policy p = (bp, qp) and a player i ∈ A ∪ {P} ∪ {s}, player
i’s payoff is assumed to be equal to:
ui(p, βi) = qp + v(bp, βi),
29These assumptions amount to a normalization that pins down what the agency will do in the absence of
the president assigning personnel to the agency. Namely, in such cases, the agency will choose pˆA. This is
why the agency observes mA + 1 policy ideas as opposed to mA.
30Our results would remain unchanged so long as maintains the assumption that the policy ideas are
independently distributed according to location-scale family.
31The assumption that the staffer’s policy bias and quality are known by the president simply reduces
notation and—because we are modeling this as a one-shot game—none of our results rely upon this assumption.
If the interaction between the president and staffer were repeated, then the informational assumption would
of course be very important. We leave such an extension for future work.
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where v(b, β) is a common “spatial” policy payoff function that is assumed to be strictly
quasi-concave, maximized at and symmetric about β = b.32 Finally, we normalize all players’
ideal points by setting the president’s ideal point equal to zero: βP ≡ 0.
The Effect of Staffing on Policymaking. After the staffer is assigned to agency A, the
staffer chooses a policy idea in the set of feasible policies to promote, denoted by p∗s ∈ FA.
We model the effect of this promotion of policy idea p∗s by the staffer as increasing the quality
of the promoted idea, qp∗s , by the staffer’s quality, qs. Thus, by the assumption that all policy
ideas start with zero initial quality, the effective quality of the promoted idea, p∗s, is simply
equal to qs, while the effective quality of all other policy ideas is left unchanged (i.e., qp = 0
for all p 6= p∗s). The staffer seeks to maximize his or her payoff when choosing p∗s.
After the staffer chooses p∗s ∈ FA, the agency then promulgates the policy p∗A that
maximizes uA(p, βA), given the set of all available policy ideas, FA:
p∗A ∈p∈FA uA(p, βA).
Given our assumptions, the agency will promulgate its default policy, pˆA, unless the staffer
promotes some other policy idea.33 Accordingly, the set of policy ideas in FA that would be
promulgated by the agency if the staffer chooses to promote them, denoted by C(FA, qs), is
defined as follows:
C(FA, qs) ≡ {p ∈ FA : uA(p, βA) ≥ uA(pˆA, βA)} = {p ∈ FA : v(bp, βA) + qs ≥ v(bpˆA , βA)}.
32Common examples of such a policy payoff function include the linear loss function, v(b, β) = −|β − b|,
and the quadratic loss function, v(b, β) = −(β − b)2.
33And perhaps even then, though that will not occur in equilibrium.
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Clearly, the set C(FA, qs) is nonempty: it contains pˆA. Any policy idea in FA that is not
in C(FA, qs) is sufficiently distant from the agency’s ideal point, βA, that the agency would
choose not to promulgate it even if the staffer promoted it.
Optimal Promotion and the Distribution of Policy Outcomes. Given our assump-
tion about v, the staffer’s optimal choice, p∗s, is the policy in C(FA, qs) that minimizes |bx−βs|.
For reasons of space and clarity, we denote the ideological location of the staffer’s choice
by y ≡ bp∗s . For any agency A and staffer s, we write ρ(s, A) to denote the equilibrium
probability that the agency will promulgate its default policy, pˆA and f(·; s, A) to denote the
equilibrium induced probability density function over policy outcomes when s is assigned to
A.34
In equilibrium, the distribution of policy outcomes depends on whether βs > βA
and, more interestingly, on whether qs < |βs − βA| (referred to as a “restricted staffer”),
|βs− βA| ≤ qs ≤ 2|βs− βA| (referred to as a “capable staffer”), or qs > 2|βs− βA| (referred to
as a “nimble staffer”). Figure 4.2 demonstrates each of these cases. The figure illustrates 3 of
the 6 possible cases: whether βs is larger or smaller than βA simply determines whether the
staffer promotes policies that are greater than or less than the agency’s ideological bias, βA,
so we omit a graphical illustration of this symmetric case. This distinction between βs < βA
and βA < βs will matter, however, when we consider the president’s incentives below.
The three cases are differentiated by the predicted comparative statics of the president’s
expected policy payoff from appointing staffer s to agency A, which is defined as follows:
VP (s, A) = ρ(s, A)v(βA, βP ) +
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; s, A) y. (4.1)
The function VP (s, A) isolates the policy impact of appointing staffer s to agency A. In
our analysis below, we presume (in line with the definition of the payoffs above) that the
34We formally derive ρ and f for each of the 6 cases in Appendix 4.6.
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Figure 4.2: Effect of Staffer Quality on the Distribution of Promoted Policies: βs > βA
president benefits from qS directly. However, our analysis does not hinge on this presumption
unless one is considering in isolation which staffer the president would choose from a fixed
pool to assign to a given agency. When choosing to which agency the president will assign
a given staffer, the president’s incentives are dictated entirely by Equation 4.1. With that
noted, we now consider each of the three cases and their implications for how the president’s
policy-based incentives are determined in each.
Restricted Staffer. When the staffer’s quality is low relative to the extremism of the
agency (q < |βs − βA|), the staffer is unable to successfully promote policies with policy
impacts close to his or her ideal policy (βs). In this region, the president’s expected policy
payoff from appointing the staffer to the agency depends on the staffer’s quality, qs, but will
be insensitive to changes in the staffer’s ideal point, βs.
Prediction 1. When choosing between restricted staffers, the president’s optimal choice will
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• depend on the staffer’s quality (qs) but
• be independent of the staffer’s ideological bias (βs).
Capable Staffer. When the staffer is of moderate quality, or “capable,” relative to the
agency (|βs − βA| ≤ qs ≤ 2|βs − βA|), the staffer can promote policies near his or her ideal
point, but is unable to successfully promote all policies that he or she prefers to the agency’s
ideal point. In this region, the president’s expected policy payoff from appointing the staffer
to the agency depends directly on both the staffer’s quality, qs, and his or her ideal point, βs.
Prediction 2. When choosing from capable staffers, the president’s choice will depend on
both the staffer’s quality (qs) and the staffer’s ideological bias (βs).
Nimble Staffer. When the staffer’s quality is high (qs > 2|βs−βA|), he or she can promote
all policies that he or she prefers to the agency’s ideal point. In this region, the president’s
expected policy payoff from appointing the staffer to the agency depends directly on the
staffer’s ideal point, βs, but not his or her quality, qs.
Prediction 3. When assigning nimble staffers based only on policy outcomes, the president’s
choice will
• depend on the staffer’s ideological bias (βs) but
• be independent of the staffer’s quality (qs).
Ideology vs Competence: Implications for Choosing Whom to Nominate. Taken
together, Predictions 1-3 imply that ideology should matter when choosing between se-
nior/experienced potential appointees, but that only talent/experience should matter when
choosing between junior/relatively inexperienced potential appointees. These incentives
would carry over to any other policy interested individual(s) charged with vetting/confirming
the appointees as well, so that the predictions fall in line with the casual observation that
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ideology matters (and, relatedly, obstruction generally only occurs) for nominations to senior
positions.35
4.3.1 Staffing, Policy Change, and Policy Outcomes
In this section, we present a series of results that characterize how the likelihood of policy
change (i.e., an agency promulgating a policy other than its default) and the expected policy
outcome vary with the characteristics of the staffer and agency. We denote the expected
policy outcome chosen by s in agency A, conditional on y 6= pˆA by y¯(s, A), defined formally
as follows:
y¯(s, A) =
∫
yf(y; s, A) y
1− ρ(s, A) . (4.2)
The Effect of Ideology. The following proposition characterizes how the agency’s ide-
ological bias relative to that of the staffer affects the probability of the staffer having an
effect on the agency’s policy (i.e., 1− ρ(s, A)). The staffer’s probability of having an effect is
weakly increasing in the distance between the staffer’s goals and those of the agency: this is
because the set of policies that the staffer prefers to the agency’s default policy, pˆA, grows as
the distance increases.
Proposition 1. Suppose that βA > βs.36 Then ρ(s, A) is
1. decreasing in βA for βA ∈ (βs, βs + qs/2) and
2. constant for βA ≥ βs + qs/2
The Effect of Productivity. The fundamental, first-order effect of agency productivity
is determining the number of possible options that the staffer can choose from when selecting
what policy idea to promote.
35Our model does not include a variable for something akin to the “level” of an appointment within a
hierarchical construction of the agency as a policymaking organ, but including such a construction that would
carry forward this prediction could be simply accomplished by (among other ways) multiplying the effect of
the appointees quality on the president’s direct utility by a factor that is increasing in the prominence of the
position appointed to within the agency in question’s hierarchy. We leave such an extension for future work.
36The result is symmetric for the case of βA < βs.
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The next proposition describes how agency productivity (mA) affects the probability
of the staffer having an effect on the agency’s policy (i.e., 1− ρ(s, A)). Intuitively, as mA
increases, the staffer is more likely to observe a policy idea that he or she prefers to the
agency’s default policy, pˆA, so the probability of the staffer having an effect on the agency’s
policy choice is increasing in mA.
Proposition 2. For any agency A and any staffer s with βs 6= βA, ρ(s, A) is decreasing in
mA.
Proposition 2 implies that appointees in more active agencies should be more likely to
affect their agency’s policymaking. This is difficult to test directly, of course, because the
productivity of an agency is better thought of as “potential productivity” in terms of realized
policies, as portrayed by the model. That said, it is simple to extend the model to allow for
observed productivity to be positively correlated with potential productivity as modeled in
this setting.37
Proposition 2 establishes that policy change is more likely in higher productivity
agencies. For the same reason, the expected policy outcome will also be closer to the staffer’s
ideal point in such agencies. This is stated formally in the next proposition.38
Proposition 3. Suppose that βs 6= βA. Then
1. if βs < βA, y¯(s, A) is decreasing in mA and
lim
mA→∞
y¯(s, A) = { βA − qs if qs < βA − βs, βs if qs ≥ βA − βs, and
37For example, suppose that the agency chooses pimA policies to promulgate. The staffer’s incentives would
remain qualitatively unchanged, as would the conclusion of Proposition 2.
38Indeed, we could state a stronger version of Proposition 3. Consider a pair of agencies A and A′ differing
only by mA < mA′ with βs 6= βA = βA′ . The distribution of the distance between the promulgated policy
and the staffer’s ideal point, conditional on the staffer having an impact, in agency A first order stochastically
dominates the analogous distribution in agency A′.
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2. if βs > βA, y¯(s, A) is increasing in mA and
lim
mA→∞
y¯(s, A) = { βA + qs if qs < βs − βA, βs if qs ≥ βs − βA.
The Effect of Policy Breadth. The next proposition describes how policy breadth (σA)
affects the probability of the staffer determining the agency’s policy choice, ρ(s, A). Increasing
the agency’s breadth decreases the probability of the staffer having an effect on the agency’s
policy choice, because it decreases the probability that the staffer will observe a policy that
he or she both prefers to the agency’s default policy and can successfully promote.
Proposition 4. For any agency A and any staffer s with βs 6= βA, ρ(s, A) is decreasing in
σA.
The Effect of Staffer Quality. Mirroring Predictions 1-3, staffer quality, qs, has a direct
effect on both the probability of policy change and the expected policy outcome only when qs
is sufficiently small. Altering the quality of a high quality staffer does not directly impact these
values because the staffer’s ability to influence policy is constrained only by the characteristics
of the agency rather than those of the staffer. These conclusions are stated formally in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5. For any agency A and any staffer s with βs 6= βA,
1. ρ(s, A) is
(a) increasing in qs for qs ∈ [0, 2|βs − βA|) and
(b) independent of qs for qs ≥ 2|βs − βA|,
and
2. |y¯(s, A)− βs| is
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(a) decreasing in qs for qs ∈ [0, 2|βs − βA|) and
(b) independent of qs for qs ≥ 2|βs − βA|.
4.3.2 Presidential Incentives
Now we turn to the president’s incentives when choosing whether, and to what agency, to
appoint a staffer s. The president’s equilibrium expected payoff from appointing staffer s to
agency A is
UP (s, A) = qs − ρ(s, A)uP (βA)−
∫ ∞
−∞
uP (y)f(y; s, A) y. (4.3)
For the purposes of our comparative statics, we now assume a specific functional form
for uP .
Assumption 2. The president’s policy payoffs are represented by a linear loss function:
uP (y) = −|y|,
Assumption 2 is a useful baseline because it implies that the president always weakly
benefits from appointing the staffer to an agency, allowing us to focus on the president’s
preferences about which agency to appoint the staffer to. If the president’s policy payoff
function is strictly concave (such as is the case with quadratic loss preferences), then when βs
and βA are both sufficiently close to each other and sufficiently large in absolute value (i.e.,
sufficiently far from the president’s ideal point) the president may prefer to not appoint the
staffer at all. This is interesting, but depends on the nature of the president’s policy payoff
function. Accordingly, for reasons of space, we note this possibility and leave it for future
work.
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Choosing an Agency
In this section, we consider the president’s incentives when choosing to which agency (if any)
to appoint a staffer with fixed bias βs.
The Effect of Ideological Bias, βA. The president’s net expected payoff from appointing
the staffer to agency A—relative to not appointing the staffer—conditional on βA, is displayed
in Figure 4.3. The figure, which presumes that qs < βs− βP , displays the effect of βA both in
the limit as mA → ∞, and an example of the effect for small values of mA There are five
qualitatively different regions of interest in Figure 4.3, which we now discuss in turn in order
to explicate the logic behind the president’s incentives.
• Always Aligned. The first of the five cases occurs when either βA < βP − qs or
βA > βs + qs. In these regions the staffer will promote only policies that benefit the
president relative to the agency’s default policy. Under the assumption of linear loss
(Assumption 2), the president’s payoff is invariant to βA within this case.
• Decreasing Alignment. As the agency’s ideological bias, βA, increases from βP − qs
to βP , the staffer is increasingly likely to promote a policy that is farther from βP than
is the agency’s default policy (i.e., βA). This is described as “decreasing alignment”
because the probability that the staffer’s and president’s policy goals are aligned is
decreasing as βA increases through this region.
• Always Opposed. For all values of βA between βP and βs − qs, the agency never
promotes a policy that the president strictly prefers to the agency’s default policy (hence
the use of the term “always opposed” for this region) and, in expectation, moving policy
to the right by a constant amount that is independent of βA. Under the assumption of
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linear loss (Assumption 2), the president’s expected payoff from appointing the staffer
to the agency is accordingly independent of agency ideology within this region.39
• Decreasing Opposition. As the agency’s ideological bias, βA, moves from βs − qs to
βs, the staffer has sufficiently high quality, qs, to successfully promote his or her ideal
policy, βs and the probability that the staffer observes a policy that he or she prefers
to βA is decreasing. Accordingly, the president’s expected utility from appointing the
staffer to the agency increases as the agency’s ideological bias increases toward the
staffer’s ideal point.
• Increasing Alignment. When the agency is more extreme than the staffer’s ideal
point (βA > βs), then the staffer will never promote a policy that the president does
not prefer to the agency’s default policy and, furthermore, increasing the agency’s
ideological bias increases the expected distance between the agency’s default policy and
the policy that the staffer will promote, thus increasing the president’s net payoff from
appointing the staffer to the agency.
39If we assumed that the president’s policy payoffs were given by a quadratic loss function, then his or her
net expected payoff would be decreasing over this region.
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Figure 4.3: President’s Net Expected Payoff as a Function of Agency Ideological Bias, βA
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The Effect of Policy Breadth, σA. The effect of policy breadth, σA, on the president’s
net expected payoff from appointing the staffer to an agency depends crucially on whether the
staffer is aligned with, or opposed to, the president with respect to the agency’s ideological
bias, βA. These two cases are displayed in Figure 4.4.
2qs
0
qsU
P(σ
A
)
σA
Opposed Staer (βs>βA>βP or βs<βA<βP)  
Aligned Staer (βA>max[βS,βP]or βA<min[βS,βP])  
Figure 4.4: President’s Net Expected Payoff as a Function of Agency Policy Breadth, σA
Though the two cases are qualitatively different, the curves in Figure 4.4 share a
common logic. When σA is close to zero, the staffer is almost certain to observe only policies
that are very close to the agency’s default policy, βA. As the agency’s policy breadth grows,
the staffer will tend to observe more policies that he or she wishes to (and can successfully)
promote—thus, the president’s expected payoff from an aligned staffer is increasing–and that
from an opposed staffer is decreasing—in this region. As σA grows large, for finite mA, the
probability that there is any policy that the staffer can and would want to promote vanishes
to 0. In the limit, as σA →∞, the staffer will be promoting the agency’s default policy with
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probability 1, so the president’s net expected utility from appointing the staffer converges to
qs.
The most interesting implication of the two curves is the reversal of the president’s
marginal incentives for aligned and opposed staffers. For aligned staffers, the president has
“Goldilocks” incentives with respect to policy breadth (“not too hot, not too cold”). This
is because the president wants to simultaneously maximize the probability of there being
some policy that the staffer can successfully promote—which suggests smaller values of
σA—and minimize the expected distance between the promoted policy and the president’s
ideal point—which suggests larger values of σA. This leads to an interactive effect between
the staffer’s quality, qs, and the agency’s policy breadth, σA, on the president’s net expected
payoff from appointing the staffer, as displayed in Figure 4.5.
The figure illustrates two key characteristics of the president’s incentives when assigning
an aligned staffer. First, higher quality staffers should be assigned to agencies with greater
policy breadth. Second, this effect is larger when the staffer’s policy bias, βs, is more distant
from that of the agency, βA. Put together, these imply that the president should emphasize
assigning high quality staffers to agencies with greater policy breadth when considering
ideologically distant agencies.
The Effect of Productivity, mA. As with policy breadth, the effect of the agency’s
productivity, mA, depends on whether staffer is aligned or opposed. As illustrated in Figure
4.6, the president prefers appointing an aligned staffer to more productive agencies, where he
or she will have more options to further the president’s policy goals, and prefers to appoint
opposed staffers to less productive agencies, where he or she will have fewer options to act
promote policies that are antithetical to the president’s policy goals.
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4.4 Conclusions
The model we have presented, even as stripped down as it is, offers subtle guidance for a
policy-motivated president when making staffing decisions. Providing a succinct summary of
this guidance is accordingly difficult. Some overall advice can be summarized as follows.
Appoint Aligned Staffers. The first, and intuitive, conclusion from the theory is that
presidents should appoint staffers whose policy goals are close to his or her own. This mimics
the “ally principle” (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004) in terms of ideology. The subtlety of
this advice emerges both when comparing two or more staffers with varying ideologies and
qualities and when confronted by multiple agencies across which the president can allocate
multiple staffers. When considering staffers of relatively low quality, Prediction 1 implies
that ideological alignment is not relevant. Rather, the staffers’ qualities are the appropriate
dispositive characteristic in deciding whom to appoint.
On the other hand, when considering a high quality staffer, the advice “flips” in
substance. Specifically, the president should appoint staffers to an agency whose ideological
bias is opposed to the staffer, relative to the policy goals of the president, in the sense that
the agency’s ideological bias is on the opposite side of the president’s ideal point from that
of the staffer. Furthermore (but with the qualification that the curvature/risk-aversion of
the president’s policy payoff function would matter), all things other than ideological bias of
the agencies in question held constant, the president should appoint a high quality staffer
whose ideal point varies from the president’s to an agency that is on the opposite side of the
president’s ideal point from the staffer’s and this divergence between the agency’s ideological
bias and the president’s ideal point should be proportional to the staffer’s quality. Thus, the
president should appoint a higher-quality, “leftist” staffer to a more distant “rightist” agency
than a lower-quality leftist staffer.
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Complementarity of Alignment and Productivity. When deciding where to assign
an aligned staffer among a set of agencies with respect to which the staffer’s ideal point is
aligned relative to the president’s, the president should choose the more productive of these
agencies. Conversely, when assigning a staffer among agencies with respect to which the
staffer’s policy goals will be opposed to those of the president, the president should choose
the less productive agency.
Narrow Agencies Are Less Important. When comparing two agencies that differ only
with respect to policy breadth, the potential staffer’s ideal point is less relevant for the agency
with the narrower policy breadth. Thus, when assigning high quality staffers whose policy
goals diverge from the president’s, the president should tend to assign these individuals to
agencies with relatively narrow policy breadths. To the degree that policy breadth correlates
with “salience” or “importance” of the agency’s jurisdiction, the result might look like the
president is assigning high quality, ideologically extreme staffers to relatively unimportant
agencies.
Talent is a Two-Edged Sword. Finally, when comparing various potential staffers,
the president should recognize that high quality staffers are those that require the most
ideological “screening” in the sense that a staffer’s ideological divergence is more relevant
for the president’s payoff when the staffer in question has high quality and therefore can
move policy quite far from the agency’s default policy. This implies that the president should
exclude some high-quality individuals on the basis of ideology while assigning lower-quality
(i.e., more junior) staffers possessing similar ideological divergence.
4.4.1 Where to Go from Here
The model presented in this article is obviously at best a first step toward including agency
characteristics and the logistical/procedural realities of administrative policymaking within a
theory of political appointments/staffing and policymaking. It elides many important details
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of the bureaucratic policymaking process, including hierarchical decision-making, information
asymmetries, coordination, implementation, and team production.40 That said, the model
does provide an illustration of the complexities facing a policy-motivated executive confronted
with staffing the agencies that actually draft and implement most public policy.
40See, inter alia, Hammond and Miller (1985), Knott and Miller (1988), Lupia and McCubbins (1994),
Ting(2002, 2003, 2008), Gailmard and Patty (2011), and Turner (2016).
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4.6 Distribution of Policy Outcomes
Here we present the distribution of policy outcomes in the six different parameter regions,
based on βs, βA, and qs. We denote the cumulative distribution of the Normal(βA, σA)
distribution by Φ(·; βA, σA) and the probability density function by φ(·; βA, σA). When the
context is clear (i.e., we are considering a single agency), we will write these simply as Φ and
φ, omitting the parameters βA and σA.
Refer to Figure 4.7 for the derivations in this section.
Restricted Staffer. If qs < |βs−βA| and βs > βA, then the staffer will promote the policy
that is closest to βs within the interval [βA, βA + qs], if any such policy idea exists. If not,
the staffer will promote βA. Thus, the probability density function of y is
f(y; s, A) = {mA φ(y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 if βA < y ≤ βA+qs, 0 otherwise, (4.4)
and the probability mass for y = βA is
ρ(s, A) ≡ Pr[y = xA; βA, σA,mA] = (1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA . (4.5)
If qs < |βs − βA| and βs < βA, then the probability density function of y is
f(y; s, A) = {mA φ(y) (Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(y))mA−1 if βA−qs ≤ y < βA, 0 otherwise, (4.6)
and the probability mass for y = βA is
ρ(s, A) ≡ Pr[y = xA; βA, σA,mA] = (1− Φ(βA) + Φ(βA − qs))mA . (4.7)
As mentioned above, note that—because qs < |βs − βA|—the distribution of policy outcomes
is independent of βs.
Capable Staffer. If |βs − βA| ≤ qs < 2|βs − βA| and βs > βA, then the probability density
function of y is
f(y; s, A) = {mA φ(y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 if βA < y ≤ 2βs−βA−qs,mAφ(y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(2βs − y))mA−1 if 2βs−βA−qs < y ≤ βs,mAφ(y) (1− Φ(y) + Φ(2βs − y))mA−1 if βs < y < βA+qs, 0 otherwise,
(4.8)
and the probability mass for y = βA is
ρ(s, A) ≡ Pr[y = xA; βA, σA,mA] = (1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA . (4.9)
If |βs − βA| ≤ qs < 2|βs − βA| and βs < βA, then the probability density function of y is
f(y; s, A) = {mA φ(y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(2βs − y))mA−1 if βA−qs < y < βs,mAφ(y) (Φ(2βs − y) + 1− Φ(y))mA−1 if βs < y ≤ 2βs−βA+qs,mAφ(y) (Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(y))mA−1 if 2βs−βA+qs ≤ y < βA, 0 otherwise,
(4.10)
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Figure 4.7: Effect of Staffer Quality on the Distribution of Promoted Policies
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and the probability mass for y = βA is
ρ(s, A) ≡ Pr[y = xA; βA, σA,mA] = (1− Φ(βA) + Φ(βA − qs))mA . (4.11)
Nimble Staffer. If qs ≥ 2|βs − βA| and βs > βA, then the probability density function of
y is
f(y; s, A) = {mA φ(y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(2βs − y))mA−1 if βA < y < βs,mAφ(y) (Φ(2βs − y) + 1− Φ(y))mA−1 if βs ≤ y < 2βs−βA, 0 otherwise,
(4.12)
and the probability mass for y = βA is
ρ(s, A) ≡ Pr[y = xA; βA, σA,mA] = (1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(2βs − βA))mA . (4.13)
If qs ≥ 2|βs − βA| and βs < βA, then the probability density function of y is
f(y; s, A) = {mA φ(y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(2βs − y))mA−1 if 2βs−βA < y ≤ βs,mAφ(y) (Φ(2βs − y) + 1− Φ(y))mA−1 if βs < y < βA, 0 otherwise,
(4.14)
and the probability mass for y = βA is
ρ(s, A) ≡ Pr[y = xA; βA, σA,mA] = (1− Φ(βA) + Φ(2βs − βA))mA . (4.15)
As alluded to earlier, note that—because qs > 2|βs−βA|—the distribution of policy outcomes
is independent of qs.
4.7 Proofs of Numbered Results
Prediction 1 When choosing between restricted staffers, the president’s optimal choice will
• depend on the staffer’s quality (qs) but
• be independent of the staffer’s ideological bias (βs).
Proof. The president’s policy incentives are based on his or her expected policy payoff function
defined in Equation Eq:PresidentPolicyPayoffs:
VP (s, A) = ρ(s, A)v(βA, βP ) +
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; s, A) y.
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Fix an agency A and consider two staffers, s and t, each of whom is restricted relative to
agency A:
qs < |βs − βA|, and
qt < |βt − βA|.
The president’s net payoff from assigning staffer s to agency A as opposed to assigning staffer
t to agency A is
∆ = VP (s, A)− VP (t, A),
= (ρ(s, A)− ρ(t, A))v(βA, βP ) +
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; s, A) y −
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; t, A) y.
Presuming that βs > βA, the marginal impact of qs on ∆ is:41
∂∆
∂qs
=
∂ρ(s, A)
∂qs
v(βA, βP ) +
∫ βA+qs
βA
v(y, βP )
∂f(y; s, A)
∂qs
y + v(βA + qs, βP )f(βA + qs).
where
∂ρ(s, A)
∂qs
= −mAφ(βA + qs)(1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 < 0, and
∂f(y; s, A)
∂qs
= 0.
From Equation Eq:fRestricted,
f(βA + qs) = mAφ(βA + qs) (1 + Φ(βA + qs)− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 = mAφ(βA + qs),
so
∂∆
∂qs
=
∂ρ(s, A)
∂qs
(
v(βA, βP )− v(βA + qs, βP )
(1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1
)
,
implying that ∆ is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in qs unless
v(βA, βP ) =
v(βA + qs, βP )
(1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 . (4.16)
Note that βA 6= βP and v being strictly decreasing in the absolute value of the difference of
its arguments implies that, for any given βA, qs, βP , Equation Eq:RestrictedNonConstant will
hold for at exactly one value mˆA > 0 (and continuity of v implies that this value mˆA will
generically be a non-integer), establishing the first conclusion of the prediction.
41The argument for βs < βA is symmetric.
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For the second conclusion, referring to Equations Eq:fRestricted-Eq:RhoRestricted2, f and ρ
are independent of βs. Accordingly, ∆ is independent of βs.
Prediction 2 When choosing from capable staffers, the president’s choice will depend on
both the staffer’s quality (qs) and the staffer’s ideological bias (βs).
Proof. As with Prediction 1, the president’s policy incentives are based on his or her expected
policy payoff function defined in Equation Eq:PresidentPolicyPayoffs:
VP (s, A) = ρ(s, A)v(βA, βP ) +
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; s, A) y.
Fix an agency A and consider two staffers, s and t, each of whom is capable relative to agency
A:
|βs − βA| ≤ qs < 2|βs − βA|, and
|βt − βA| ≤ qt < 2|βt − βA|.
The president’s net payoff from assigning staffer s to agency A as opposed to assigning staffer
t to agency A is
∆ = VP (s, A)− VP (t, A),
= (ρ(s, A)− ρ(t, A))v(βA, βP ) +
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; s, A) y −
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; t, A) y.
Presuming that βs > βA and letting ρq ≡ ∂ρ(s,A)∂qs and fq(y) ≡
∂f(y;s,A)
∂qs
,
ρq = −mAφ(βA + qs)(1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 < 0, and
fq(y) = {− mA(mA − 1)φ(y)φ(βA + qs) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(βA + qs))mA−2if βA < y ≤ 2βs − βA − qs,
0 otherwise,
Then, the marginal impact of qs on ∆ is:
∂∆
∂qs
= ρqv(βA, βP ) +
∫ 2βs−βA−qs
βA
v(y, βP )fq(y) y + v(βA + qs, βP )f(βA + qs).
From Equation Eq:fCapable,
f(βA + qs) = mAφ(βA + qs) (1 + Φ(βA + qs)− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 = mAφ(βA + qs),
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so
∂∆
∂qs
= ρq ·
(
v(βA, βP )− v(βA + qs, βP )
(1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA−1
)
+
∫ 2βs−βA−qs
βA
v(y, βP )fq(y) y.
As with Prediction 1, ∆ will in general be a non-constant function of qs, as claimed.
For the second conclusion, returning to the President’s expected payoff function defined in
Equation Eq:PresidentPolicyPayoffs:
VP (s, A) = ρ(s, A)v(βA, βP ) +
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; s, A) y,
the marginal effect of βs on VP is
∂VP (s, A)
∂βs
= 2
∫ βA+qs
βs
v(y, βP )mA(mA − 1)φ(y)φ(2βs − y) (Φ(2βs − y) + 1− Φ(y))mA−2 y
−2
∫ βs
2βs−βA−qs
v(y, βP )mA(mA − 1)φ(y)φ(2βs − y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(2βs − y))mA−2 y,
which (due to the exponent mA − 2 and the non-constant nature of v) can be equal to zero
for at most one value mA, given v, φ, and βs 6= βA, establishing the second conclusion of the
prediction.
Prediction 3 When assigning nimble staffers based only on policy outcomes, the president’s
choice will
• depend on the staffer’s ideological bias (βs) but
• be independent of the staffer’s quality (qs).
Proof. Again, the president’s expected policy payoff function, as defined in Equation Eq:Pres-
identPolicyPayoffs, is
VP (s, A) = ρ(s, A)v(βA, βP ) +
∫
v(y, βP )f(y; s, A) y.
For the first conclusion of the prediction, and as with Prediction 2, suppose that βa > βA.
Then, from Equation Eq:fNimble, the marginal effect of βs on VP is
∂VP (s, A)
∂βs
= 2
∫ 2βs−βA
βs
v(y, βP )mA(mA − 1)φ(y)φ(2βs − y) (Φ(2βs − y) + 1− Φ(y))mA−2 y
−2
∫ βs
βA
v(y, βP )mA(mA − 1)φ(y)φ(2βs − y) (Φ(y) + 1− Φ(2βs − y))mA−2 y,
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which (due to the exponent mA − 2 and the non-constant nature of v) can be equal to zero
for at most one value mA, given v, φ, and βs 6= βA, establishing the first conclusion of the
prediction.
For the second conclusion, note that Equations Eq:fNimble-Eq:RhoNimble2 are independent
of qs, so that VP is independent of qs as well, as claimed.
Proposition 1 Suppose that βA > βs. Then ρ(s, A) is
1. decreasing in βA for βA ∈ (βs, βs + qs/2) and
2. constant for βA ≥ βs + qs/2
Proof. Fix βA > βs. If βA ∈ (βs, βs + qs/2), then qs < 2|βs − βA|, so that
ρ(s, A) = (1− Φ(βA) + Φ(2βs − βA))mA ,
so that, noting that
Φ(βA)
βA
=
Φ(βA; βA, σA)
βA
= 0,
Φ(2βs − βA)
βA
=
Φ(βA; βA, σA)
βA
= −
√
2
pi
e
− (2βA−2βs)
2
2σ2
A
σA
, and
Φ(βA + qs)
βA
=
Φ(βA + qs; βA, σA)
βA
= 0,
it follows that
∂ρ(s, A)
∂βA
= −mA

√
2
pi
e
− (2βA−2βs)
2
2σ2
A
σA
 (1− Φ(βA) + Φ(2βs − βA))mA−1 < 0,
establishing the first conclusion of the proposition. If βA ≥ βs + qs/2, then
ρ(s, A) = (1 + Φ(βA)− Φ(βA + qs))mA ,
so that, in this case,
∂ρ(s, A)
∂βA
= −mA
(
Φ(βA + qs)
βA
− Φ(βA)
βA
)
(1− Φ(βA) + Φ(βA + qs))mA−1 = 0,
establishing the second conclusion of the proposition.
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Proposition 2 For any agency A and any staffer s with βs 6= βA, ρ(s, A) is decreasing in
mA.
Proof. Follows immediately from Equations Eq:RhoRestricted, Eq:RhoRestricted2, Eq:Rho-
Capable, Eq:RhoCapable2, Eq:RhoNimble, Eq:RhoNimble2, and the assumption that Φ(x) ∈
(0, 1) for all x ∈ R.
Proposition 3 Suppose that βs 6= βA. Then
1. if βs < βA, y¯(s, A) is decreasing in mA and
lim
mA→∞
y¯(s, A) = { βA − qs if qs < βA − βs, βs if qs ≥ βA − βs, and
2. if βs > βA, y¯(s, A) is increasing in mA and
lim
mA→∞
y¯(s, A) = { βA + qs if qs < βs − βA, βs if qs ≥ βs − βA.
Proof. From Equation Eq:YBar:
y¯(s, A) =
∫
yf(y; s, A) y
1− ρ(s, A) .
We prove the result for each of the three cases, presuming that βA > βs: the case where
βA < βs is proved similarly. Throughout, recall that y¯(s, A) is simply the conditional expected
value of policy given that y 6= βA. Accordingly, the proof strategy in each case is conditional on
y 6= βA as well (this implies that we can ignore the denominator and normalize f conditional
on mA).
• Restricted staffer. For any pair of policies x, z ∈ (βA − qs, βA), the likelihood ratio
for x over z, given mA, βA, and qs, is
λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs) =
φ(x)(Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(x))mA−1
φ(z)(Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(z))mA−1 ,
=
φ(x)
φ(z)
(
Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(x)
Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(z)
)mA−1
.
Suppose that |x− βs| < |z − βs|. Because βA − qs > βs (the restricted staffer case with
βA > βs), this implies that x < z, so that Φ(x) < Φ(z), and
Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(x)
Φ(βA − qs) + 1− Φ(z) > 1.
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Thus, as mA increases, the likelihood ratio λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs) increases without bound
and, because φ(x)
φ(z)
> 0, λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs) increases without bound as mA increases.
Accordingly, y¯ must decrease with mA and, in the limit, converge to βA − qs.
• Capable staffer. Consider first any pair of policies x, z ∈ (βs, βA), and the likelihood
ratio for x over z, λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs):
λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs) =
φ(x)
φ(z)
(
Φ(max[2βs − x, βA − qs]) + 1− Φ(x)
Φ(max[2βs − z, βA − qs]) + 1− Φ(z)
)mA−1
.
Suppose that βs < x < z. This implies that
Φ(max[2βs − x, βA − qs]) ≥ Φ(max[2βs − z, βA − qs]) and
Φ(x) < Φ(z),
further implying that
Φ(max[2βs − x, βA − qs]) + 1− Φ(x)
Φ(max[2βs − z, βA − qs]) + 1− Φ(z) > 1.
Thus, as mA increases, the likelihood ratio λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs) increases without bound
and, because φ(x)
φ(z)
> 0, λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs) increases without bound as mA increases. A
similar argument applies to x, z ∈ (βA − qs, βs). To establish the result, consider any
x, z with βA − qs < x < βs < z and βs − x = z − βs (x and z equidistant from, and on
opposite sides of, βs). In this case,
λ(x, z;mA, βA, qs) =
φ(x)
φ(z)
(
Φ(x) + 1− Φ(2βs − x)
Φ(2βs − z) + 1− Φ(z)
)mA−1
,
=
φ(x)
φ(z)
(
Φ(x) + 1− Φ(z)
Φ(x) + 1− Φ(z)
)mA−1
,
=
φ(x)
φ(z)
< 1.
Thus, the likelihood of any policy x 6= βs relative to βs is decreasing, and the likelihood
of every policy x ∈ (βA − qs, βs) relative to 2βs − x is constant, with respect to mA.
Thus, y¯ is decreasing with mA and, in the limit, must converge to βs.
• Nimble staffer. It is easy to verify that the argument for the capable staffer case,
above, applies without modification.
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Proposition 4 For any agency A and any staffer s with βs 6= βA, ρ(s, A) is decreasing in
σA.
Proof. Follows immediately from Equations Eq:RhoRestricted, Eq:RhoRestricted2, Eq:Rho-
Capable, Eq:RhoCapable2, Eq:RhoNimble, Eq:RhoNimble2, and the fact that, for any x 6= 0,
∂Φ(βA + x; βA, σA)
∂σA
= [x].
Proposition 5 For any agency A and any staffer s with βs 6= βA,
1. ρ(s, A) is
(a) increasing in qs for qs ∈ [0, 2|βs − βA|) and
(b) independent of qs for qs ≥ 2|βs − βA|,
and
2. |y¯(s, A)− βs| is
(a) decreasing in qs for qs ∈ [0, 2|βs − βA|) and
(b) independent of qs for qs ≥ 2|βs − βA|.
Proof. Follows immediately from the arguments in proofs of Predictions 1–3.
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Chapter 5
Party Systems and Legislative
Behavior: Evidence from the
Antebellum U.S. Congress
Political parties were conspicuously absent from the U.S. Constitution. The American
Founders were deeply skeptical about, if not hostile toward, the role of parties in the new
nation’s governance. George Washington articulated the Founders’ views in his presidential
farewell address when he warned that “the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit
of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and
restrain it.”42 The history of American democracy, however, is largely the history of American
political parties (e.g. Fiorina 1980; Lipset 1959; Schattschneider 1942; Schlesinger 1945;
Silbey 1991; Tocqueville 1963 [1840]). By the 1830s, not only had mass political parties
linked voters to the state (Aldrich 1995) but they also coordinated and organized the nation’s
governmental activity (James 2006; Skowronek 1982).
Though an impressive literature documents the development of early American party
systems (e.g. Beard 1915; Charles 1961; Formisano 1981; Holt 1969; Hofstadter 1969;
42See https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc21/pdf/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc21.pdf. Wash-
ington’s remarks were intended as criticism of the parties that had already emerged by the end of his
presidency.
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McCormick 1966,1986; Selinger 2016), scholarship has paid less attention to understanding
how political parties structured elite behavior during this period. The relative inattentiveness
is surprising because American political parties are generally conceptualized as tripartite
institutions — i.e., party organizations, parties-in-the-electorate, and parties-in-office —
created by strategic political elites to advance their electoral and policy goals (e.g. Aldrich
1995; Selinger 2016; Sorauf 1967). Moreover, despite important institutional developments
in the nineteenth-century Congress (e.g. Gamm and Shepsle 1989; Gamm and Smith 2002;
Harlow 1917; Jenkins 1998, 2011; Jenkins and Stewart 2012), scholarship on the emergence
of congressional parties generally distinguishes congresses based on the presence or absence
of parties (e.g. Aldrich 1995; Formisano 1981) but does not consider evolution in the nature
of party influences once they were established.
In this paper, we study the relationship between political party membership and
legislative behavior in the antebellum Congress. Understanding how partisanship was
reflected in legislative behavior during this time period provides insight into how political
parties organized the early American state, during which time Congress was the locus
of governmental operations (Skowronek 1982, 23). High levels of partisan behavior in the
contemporary Congress (Koger and Lebo 2017; Lee 2009, 2016; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
2016) suggest the importance of understanding how political parties structured legislative
behavior in other periods of U.S. history. And though a large scholarship studies party
influence in Congress (e.g. Brady, Cooper, and Burley 1979; Cox and Poole 2002; Snyder
and Groseclose 2000; Jenkins and Weidenmier 1999; Patterson and Caldeira 1988; Smith
2007), virtually all of it focuses on the post-Reconstruction or more recent eras. We build
on research that traces the institutional development of the House and Senate (e.g. Binder
and Smith 1997; Gamm and Smith 2002; Jenkins and Stewart 2012; Schiller and Stewart
2015; Swift 2002; Wirls and Wirls 2004) to examine the relationship between partisanship
and congressional behavior between chambers and over time in the nation’s first six decades.
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Our focus and approach responds to recent calls for integrating congressional studies and
quantitative methods with American political development (Katznelson and Lapinski 2005;
Wawro and Katznelson 2014).
We contribute three primary findings using data from the 1st through 36th Congresses
(1789-1861). First, while partisanship was a statistically and substantively significant predictor
of legislative voting records across the antebellum period, we find this relationship exhibited
systematic variation between chambers and across time. Second, we find that the association
between partisanship and legislative behavior was about 50 percent stronger in the House
than in the Senate and varied from one Congress to the next, often in ways not directly
attributable to existing accounts of institutional change. Third, in each chamber, we uncover
evidence of three distinct party regimes during the antebellum Congress. In combination,
our findings suggest that scholarship on party emergence in the early American Congress is
incomplete without also considering variation in the extent to which parties lent structure to
legislative behavior. Our results also have important implications for understanding how the
evolution of party systems and development of partisan institutions affected representation
and state operations in an era with a more limited national governing apparatus.
5.1 Political Parties and Legislative Behavior
Political parties organize political life and occupy an especially prominent role in scholarship
on legislative institutions. Few questions have received as much attention in congressional
scholarship, however, as the relationship between partisanship and legislative voting behavior
(e.g. Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Cox and Poole 2002; Snyder and Groseclose 2000;
Jenkins and Weidenmier 1999; Smith 2007). Linkages between party membership and
legislative behavior arise through two main channels. In the first, roll call voting records
reflect legislators’ party membership through the internal politics of the chamber. As Poole
and Rosenthal (1997, 35) describe it, “political parties, either through the discipline of
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power, leaders or through successful trades, function as effective logrollers …to map complex
issues into a low-dimensional space.” To do so, legislative party leaders create incentives for
legislators to hew to the party line (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1993). These incentives, which
could include promising favorable committee assignments or withholding future electoral
support, serve as enforcement mechanisms for securing legislators’ support for the party
position. Negative agenda control further allows party leaders to prevent consideration of
items on which party members disagree (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 2005; Gailmard and
Jenkins 2007) such that legislatures consider only those policy proposals with widespread
agreement among majority party members. As a result, partisanship may be highly predictive
of legislative behavior even when underlying preferences vary among copartisan legislators.
Second, legislative voting records can also reflect political party membership through
constituency- and electorally-induced pressures. For instance, party organizations nominate
candidates who share their policy views and enforce party discipline by withholding electoral
support from or recruiting challengers for officeholders who are insufficiently loyal. Partisan
constituencies prefer legislators who identify with their preferred party and create demand
for legislators to vote in ways consistent with party priorities. In both instances, legislators’
desire to win and maintain office leads them to cast roll call votes that reflect the party label
on which they were elected (Mayhew 1974; Schlesinger 1966).43
These theoretical perspectives on party influence in legislatures, however, have been
developed by observers of the modern U.S. Congress. Though political parties quickly
emerged in the early Congress as a solution to social choice and collective action problems
(Aldrich 1995; Hoadley 1980,1986), the chambers adopted relatively few (and weak) partisan
institutions and well-developed party organizations did not emerge until at least the 1830s
43It is also possible that party membership serves as a proxy for individual legislators’ preferences; if
like-minded legislators are also members of the same party, similarities in legislative voting behavior may
reflect legislators’ shared preferences. To the extent legislators’ roll call records reflect electorally-induced
preferences, however, an association between partisanship and legislative behavior could provide evidence of
a “party effect” independently of the legislator’s own preferences.
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(Beard 1915; Charles 1961; Hofstadter 1969). Prior to that, the early parties were highly
personalistic (Shefter 1994; Skowronek 1982), loosely organized around personal loyalties
rather than institutional rules and with weak ties with the electorate. While early parties
may indeed have helped solve coordination problems in the legislature (Aldrich 1995; Hoadley
1980; Ryan 1971), it is unclear to what degree legislators had incentives to cast roll call votes
based on their partisan affiliations absent the institutionalized partisan arrangements in later
congresses and clear partisan electoral connections. Mass-based parties that arose beginning
in the late 1820s and 1830s had well-developed electoral organizations, yet these parties were
notable for their lack of programmatic commitments (Gerring 1998; Skowronek 1982) and
instead were motivated primarily by distributing patronage (James 2006). These contextual
features raise questions about the relevance of contemporary theories of legislative parties for
explaining antebellum congressional behavior.
5.1.1 Political Parties in the Early U.S. Congress
To what extent did legislative behavior in the early American Congress reflect legislators’
partisan commitments? The historical details suggest somewhat conflicting answers. On the
one hand, partisan legislative institutions during this time period were relatively weak by
contemporary standards. The intellectual legacies of the Founders may have contributed to
an aversion among legislators for partisan legislative institutions. According to (Silbey 1989,
130), “the deep and persistent republican ideological tradition affected the development of
Congress in this era, with its strong antagonism …to any institutions that sought to discipline
people, work out compromises, bring people into coalitions. It was a powerful tradition
that opposed political parties as divisive and feared wily political leaders as dangers to
republican harmony.” As a result, antebellum legislative parties may have lacked the will or
the means to collectively organize their members (Polsby 1968). Other research indicates
that antebellum political parties were organized primarily around the presidency rather than
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Congress (Gerring 1998; McCormick 1966). To the extent parties did play an important
role in the affairs of the national government, their influence may have been clearer when
examining presidents’ behavior but more limited in Congress.
On the other hand, while congressional parties during this era lacked the full com-
plement of formal tools implicated in contemporary accounts of party influence, they were
not altogether impotent. As Aldrich (1995, chapter 3) details, the emergence of parties soon
after the founding provided stability and structure to legislative voting behavior. Legislative
parties distinguished members according to their preferences and, by the Third Congress
(1793-95), induced members to consider congressional proposals among a single, dominant
ideological dimension. During Jefferson’s administration (1801-09), informal legislative orga-
nizations helped coordinate the legislative agenda with the President’s program. However,
the emergence of partisan cleavages among its members eventually stimulated Congress to
develop partisan institutions. For instance, ambitious chamber leaders stacked the select
committee system with their legislative allies (Gamm and Shepsle 1989), and the development
of the standing committee system starting around 1810 advanced the partisan goals of House
and Senate leaders (Gamm and Shepsle 1989; Gamm and Smith 2002; Harlow 1917; Jenkins
1998). Partisan competition over the legislative agenda structured debates over institutional
results and procedures (Binder 1995, 1996, 1997). Early Speakers of the House have been
regarded as quite partisan (Furlong 1967; Jenkins 2011), and the implementation of the voice
vote in 1839 allowed parties to exercise greater control over rank-and-file voting behavior and
contributed to increasingly partisan elections for Speaker, clerk, and printer (Jenkins and
Stewart 2012). While congressional parties may have had fewer formal powers during the
antebellum period than they developed in more recent times, these accounts suggest that
partisanship was an important predictor of legislative behavior even in the country’s early
years.
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The nature of party competition outside the legislature may have also contributed to
partisan voting records among members of Congress. Beginning in the 1820s, parties developed
state and local electoral organizations dedicated to recruiting candidates and mobilizing the
electorate (Aldrich 1995; Silbey 1989). Parties’ roles in nominating presidential candidates and
administering the early American state further suggest the potential for legislative influence.
Presidential elections were contested on a partisan basis following George Washington’s
retirement, and Federalist and Republican members of Congress convened separately to
choose their party’s presidential candidates through 1824 (Fess 1907). The patronage basis of
mass parties in the antebellum period (James 2006) contributed to partisan administration
of government (Skowronek 1982) and further suggests that electoral competition for control
of Congress was reflected in the partisan character of legislative voting records.
Despite important institutional changes within Congress during the antebellum period
along with the development of the first three party systems, relatively little is known about the
relationship between partisanship and legislative voting patterns in this era. Instead, virtually
all scholarship on partisanship and legislative voting behavior studies congressional voting
behavior after the Civil War. Thus, in the main we test the hypothesis that partisanship was
an important contributor to legislative roll call voting records in the antebellum Congress.
5.1.2 Institutions and Party Development in the Antebellum Congress
Congressional and party developments in the antebellum era, however, suggest that the
association between party and legislative behavior was far from static. Further, the early
House and Senate developed at different rates and through different means. Existing studies
of party emergence in Congress (e.g. Aldrich 1995; Hoadley 1980; Ryan 1971) may therefore
provide an incomplete account of how parties shaped congressional behavior in the country’s
first 70 years. With a few important exceptions (Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1979; Cox and
Poole 2002; Snyder and Groseclose 2000), researchers have also paid less attention to temporal
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and interchamber variation in the relationship between partisanship and congressional voting
behavior. Following Wawro and Katznelson (2014), we aim to explore systematic historical
variation in these patterns.
In doing so, we expect that antebellum parties shaped legislative behavior to a
significantly greater degree in the House than in the Senate. The House and Senate differed
along a number of dimensions, with implications for the importance of partisanship for
legislative behavior. First, while members of the House were elected directly by voters, all
Senators were elected by state legislatures during the antebellum era. Senators were thus
somewhat further removed from the incentives to respond to local party organizations and
mass mobilization efforts (Swift 1996). Instead, their continued tenure in office depended more
on their ability to pass legislation and secure federal benefits desired by the state legislature
(Schiller 2006; Schiller, Stewart, and Xiong 2013; Schiller and Stewart 2015).44 Second,
reflecting these differences in partisan electoral incentives, party leadership structures differed
across the chambers and were stronger (and more politicized) in the House (Binder and
Smith 1997; Jenkins and Stewart 2012). Third, the chambers took different paths in adopting
rules and procedures that affected the degree of partisan control over the consideration of
legislation. For instance, whereas the early U.S. House adopted rules to limit minority party
rights, the Senate was more protective of the minority party (Binder 1997). Altogether,
these chamber-level differences in responsiveness to the mass electorate, presence of party
leadership, and rules and procedures lead us to expect that legislative voting records in the
House reflected partisanship to a greater degree than in the Senate.
44Riker (1955) posits that the political canvas led state legislative elections to be referenda on which
candidate the legislature should elect to the U.S. Senate, which could have made state legislatures beholden
to U.S. Senators (rather than the other way around). Under this scenario, the relationship between party
membership and voting behavior in the Senate would also have likely been lower than in the House. However,
more recent scholarship (Schiller 2006; Schiller 2013) indicates that state parties often did not settle on U.S.
Senate candidates prior to state legislative elections, showing instead that candidates for the Senate began
jockeying for support from state legislators only after the legislative elections had been completed.
115
We further argue that the relationship between partisanship and legislative behavior
in the antebellum era varied across time. As congressional parties emerged in response to
social choice and collective action problems (Aldrich 1995), we expect that legislators’ voting
records increasingly reflected their party affiliations in the country’s first decade. However,
the relationship between partisanship and voting behavior was not static upon the parties’
emergence. Partisanship likely receded in importance in the period following the War of
1812, as party cohesion declined (e.g. Binder 1995) and legislators were more responsive
to constituency interests than organized political parties (Jenkins and Weidenmier 1999).
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) further show that a single ideological dimension fares poorly in
explaining legislative voting behavior from roughly 1815 through 1825, which suggests that
legislative parties were less effective in reducing the dimensionality of the agenda. By the
late 1820s, however, mass political parties had developed in earnest and Congress was more
fully a partisan institution. The Whigs and Democrats had developed “electoral machines,
legislative organizations, [and] partisan followers” (Binder 1995, 1099); in the House, the use
of the voice vote for leadership positions by the end of the 1830s had allowed House parties to
better monitor rank-and-fie voting behavior and contributed to increasingly partisan elections
for Speaker, clerk, and printer (Jenkins and Stewart 2012). More generally, Silbey (1989,
131) characterizes the period from 1830 to 1870 as a “partisan era” in which “party, not the
individual, was the key.” Thus, we expect the association between partisanship and legislative
behavior to strengthen with the emergence of mass party organizations and increasingly
partisan legislative institutions. This relationship is likely to be strongest in the House, which,
as we argued above, was more responsive as an institution to mass political developments.
Though existing research offers important insights into the predictors of especially
salient roll call votes in the antebellum era and the historical development of mass political
parties and legislative organization, considerably less is known about how partisanship more
generally structured patterns of legislative behavior throughout this era. Our discussion above
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identifies several testable hypotheses about the degree to which partisanship was reflected in
legislative voting records and how this relationship varied across chambers and time. We now
describe the empirical approach we use to study these questions.
5.2 Data
We test the hypotheses outlined above using roll call voting behavior in the 1st through
36th congresses.45 We include all legislators who served full terms in office and our unit of
analysis is the legislator-pair. As our key dependent variables, we use legislator agreement
scores generated from roll call data.46 These scores express the number of instances in which
legislators i and j voted the same way on recorded votes. The scores are normalized by
the total number of recorded votes so that they represent the percentage of the time that
legislators i and j voted together within a given Congress. Higher values of these entries
indicate greater similarity in legislative behavior. We generate agreement scores for each
possible pair of legislators.47 The distribution of these scores is displayed in Figure 5.3 in the
Supplementary Appendix. Pooling together the 1st through 36th Congresses yields 368,354
pairs of House members and 22,288 pairs of Senators for our main analyses.48
For our purposes, agreement scores offer several key advantages over alternative
dependent variables derived from commonly-used scaling techniques such as DW-NOMINATE.
45These data were obtained from http://www.voteview.com. We are grateful to Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal for making them available. We note, however, that our analysis is necessarily limited to recorded
floor votes, which raises questions about selection bias. For instance, it may be possible that recorded votes
were used by party leaders to enforce party discipline (Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008), in which case
partisan agreement may be higher than we would have observed otherwise. For the purposes of our analysis,
however, this potential explanation for variation in the use of recorded votes is precisely one of the main
reasons we hypothesize why the importance of partisanship for legislative voting behavior may have varied
over time. However, we note that further research is necessary on the use of recorded votes and potential
selection issues.
46Agreement scores featured prominently in Truman’s (1956) study of state delegations’ voting patterns
in the House of Representatives and have been used in several other recent analyses of legislative behavior,
including Masket (2008) and Rogowski and Sinclair (2012).
47We treat instances in which one or both legislators missed votes as the absence of agreement, but we
obtain substantively similar results when treating these as instances of agreement.
48Complete information about the number of legislators and roll calls for each Congress are shown in Table
5.4 in the Supplementary Appendix.
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First, agreement scores make no assumptions about the nature of the legislative agenda or
the dimensionality of congressional voting behavior. Second, agreement scores do not require
us to impose assumptions about the nature of legislative behavior over time that are needed
to ensure cross-temporal comparability (see e.g., Bateman and Lapinski Forthcoming; Lee
2016). Given our interest in studying partisan voting behavior across an extended period of
time, we are reluctant to adopt assumptions about the congressional agenda or legislators’
decision calculus uncritically; instead, agreement scores provide a clear metric of the extent to
which legislators serving together cast votes together. As we discuss below, however, we note
that we have replicated our main results using DW-NOMINATE scores and find patterns
that closely mirror those using agreement scores.
We assess the importance of partisanship for legislative voting behavior by evaluating
whether copartisan legislators vote together at higher rates than legislators who are members
of different parties. Thus, our key explanatory variable is an indicator for whether a pair of
legislators is affiliated with the same political party. We use data on legislator partisanship
from McKibbin (1992) to create an indicator, Same party, which takes a value of 1 if both
legislators were members of the same party and zero otherwise.49 We note that all our results
are robust to using the measure of partisanship reported in Martis (1989), and we report
these additional sets of results in the Appendix.50 We expect that higher rates of agreement
among copartisan legislators indicate greater importance of partisanship for legislative voting
behavior.
49In our main models, we do not consider pairs of legislators who both identify as Independents or
nonpartisans as copartisans.
50The McKibbin and Martis measures are distinct in several ways. The McKibbin data provide a single
measure of partisanship for a legislator’s entire career based on the party with which the legislator identified
for the longest period of time. The Martis measure reports the legislator’s partisanship for each Congress, and
in principle this measure could vary over time for a given legislator. The McKibbin measure has the virtue of
being relatively parsimonious, while the Martis measure is useful for characterizing partisanship during each
Congress (and thus is plausibly pre-treatment). In the main, though, the measures largely agree and, as a
result, we obtain virtually identical patterns of results using both measures. See Table 5.5. The number of
observations differs between these models due to differences in the availability of partisan indicators.
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At the outset, we note that our empirical approach does not allow us to dispositively
isolate partisan influences on legislative behavior from other influences that may be correlated
with it. A sizable literature interrogates whether party affects legislative behavior indepen-
dently from preferences (e.g., Cox and Poole 2002; Krehbiel 1993; Snyder and Groseclose
2000); given the challenges of isolating these effects in research on the contemporary Congress,
we do not expect to resolve this debate while studying the early American Congress. Instead,
we look for meaningful variation in the association between partisanship across chambers and
over time in ways that correspond with the theoretical account we outlined above. Below we
also discuss several robustness checks that provide evidence consistent with the independent
effects of parties by leveraging repeated pairs of legislators and distinguishing nonpartisan
legislators from those who identified with a major party.
Because politics was highly regional in nature during much of the nation’s history,
we created an indicator, Same region, which indicates whether a pair of legislators both
represented constituencies from the same Census region.51 We note, however, that tensions
over the issue of slavery led to conflict primarily between legislators from the North and the
South. Thus, we have also estimated models while specifying the Same region variable using
North and South as the regional categories, with the South defined as the 11 states of the
Confederacy. Our results for both shared copartisanship and shared region are robust to this
alternative characterization of regionalism.52
We also account for other characteristics that might influence shared patterns of voting
behavior. To account for the influence of constituency preferences on legislator voting records,
we use an indicator for whether legislators represented the Same state.53 We include an
51The states belong to each Census region are as follows: New England: CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT;
Mid-Atlantic: NJ, NY, PA; South Atlantic: DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA; East North Central: IL, IN, MI,
OH, WI; East South Central: AL, KY, MS, TN; West North Central: IA, MO, MN; West South Central: AR,
LA, TX.
52See Table 5.6.
53Ideally, we would use data on district (or state) presidential vote share, yet unfortunately the former
data are not available for the years prior to 1840.
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indicator for Shared Committee that takes a value of 1 if both members of a legislator-pair
served together on at least one standing committee, and zero otherwise.54 We also included a
variable for Service Overlap that characterizes the total number of years the legislators had
served together in the House and Senate.55 Legislators who served together on committees and
who have served together in Congress have additional opportunities to develop relationships,
identify commonalities, and rely on each other as trusted cue sources (e.g., Matthews 1975).
If shared committee membership and congressional service increased similarities in voting
behavior, we expect the coefficients to be positive.56 Summary statistics for all variables are
shown in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 in the Supplementary Appendix.
We model legislator agreement rates as a function of the explanatory variables noted
above and indicators for each Congress. For simplicity, we present results from linear
regression, but we discuss alternative modeling strategies and present those results in the
Supplementary Appendix. Because agreement rates between legislators i and j could also be
associated with legislator i’s rate of agreement with legislator k, we cluster standard errors
on legislator i within each Congress.57
We conduct two main sets of analyses to evaluate our hypotheses about partisanship
and legislative behavior. In the first, we estimate the models described above separately for
54These data were obtained from: David Canon, Garrison Nelson, and Charles Stewart, “Historical
Congressional Standing Committees, 1st to 79th Congresses, 1789-1947: 1st through 36th Congresses, House
and Senate,” February 13, 1998 (available at http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html#1).
55These data were obtained from Carroll McKibbin, “Roster of United States Congressional Officeholders
and Biographical Characteristics of Members of the United States Congress, 1789-1996: Merged Data”, 1997,
ICPSR Study #7803. This variable is measured in decades.
56We note that we also estimated models that accounted for a range of other potential sources of similarities,
including attending the same college, shared military service, and originating from the same state, but the
results for these additional characteristics were substantively tiny or not statistically significant, and they did
not change our findings for the key variables listed above.
57We note that an alternative research design could include a differences-in-differences strategy with
legislator and Congress fixed effects that studies changes in voting behavior among legislators who switch
parties. Causal identification in this model would come from legislators who changed parties between one
Congress and the next. While this research strategy is generally superior for identifying causal relationships,
this strategy is less well-suited for studying the role of partisanship over time due to the very small number
of legislators in any given Congress who switched parties.
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the House and Senate over the entire time period from 1789-1861. In the second, we evaluate
how the relationship between partisanship and roll call voting behavior varied over time
by estimating our models separately for each Congress and comparing the coefficients for
Same party across the 36 Congresses in our data. This approach is similar to that advocated
by Wawro and Katznelson (2014) and allows us to more closely explore how and when the
importance of partisanship varied over time and to periodize partisan eras in the antebellum
Congress.
5.3 Results
Results for our first analysis of voting patterns in the U.S. Congress are shown below in Table
5.1. Results for the House are shown on the left and results for the Senate are shown on
the right. In the main, the table shows that partisanship was significantly associated with
legislative behavior in both chambers of the antebellum Congress. The coefficients for Same
party are positive and statistically significant, showing that legislators who were members of
the same party voted together more frequently than legislators who were not from the same
party.
Consistent with our expectations, the results also show that the relationship between
partisanship and legislative behavior was stronger in the House than in the Senate, where
voting patterns may been more insulated from partisan developments. The importance of
shared partisanship was about 50 percent larger in magnitude in the House, where copartisans
voted together about 11 to 12 percentage points more frequently than legislator-pairs from
opposite parties, compared with about 7 to 8 percentage points more frequently in the Senate.
This difference is significant at p < .001.
The results for the other covariates are also of substantive interest. Geographic
considerations also played an important role in structuring legislative voting behavior. In
both models, the coefficients show that legislators from the same region and state exhibited
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greater similarities in voting behavior than other legislators. Though these variables do not
allow us to distinguish constituency influence from preferences that may be shared among
legislators from similar geographic areas, they do suggest that legislators that represented
similar constituencies compiled more similar voting records in Congress than legislators from
different regions or states. Interestingly, the magnitude of the Same state coefficient is larger in
the Senate than in the House, which is consistent with our theoretical argument that Senators’
behavior in office reflected responsiveness to their principals, state legislatures. Overall, shared
committee membership had a relatively weak association with legislative voting behavior. The
coefficients are both positive but very small magnitude, and are statistically distinguishable
from zero only in the House. These results suggest that shared committee membership was
not associated with greater similarity in voting behavior. Finally, we find limited evidence
that shared congressional service was associated with greater similarities in voting behavior,
as virtually all of the coefficients are negative.
While the results in Table 5.1 show that shared partisanship was a significant predictor
of legislative voting behavior in the antebellum Congress, the findings suggest that it may not
have been a particularly powerful one. The R2 statistics suggest that party, in combination
with the other covariates, explains about 47% of voting behavior in the House and 37% in
the Senate. The explanatory power of party thus appears to be considerably weaker than it
was in the mid-nineteenth century, when Weisberg 1978 reports that partisanship explains
approximately 85% of congressional voting decisions. While we do not wish to overinterpret
these model fit statistics, they do provide important context for contrasting the explanatory
power of party in the antebellum period with more recent congresses.
The results shown above are robust to a number of alternative modeling strategies
and specifications. First, we obtain substantively identical patterns when estimating negative
binomial regressions in place of linear regression.58 Second, we conducted a supplementary
58See Tables 5.9.
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Table 5.1: Legislative Voting Behavior in the U.S. Congress, 1789-1861
House Senate
Same Party 0.115∗ 0.076∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Same Region 0.049∗ 0.053∗
(0.001) (0.004)
Same State 0.031∗ 0.080∗
(0.002) (0.008)
Shared Committee 0.005∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Service Overlap -0.013∗ -0.004∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.365∗ 0.426∗
(0.007) (0.013)
N 368,354 221,824
MSE 0.02 0.02
R2 0.22 0.14
Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legis-
lator in parentheses. Indicators for each Congress are also included but not reported. ∗p < .05.
123
analysis in which our dependent variable is the difference in two legislators’ DW-NOMINATE
scores rather than their agreement rates. For these models, we would expect that shared parti-
sanship would result in a negative relationship with the difference between DW-NOMINATE
scores, which would indicate more similar voting patterns among copartisans. We find strong
evidence for these patterns when analyzing both the first and second dimension of legislators’
DW-NOMINATE scores.59
As we noted above, our analyses cannot rule out the possibility that the Shared
partisanship variable reflects legislators who generally share similar ideological dispositions
(see, e.g., Krehbiel 1993). While precisely estimating the causal effect of partisanship remains
an important challenge in legislative scholarship, we attempted to make headway on this
question by replicating our analyses in Table 5.1 for those pairs of legislators who served
together for more than one Congress. We estimated the models above while also including
the lagged value of the difference in DW-NOMINATE scores between the pairs. To the degree
that DW-NOMINATE scores reflect legislator preferences, the coefficient estimate for the
difference in DW-NOMINATE scores should reflect the influence of shared preferences while
the coefficient estimate for Shared partisanship characterizes the importance of party ties.60
Our analysis focused on the House due to the relatively small number of legislators who served
in successive Senates. We find that the coefficients for the difference in DW-NOMINATE
scores are negative and statistically significant, indicating that legislators who voted more
dissimilarly in a previous Congress exhibited lower agreement rates in the current Congress.
However, we continue to find positive and statistically significant coefficients for the Shared
partisanship variable.61 These results suggest that our findings about the importance of
partisanship reflect the importance of legislative parties over and above shared preferences.
59See Table 5.10.
60We acknowledge that this solution is imperfect, however, because lagged DW-NOMINATE scores also
likely reflect lagged party effects and because norms of congressional tenure changed during this period.
61See Table 5.11.
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As we noted above, the findings in Table 5.1 likely obscure important variation across
time in how partisanship shaped congressional voting records. We now examine temporal
variation in the relationship between partisanship and roll call voting behavior in greater
detail.
Partisanship and Legislative Voting Behavior across Time
Though political scientists and historians have frequently periodized American party systems
(Burnham 1970; McCormick 1966, 1986), less is known about how these periods reflect
stability and change in legislative voting behavior. We estimated our models above separately
for each Congress and chamber. Figure 5.1 shows the coefficients for Same party for each
Congress between 1789 and 1861. House coefficients are shown in the top plot and the bottom
plot shows coefficients for the Senate. The plotted points are the coefficient estimates and
the vertical lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Descriptively, the plot for the House reveals substantial variation across time in
the relationship between partisanship and legislative voting behavior. Consistent with the
analysis of individual roll call votes found in Aldrich (1995, chapter 3), the coefficients for
shared partisanship in the First and Second Congresses are virtually zero and estimated
relatively precisely. By the Third Congress, however, the coefficient is positive and statistically
significant and continued as such for most of the first party system. However, partisanship had
virtually no association with roll call voting patterns by the mid-1810s when the Federalists’
representation in Congress had substantially diminished.62 With the emergence of mass
party organizations by the mid-1830s, partisanship increased in importance and remained a
statistically and substantively important predictor of voting patterns up to the Civil War,
though its magnitude varied somewhat.
62Factions soon emerged within the Democratic-Republicans (Schouler 1887, 47), which culminated with
the intraparty contestation over the presidential election in 1824.
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The results for the Senate are broadly consistent with those for the House. Note,
first, that the confidence intervals are much larger for the Senate coefficient estimates due
to its considerably fewer members. Though all of the coefficient estimates during the first
15 Congresses are positive, and are occasionally statistically significant, they mostly hover
between 0.05 and 0.10 and provide less evidence of temporal variation than we find in the
House. Similar to the House, however, the coefficient estimates during the Era of Good Feeling
(here, the 16th through the 22nd Congresses) are mostly statistically insignificant and very
small in magnitude. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant beginning with
the 23rd Congress (1833-35) and continuing for the rest of the time series. The coefficients
are largest in magnitude in the 27th-29th congresses before returning to the 0.05 to 0.10
range.
In comparing the results across time and chambers, several key findings emerge. First,
to reiterate, the relationship between partisanship and legislative behavior varied substantially
over time. While party was reflected in congressional roll calls to a greater degree as formal
legislative parties emerged, the association did not remain constant thereafter. Studies of
party and congressional development are incomplete without accounting for this variation.
Second, not only was the relationship between partisanship and voting behavior stronger
in the House than in the Senate, consistent with our aggregate findings in Table 5.1, but
it was also more variable in the House. Part of the explanation could lay in the fact that
membership changed more quickly in the House than in the Senate due to its longer terms.
It is also possible that the more numerous changes to partisan organization in the House,
the presence of stronger partisan leadership positions, and the increased importance of mass
party organizations for the election of House representatives contributed to more sudden
changes and greater variability in the role of partisanship.
We extend the results discussed above and formally test for structural changes in
the relationship between legislative behavior and partisanship using the approach described
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by Wawro and Katznelson (2014) and applied in Spirling (2012). This approach allows us
to periodize the partisan nature of voting behavior in the U.S. Congress. We use the time
series of linear regression coefficients to identify possible change points in the relationship
between Same party and legislator agreement scores.63 The best-fitting change point model
(selected based on models which returned the lowest BIC) has two structural breaks in both
chambers.64 The dashed vertical lines in Figure 5.1 correspond to the change points identified
by the models and partition each chamber into three periods. The solid horizontal lines show
the average coefficient value for Same party during each of the periods.
In the House, the structural breaks identified by the model correspond with the 14th
and 22nd congresses. The 14th Congress, which convened in March 1815, coincided with
the end of the War of 1812 and the dissolution of the Federalists. The model suggests that
this period of reduced partisanship lasted through the 22nd Congress, which corresponds
with Andrew Jackson’s first term. Beginning in the 23rd Congress, at the start of Jackson’s
second term, a renewed, stronger (and more consistent) era of partisanship began in the
House. While these changepoints cannot dispositively identify what factors reconfigured
the relationship between partisanship and legislative voting behavior, the dates are broadly
consistent with accounts of early American parties that emphasize the importance of the War
of 1812 and the growth of mass party organization under Jackson.
The patterns are somewhat different in the Senate, where the 25th and 30th congresses
are identified as the structural breaks. Between these two congresses, partisanship was much
63It is important to note that our coefficients are measured with error; as with Spirling (2012), our use
of these estimates in the change point model does not account for this uncertainty. While we suspect that
incorporating uncertainty may not materially affect the locations of the breakpoints due to the relatively small
standard errors (especially in the House), developing a change point model to accommodate measurement
uncertainty is an important endeavor for future research.
64Following standard practice, we fit the models while requiring a minimum segment size of 15% of the
time series, or five congresses. Fit statistics are shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. In addition, we calculated the
confidence intervals on the chosen break dates. The confidence interval on the first House breakpoint is from
the 13th through the 22nd Congress while the confidence interval on the second break ranges from the 20th
to the 23rd Congress. For the Senate, the confidence interval on the first break is from the 21st through 26th
Congress while the interval for the second break is from the 29th through 34th Congress.
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more strongly associated with legislative behavior than in the periods before and after this
brief interlude, and is an exception to the general pattern of a relatively weak association
between partisanship and legislative behavior in the antebellum Senate. These results also
show a Senate that appears further removed from the partisan developments that seem to
be associated with legislative voting patterns in the House. We also note, though, that
the first extended filibuster (lasting three weeks) occurred during the 25th Congress on a
bank bill sponsored by Henry Clay (Binder and Smith 1997), while the end of this period
of more intense partisanship coincided with the conclusion of the Mexican-American War
which had generated fierce disagreement between Democrats and Whigs. In general, however,
the figure reveals considerable continuity in the relationship between Senate voting behavior
and partisanship despite the emergence and development of mass party organizations and
increasingly partisan institutions in the House.
The structural breaks identified by our change point model allow us to study the
evolution of legislative voting behavior across the antebellum Congress. We used the model
specifications from Table 1 to study the predictors of legislative behavior in each chamber
using the breakpoints described above. These results are shown in the top panel of Table
5.2. In the House, our findings show that partisanship was of roughly similar importance for
structuring legislative behavior in both the first and third periods identified by the change
point model. In each of these periods, moveover, partisanship’s importance was an order of
magnitude greater than it was in the second period identified by the change point model.
We contrast the findings based on our estimated structural breaks with the results
we obtain when using Jenkins and Stewart’s (2012) description of the three eras of party
organization during the antebellum period.65 These findings are shown in the bottom panel
of Table 5.2. While the dates of our structural breaks generally correspond with the epochs
65Jenkins and Stewart (2012, 13) describe the first period, 1789-1811, as “the least institutionalized period
of organizational politics,” as congressional leadership positions were infrequently contested and held few
important powers. In the second period, 1811-1839, competition for leadership positions gained intensity as
party organizations increasingly sought to use these positions for partisan benefits. They mark the third
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Figure 5.1: Structural Breaks in Partisanship and Legislative Voting Behavior
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Plot shows the coefficient estimates when estimating regressions of legislative voting behavior
on shared partisanship separately for each congress and political party in gray. The dashed
vertical lines correspond with the estimated structural breaks in the coefficient estimates.
The solid horizontal lines are intercepts for each section of the data.
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identified by Jenkins and Stewart, the results indicate that our periods correspond with more
dramatic changes in the importance of partisanship, as the coefficients for Same Party are
less variable across the models that are based on the periods of party organization identified
by Jenkins and Stewart.
We find even more dramatic differences in identifying the correlates of Senate behavior
when comparing model results based on the estimated structural breakpoints and the Jenkin-
s/Stewart eras of party organization. Aside from a single decade (roughly the 1840s), our
breakpoints suggest that partisanship was a rather meager (though statistically significant)
predictor of voting behavior. Had we used the Jenkins and Stewart eras, however, we would
have found that partisanship was significantly more important by the last two decades of the
antebellum era than it was in the Senate’s first half-century.
Altogether, these findings suggest that developments in mass party organization outside
the U.S. Congress did not always map perfectly onto changes in legislative behavior. They also
further underscore the importance of incorporating behavior from the parties-in-government
when accounting for processes of party development.
In additional analyses reported in the Supplementary Appendix, we considered how the
coefficients for the Same region variable varied across time and chambers.66 Consistent with
accounts that describe how local party organizations built networks to ameliorate regional
conflict (Silbey 1981, 1991; Skowronek 1982), we find that the coefficients for Same region
are generally smaller [larger] in magnitude during congresses in which shared partisanship
was more [less] important. This pattern ends around 1850 with the breakdown of the second
party system, and the coefficients for Same region increased until the Civil War as the parties
could no longer manage regional differences. The findings are also consistent with other
accounts that emphasize how regional considerations often played a greater role in shaping
period from 1839 through the end of the Civil War, during which party leaders and activists gained new
means of enforcing party discipline among rank and file legislators.
66See Figure 5.6.
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Table 5.2: Periods of Legislative Voting Behavior in the U.S. Congress
Breakpoint Model Periods
House Senate
1789-1817 1817-1833 1833-1861 1789-1839 1839-1849 1849-1861
Same Party 0.117∗ 0.009∗ 0.143∗ 0.036∗ 0.219∗ 0.058∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Same Region 0.045∗ 0.067∗ 0.044∗ 0.058∗ 0.031∗ 0.062∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Same State 0.048∗ 0.043∗ 0.023∗ 0.098∗ 0.048∗ 0.037∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011)
Shared Committee 0.028∗ 0.008∗ 0.001 0.006 -0.004 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Service Overlap -0.004 -0.016∗ -0.012∗ -0.0004 -0.006 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.363∗ 0.394∗ 0.313∗ 0.436∗ 0.259∗ 0.342∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.006) (0.004)
N 45,070 59,439 246,376 10,041 3,793 6,189
MSE 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
R2 0.14 0.08 0.33 0.07 0.41 0.13
Jenkins/Stewart Periods
House Senate
1789-1811 1811-1839 1839-1861 1789-1811 1811-1839 1839-1861
Same Party 0.098∗ 0.066∗ 0.143∗ 0.060∗ 0.034∗ 0.111∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007)
Same Region 0.048∗ 0.051∗ 0.047∗ 0.037∗ 0.063∗ 0.049∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005)
Same State 0.056∗ 0.041∗ 0.020∗ 0.126∗ 0.085∗ 0.051∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010)
Shared Committee 0.032∗ 0.009∗ 0.001 0.186∗ 0.003 -0.002
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.025) (0.004) (0.003)
Service Overlap -0.002 -0.011∗ -0.016∗ 0.020∗ -0.003 -0.006∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.368∗ 0.361∗ 0.307∗ 0.434∗ 0.388∗ 0.317∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007)
N 29,583 116,947 221,824 2,661 8,370 9,775
MSE 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
R2 0.11 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.07 0.20
Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legis-
lator in parentheses. Indicators for each Congress are also included but not reported. ∗p < .05.
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congressional voting patterns in the absence of well-organized political parties (Poole and
Rosenthal 1997).
Were Some Party Ties Stronger than Others?
In a final set of analyses, we explore temporal variation across parties. Several accounts
emphasize the varying strengths of party commitments in the antebellum period. For instance,
(Jenkins 2011) notes the hard-line partisan nature of Federalist Speakers of the House, while
Democratic-Republican Speakers governed the House with less partisan fervor. Discussing the
second party system, Aldrich (1995, 135) points out that the Whig Party was organized more
around “personal commitment and leadership of moderates” rather than institutionalized
sources of party discipline. Accounts such as these suggest that the association between
partisanship and legislative behavior could have varied in strength across political parties.
We estimated separate models for each Congress and allowed the coefficient for
shared partisanship to vary across each of the major parties. We focused on the House due
to the small number of legislator-pairs within each party in the Senate. The results are
shown in Figure 5.2. Two key findings stand out. First, in general, the magnitudes of the
relationship are quite similar when evaluating the most significant party cleavages in each
period. Between the 4th and 14th Congresses, the coefficient estimates for shared partisanship
among Federalists and Democratic-Republicans generally parallel each other. Though the
magnitude of the coefficients is generally larger for the Federalists, the differences are not
statistically distinguishable from zero. (Confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates are
not shown in the figure for visual clarity.) During the second party system, partisanship was
roughly equally influential for the behavior of Democrats and Whigs; any differences in the
coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero.
The second important finding from the figure is that pairs of legislators in which both
identified as Independents or were unaffiliated with any party did not vote together at higher
132
rates. The coefficient estimates for these legislators are almost always zero or very close to
zero, and are clearly smaller in magnitude relative to the coefficients for partisans. This
result indicates that legislators who were united by their absence of partisanship exhibited no
propensity to vote together at higher rates, and points to the importance of party membership
as a key factor that structured legislative voting behavior in the antebellum House. Though
not dispositive, the absence of any systematic patterns of shared voting behavior between
Independents also provides suggestive evidence that party membership affected legislative
behavior above and beyond individual legislators’ preferences.
In sum, our findings indicate that partisanship varied in systematic ways across
chambers, time, and parties for the first 70 years of U.S. history. These patterns appear to
reflect predictable responses to important partisan developments both inside of and external
to Congress. In the country’s infancy, political parties helped lend structure to individual-level
and aggregate patterns of legislative behavior, though this process was interrupted by the
emergence and disappearance of major political parties that coincided with the country’s
first three party systems.
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Figure 5.2: Variation across Parties in the U.S. House, 1789-1861
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Plot shows the coefficient estimates when estimating regressions of legislative voting behavior
on shared partisanship separately for each congress and political party. All other variables
included in the models reported in Table 1 are also included in the models. The points are
the coefficient estimates. The horizontal line at zero indicates the null hypothesis of no
association between shared partisanship and legislator agreement scores.
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5.4 Conclusion
The American Founders viewed political parties with antipathy. The condemnation of parties
from Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and others suggests widespread agreement among early
Americans that, as Lord Bolingbroke (1870, 215) argued a half-century earlier in England,
“Party is a political evil, and faction is the worst of all parties.” The realities of collective
decision-making, however, quickly led to party organization within Congress. Despite wide
scholarly interest among political scientists and historians in documenting, explaining, and
periodizing the development of the American two-party system, considerably less has been
known about the association between partisanship and legislative behavior in the early
republic.
Overall, our results show that partisanship was a significant and important predictor
of legislative behavior in the antebellum U.S. Congress. Yet this aggregate relationship misses
important temporal and cross-chamber variation. As the chamber whose members were
closer to mass electorates, voting records in the House were more strongly associated with
partisanship than in the Senate. We also find several distinct periods of partisan voting
behavior, particular in the House. Our findings are consistent with the perspective offered by
Sharp (1989, 7), who argued that historians have often “misread the history of the United
States by assuming that American political party development has been linear and that the
modern two-party system can trace its origins to the 1790s.”
The results reported here suggest ways in which macro-level political developments in
American political history shaped micro-level behavior. While Congress, and particularly the
House, introduced a number of institutional changes that had important implications for the
partisan organization of the chamber, members of Congress were not immune to partisan
developments happening across the nation. As mass party organizations offered ambitious
office-seekers a means for achieving their electoral goals, partisanship played an increasingly
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important role in structuring legislative behavior. Our research thus helps illuminate how
the rise of party organizations was associated with legislative coalitions and patterns of
governance.
Our findings raise several important questions about the nature of the electoral
connection in antebellum America. Recent scholarship has provided intriguing evidence of an
electoral connection in the antebellum period (e.g., Carson and Engstrom 2005), and future
research could study how individual legislators used partisan connections to achieve their
goals, particularly on key partisan issues. It could be especially enlightening to explore how
partisan support in Congress affected subsequent electoral performance in this early period.
Finally, we note that our empirical strategy does not permit us to reach strong causal
conclusions about how partisan affected legislative voting behavior. Additional scholarship,
both theoretical and empirical, can provide important insight into the conditions under which
the partisan organization of legislatures affects roll call voting patterns and on what issues.
In addressing these questions, we encourage future scholarship to pay particular attention to
how these patterns have varied across periods of U.S. history.
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5.6 Appendix
Table 5.3: Legislator-Pairs by Congress and Chamber
Congress # House Senate
1 910 136
2 878 253
3 2, 507 276
4 2, 036 190
5 2, 186 210
6 2, 554 253
7 2, 340 210
8 4, 182 171
9 4, 325 406
10 3, 857 325
11 3, 808 231
12 3, 967 435
13 5, 784 153
14 5, 736 253
15 6, 524 465
16 6, 492 465
17 6, 718 666
18 9, 631 780
19 9, 603 561
20 9, 302 820
21 8, 839 780
22 8, 854 741
23 10, 945 666
24 12, 588 595
25 11, 964 990
26 12, 660 741
27 11, 352 741
28 19, 503 861
29 21, 528 820
30 22, 791 630
31 21, 945 1, 275
32 21, 736 1, 128
33 24, 531 1, 128
34 24, 090 1, 326
35 22, 578 1, 431
36 19, 110 1, 176
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Table 5.4: Number of Roll Call Votes by Congress and Chamber
Congress # House Senate
1 109 100
2 102 52
3 69 79
4 83 86
5 155 202
6 96 120
7 142 88
8 132 150
9 158 88
10 237 91
11 293 167
12 314 204
13 352 263
14 113 189
15 106 132
16 147 120
17 95 91
18 94 178
19 111 234
20 233 238
21 273 277
22 462 422
23 327 229
24 459 439
25 475 410
26 751 334
27 974 822
28 597 305
29 642 383
30 478 344
31 572 499
32 455 358
33 607 546
34 729 449
35 548 702
36 433 607
Table 5.5: Legislative Voting Behavior in the U.S. Congress, 1789-1861, Alternative Party
Measure
House Senate
Same Party 0.127∗ 0.103∗
(0.002) (0.005)
Same Region 0.045∗ 0.051∗
(0.001) (0.004)
Same State 0.028∗ 0.077∗
(0.002) (0.008)
Shared Committee 0.006∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Service Overlap -0.013∗ -0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.330∗ 0.411∗
(0.001) (0.013)
N 335,354 20,338
MSE 0.01 0.02
R2 0.25 0.19
Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legis-
lator in parentheses. Indicators for each Congress are also included but not reported. ∗p < .05.
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Table 5.6: Legislative Voting Behavior in the U.S. Congress, 1789-1861, Alternative Region
Measure
House Senate
Same Party 0.114∗ 0.076∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Same Region 0.067∗ 0.054∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Same State 0.038∗ 0.097∗
(0.002) (0.007)
Shared Committee 0.006∗ 0.0002
(0.001) (0.002)
Service Overlap -0.010∗ -0.003
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.334∗ 0.418∗
(0.008) (0.013)
N 371,124 22,288
MSE 0.01 0.02
R2 0.25 0.16
Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legis-
lator in parentheses. Indicators for each Congress are also included but not reported. ∗p < .05.
Table 5.7: House Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Agreement scores 0.39 (0.14) 0.03 0.96
Same party 0.43 (0.50) 0 1
Same region 0.21 (0.41) 0 1
Same state 0.07 (0.25) 0 1
Shared committee 0.04 (0.20) 0 1
Service overlap 2.87 (3.60) 0 29.00
Table 5.8: Senate Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Agreement scores 0.41 (0.15) 0.04 0.90
Same party 0.41 (0.49) 0 1
Same region 0.18 (0.38) 0 1
Same state 0.02 (0.15) 0 1
Shared committee 0.22 (0.42) 0 1
Service overlap 7.17 (5.69) 0 24.75
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Table 5.9: Legislative Voting Behavior in Congress, 1789-1861
House Senate
Same Party 0.290∗ 0.184∗
(0.005) (0.010)
Same Region 0.119∗ 0.124∗
(0.003) (0.009)
Same State 0.067∗ 0.160∗
(0.004) (0.015)
Shared Committee 0.013∗ 0.000
(0.003) (0.006)
Service Overlap -0.034∗ -0.011∗
(0.003) (0.005)
Constant -1.019∗ -0.865∗
(0.018) (0.028)
N 368,354 22,288
Note: Entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on
legislators in parentheses. Indicators for each Congress are also included but not reported.
∗p < .05.
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Table 5.10: Legislative Voting Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Alternative Dependent Variable
Dependent variable: Difference in DW-NOMINATE Scores
House Models Senate Models
First Dimension Second Dimension First Dimension Second Dimension
Same Party -0.252∗ -0.030∗ -0.181∗ -0.028∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010)
Same Region -0.092∗ -0.142∗ -0.083∗ -0.183∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013)
Same State -0.024∗ -0.029∗ -0.100∗ -0.063∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017)
Shared Committee 0.003 -0.008∗ 0.011∗ -0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Service Overlap 0.031∗ 0.025∗ 0.015∗ 0.053∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Constant 0.569∗ 0.633∗ 0.623∗ 0.757∗
(0.025) (0.039) (0.043) (0.054)
N 368,354 22,288
MSE 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.33
R2 0.21 0.04 0.14 0.05
Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legislator in
parentheses. Indicators for each Congress are also included but not reported. ∗p < .05.
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Table 5.11: Legislative Voting Behavior in the U.S. House, 1789-1861: Including Lagged
DW-NOMINATE Scores
House
Same Party 0.036∗
(0.002)
Same Region 0.024∗
(0.002)
Same State 0.022∗
(0.003)
Shared Committee 0.011∗
(0.002)
Service Overlap -0.004∗
(0.002)
Difference in DW-NOMINATE scores (lagged) -0.278∗
(0.005)
Constant 0.524∗
(0.014)
N 68,826
MSE .11
R2 .45
Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on legis-
lator in parentheses. Indicators for each Congress are also included but not reported. ∗p < .05.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of Agreement Scores, 1789-1861
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Figure 5.4: Fit Statistics for Breakpoint Model in the House
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Figure 5.5: Fit Statistics for Breakpoint Model in the Senate
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Figure 5.6: Regional Influences on Voting Behavior in the U.S. Congress, 1789-1861
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Plots show the coefficient estimates when estimating regressions of legislative voting behavior
on shared region separately for each congress. All other variables included in the models
reported in Table 1 are also included in the models. The points are the coefficient estimates
and the vertical lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals. The horizontal line at zero
indicates the null hypothesis of no association between shared region and legislator agreement
scores.
152
Chapter 6
Federal Register Data Documentation
To date, most studies of rulemaking utilize data taken from the Unified Agenda. The Unified
Agenda is a semi-annual accounting of federal regulatory activity. The Regulatory Information
Service Center (a part of GSA) compiles the Unified Agenda in conjunction with the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB.67 The Unified Agenda data has
several upsides. Apart from being widely used and accepted, the Unified Agenda notes the
significance level of the rules and includes other information about various tests the rules
underwent (such as environmental impact assessments). The main problem with the Unified
Agenda is its incompleteness. Rules that are started and completed (many direct final rules)
between reporting periods may not appear, for example. Moreover, agencies self-report their
activities and face no penalty for excluding information (O’Connell 2008). Because all rules
must be printed in the Federal Register and because it is the official means of notifying the
public of regulatory activity, the Federal Register is the most complete source of regulatory
activity. As O’Connell (2011) notes: “In an ideal world, empirical studies of rulemaking
would use individual agency rule submissions to the Federal Register. Since virtually all rules
are published in the Federal Register, there would be no selection issues as to what rules
67More information from this website: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/
StaticContent/UA_About.jsp
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were included” (490). She goes on to note that Federal Register data has been prohibitive to
collect leading to more limited studies of short time periods and fewer agencies. Finally, using
a dataset based on the Federal Register, Nou and Stiglitz (2015) find that the Unified Agenda
has severe issues with underreporting of proposed rules and may even exhibit politically
strategic underreporting.
6.1 Collection Method
As mentioned above, Nou and Stiglitz (2015) also collected a dataset of rulemaking activity
based on the Federal Register. Their data set is based on “machine-readable Federal Register
entries from a variety of sources” (747). They search headings for proposed rules and exclude
entries that seem to be for proposed hearings or other activities. My data set covers fewer
years but uses a different collection method and includes more information. My dataset also
focuses on final rules rather than proposed rules.
To collect the data, I utilized the Federal Register .xml files held by the Government
Printing Office. An example of a rule from the .xml file is available in the appendix along
with the Python code used to extract all of the rules.68 There is one .xml for every business
day which includes everything published in the Federal Register for that day. Helpfully, .xml
files contain tags of each type of document, so I could extract individual document types. I
used this to obtain final rules (including direct final rules and other rule changes), but the
same process could be used to obtain Notices of Proposed Rulemaking and other agency
documents published in the Federal Register. Within each document type, there are tags for
various pieces of information about the rule itself–the date it was published, the effective date
of the rule, the signatories on the rule and more (as described in the next section). Using
Python, I extracted the information in each relevant tag and produced a .csv file of these
data for each final rule published in the Federal Register from 2000-2015. There are a total
68Available here: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=FR
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of 61,216 final rule documents. This collection could easily be extended to the present as new
Federal Register files are quickly placed in the repository. Though I collected data about final
rules, the Federal Register also contains the text of final rules as well. The script I used to
collect the data is available in the dataverse. It should be noted, however, that the data that
came directly from this script have been partially cleaned, so if the script were to be used to
collect new data, these would need to be cleaned as well. (Tags removed, for example).
As is visible from the rule example in the appendix, there are tags at various levels
for different information types. For example, the subagency that produced the rule can be
found between <SUBAGY> and </SUBAGY>. One challenge in the collection was dealing
with rules that have multiple iterations of the same variable (e.g. multiple people signed the
rule and each have a tag). This was solved by adding every iteration of one variable type
into one cell. It is difficult to solve this problem by incorporating multiple cells because some
have many signatories but most have one or two.
6.2 Data Concerns
Though these data have several upsides, there are also some concerns to consider. First, it is
not easy to connect with other rule data sources. Though the RIN can be used to identify
and track rules, many rules do not utilize RINs. This can also make it difficult to know the
significance level of the rule or other tests (e.g. environmental impact) it has undergone.
That said, the .xml documents provide more preamble and rule text information that could
be analyzed in the future if a researcher was inclined to collect it from the .xml documents.
Another future challenge of these data is that, while they possess a lot of information, there
are also occasionally errors in inputs (information input into the wrong tag, for example)
or differences in the way a particular agency was input. For example, the Federal Aviation
Administration might be listed as “Department of Transportation (FAA), Federal Aviation
Administration, Federal Aviation Administration (DOT),” etc. Finally, rules can appear
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multiple times in the same dataset if the rule was considered and finalized multiple times.
This is sometimes additionally challenging because some of these rules do not have RIN
numbers that would make them easier to track through time. That said, multiple final actions
taken over time on a rule should not necessarily be disqualified. Sometimes these changes
may be substantial enough to be considered new rules.
6.3 Variable Descriptions/Codebook
Below is a listing of the variables in the dataset and their descriptions, including potential
work that will need to be done to use the variable in analysis. There is no ”codebook” in
the ANES sense because the variables are simply listed as the text reported, not as variables
coded with numbers that would need to be decoded.
Date: The date of publication in the Federal Register in YYYY-MM-DD format.
Agency: The agency that produced the rule. If the agency is within a department, this is
usually the department, though sometimes no department is listed. If an independent agency,
it will be listed here. See cleaned agency for a better version of this and the next variable
combined. I left in this variable information for completeness and in case department is the
relevant level of analysis rather than subunit.
Subagency: The subagency that produced the rule. This is the unit that actually produced
the rule if it is within a department. For example, the Farm Service Agency is within the
Department of Agriculture. It will be NA in about a third of cases because independent
agencies are listed under the agency section instead. It should be noted that the Federal
Register did not input these data perfectly (e.g. differences in how to list the same agency, a
spelling error or two) and there are some strange instances of multiple agencies sponsoring
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the same rule that appear oddly. See Cleaned Agency for a cleaner, combined version of the
two variables above.
Cleaned Agency: This is my take on cleaning the agency data. I utilized the subagency
header when possible and grabbed the agency variable when the subagency variable was
not defined. For example, if the agency was listed as “Department of Transportation” and
the subagency as “Federal Aviation Administration,” this variable will be “Federal Aviation
Administration.” If agency is listed as “Environmental Protection Agency” and subagency
is blank, this variable will be “Environmental Protection Agency.” This creates a more
unified listing of the rule producer(s) at the lowest possible level. A small number of rules
have multiple creators. Often these are procurement rules from DOD/NASA/GSA. I would
recommend excluding rules with more than two or three sponsors from analysis or find a
more appropriate way to list them.
CFR: This is the parts of the Code of Federal Regulations affected by the rule. Sometimes
this includes multiple sections as well as multiple parts within the same section. There are a
handful of mistakes from the way the data were originally input that remain in this variable
and will need to be cleaned.
Signature Date: The date the final rule was signed.
Signatory Name: The name of the person or people who signed the rule.
Signatory Title: The job title of the person or people who signed the rule.
RIN: The rule identification number. Not all rules have one. If it does, it should be trackable
with sources like Regulations.gov, the Unified Agenda, etc.
FRDOC: The Federal Register ’s document identification.
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Effective Date: The date the rule is supposed to go into effect. Unfortunately, this is in
a text format because agencies input this in a variety of ways. Dates would need to be
extracted from text. For example, some rules simply list the date while others have some text
before the date. Some rules may have multiple relevant dates. Agencies sometimes switched
between using this tag and the following tag. About one third of rules do not have anything
listed.
Important Dates: This includes important dates. This sometimes includes effective dates
although less frequently than the previous variable. About two thirds of rules do not have
anything listed here. Could be combined with Effective Date. Only about 1400 are NA on
both, which suggests agencies switched between the two in most cases.
Addresses: Has address for questions or for where paper comments may be sent.
Subject List: This is a very useful list of subjects contained in the rule. This is either
coded by the agency or the Federal Register, I’m not sure which. The difficulty with the
subject list is that it is difficult to know how many subjects are contained in each rule. It
would be necessary to identify situations where the subject is the same but described in a
slightly different way. It may be possible to identify all possible subjects and dummy code
each subject for each rule. It will take some work to a
AUTH: This is a list of authorizing material for the rule. This includes areas of the U.S.
Code, references to specific public laws, and executive orders.
Agency2: This is another listing of agency provided in the listing. This one has more issues
with language differences than most of the others.
Action: The type of rule or action being completed. Includes final rules, direct final rules,
and much more. Could probably be consolidated into fewer categories than the many given.
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Summary: This is a provided summary of the rule. About 4,700 do not have summaries.
First Page: The page of the Federal Register on which the rule starts.
Last Page: The page of the Federal Register on which the rule ends. May be the same as
the first page for a short rule.
Rule Title: The title of the rule.
6.4 Simple Statistics and Plots
Figure 6.1 shows the number of all final actions and final rules (those tagged as final rules in
the action category rather than direct final rules, interim final rules, or other such actions)
over time.
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Figure 6.1: Number of All Final Actions and Final Rules Over Time.
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Table 6.1 shows the top 20 individual rule producers (where a rule is all rules tagged as
final in the .xml including direct final rules, temporary rules, and corrections) from 2000-2015.
This excludes team producers. The Department of Defense and NASA often co-produce
rules and sometimes involve other agencies such as GSA. These seem to be procurement
regulations.
The Federal Aviation Administration is the largest producers of final actions each year.
This is consistent with my previous research on the Regulations.gov data and consistent with
Nou and Stiglitz’s (2015) Proposed Rules dataset. The second largest producer is the EPA
followed by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard produces a lot of temporary deviations other
smaller regulations. It is also worth noting that independent regulatory commissions like the
FCC and SEC make a large number of regulations that are often excluded from other sources
(including my own Regulations.gov data) because they are typically not subject to OIRA
review.
As can be seen in Table 6.2, there are a variety of different action types listed. Many
of these categories can probably be combined but are left in tact for completeness. (e.g.
“Final Rule; Correction” is likely similar to “Correcting Amendment”.) The top ten categories
make up about 75 percent of the rules in the data. Over half of the rules are listed as final
rules. Before using, it would be prudent to check for typographical errors in the rule action
listing.
Table 6.3 lists the 25 most common subjects tagged in rules. As mentioned above,
the subjects lists are somewhat messy and will require cleaning to use most effectively. For
this table, I cleaned up the subjects somewhat and split them by commas (as this is how
multiple subjects in individual rules are divided). I then counted the most common uses. AS
is visible, reporting and recordkeeping is the most common subject listed on a rule followed by
incorporation by reference. Many of the top subjects list airworthiness, aircraft, or aviation.
Given that the FAA is the top rule producer, this is not surprising. An investigator may wish
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Table 6.1: Table of the top 20 individual rule producers 2000-2015.
Agency Number of Rules
Federal Aviation Administration 12,275
Environmental Protection Agency 8,681
Coast Guard 6,051
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 4,665
Federal Communications Commission 3,061
Food and Drug Administration 1,886
Internal Revenue Service 1,346
Agricultural Marketing Service 1,241
Federal Emergency Management Agency 1,137
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 939
Fish and Wildlife Service 801
Department of Defense (no subagency listed) 612
Defense Acquisition Regulation System 542
Securities And Exchange Commission 508
Department of Veterans Affairs 485
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 474
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 466
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 461
Postal Service 415
Office of Personnel Management 407
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Table 6.2: Top ten rule action types. These categories make up about 75 percent of all rules
in the data.
Action Type Number of Actions in Category
Final Rule 31,574
Direct Final Rule 2,560
Temporary Final Rule 2,493
Final Rule; Request for Comments 1,864
Interim Rule; Request for Comments 1,541
Final Rule; Correction 1,377
Notice of Temporary Deviation from Regulations 935
Interim Rule 923
Temporary Rule; Closure 916
Correcting Amendment 736
to create a single subject that lists any of these categories, especially since a single rule may
list all of these subjects. Air pollution, ozone, pesticides, and environmental protection are
not surprising either, considering the proliferation of EPA regulations.
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Table 6.3: List of 25 Most Common Subjects Tagged in Rules
Subject Count
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements 17,828
Incorporation by reference 12,099
Aircraft 7,520
Aviation safety 7,481
Environmental protection 7,337
Safety 6,820
Administrative practice and procedure 6,759
Air transportation 6,687
Air pollution control 4,708
Intergovernmental relations 4,287
Navigation (water) 3,072
Marine safety 2,842
Waterways 2,594
Security measures 2,471
Ozone 2,436
Airspace 2,411
Harbors 2,407
Agricultural commodities 2,134
Navigation (air) 2,131
Volatile organic compounds 1,933
Imports 1798
Pesticides and pests 1778
Nitrogen dioxide 1762
Government procurement 1663
Particulate matter 1639
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6.6 Appendix
6.6.1 Rule File Example
This is an example of the part of the .xml document dedicated to a single rule. As you can
see, there are various tags that mark out categories for each rule.
<RULE>
<PREAMB>
<AGENCY TYPE="N">DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES</AGENCY>
<SUBAGY>Food and Drug Administration</SUBAGY>
<CFR>21 CFR Parts 1, 11, 16, 106, 110, 114, 117, 120, 123, 129, 179, and
211</CFR>
<DEPDOC>[Docket No. FDA-2011-N-0920]</DEPDOC>
<RIN>RIN 0910-AG36</RIN>
<SUBJECT>Current Good Manufacturing Practice, Hazard Analysis, and
Risk-Based Preventive Controls for Human Food; Clarification of
Compliance Date for Certain Food Establishments</SUBJECT>
<AGY>
<HD SOURCE="HED">AGENCY:</HD>
<P>Food and Drug Administration, HHS.</P>
</AGY>
<ACT>
<HD SOURCE="HED">ACTION:</HD>
<P>Final rule; clarification of compliance date for certain food
establishments.</P>
</ACT>
<SUM>
<HD SOURCE="HED">SUMMARY:</HD>
<P>The Food and Drug Administration (FDA or we) is clarifying the
compliance date that we provided for certain food establishments
subject to a final rule that published in the <E T="04">Federal
Register</E> of September 17, 2015. Among other things, that final
rule amended our regulation for current good manufacturing practice
in manufacturing, packing, or holding human food to modernize it,
and to add requirements for domestic and foreign facilities that are
required to register under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(the FD&amp;C Act) to establish and implement hazard analysis and
risk-based preventive controls for human food. We are taking this
action in response to requests for clarification of the compliance
date for facilities that manufacture, process, pack, or hold grade
?A? milk or milk products and that are regulated under the National
Conference on Interstate Milk Shipments (NCIMS) system.</P>
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</SUM>
<EFFDATE>
<HD SOURCE="HED">DATES:</HD>
<P>The compliance date under the Current Good Manufacturing Practice,
Hazard Analysis, and Risk-Based Preventive Controls for Human Food
rule (published on September 17, 2015 at 80 FR 55908) for grade ?A?
milk and milk products covered by NCIMS under the PMO is September
17, 2018.</P>
</EFFDATE>
<FURINF>
<HD SOURCE="HED">FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:</HD>
<P>Jenny Scott, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (HFS-300),
Food and Drug Administration, 5100 Paint Branch Pkwy., College Park,
MD 20740, 240-402-2166.</P>
</FURINF>
</PREAMB>
<SUPLINF>
<HD SOURCE="HED">SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:</HD>
<P/>
<HD SOURCE="HD1">I. Background</HD>
<P>In the <E T="04">Federal Register</E> of September 17, 2015 (80 FR
55908), we published a final rule entitled ?Current Good Manufacturing
Practice, Hazard Analysis, and Risk-Based Preventive Controls for
Human Food? (the final human preventive controls rule). Among other
things, the final human preventive controls rule amended our
regulation for current good manufacturing practice in manufacturing,
packing, or holding human food to modernize it, and to add
requirements for domestic and foreign facilities that are required to
register under section 415 of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. 350d) to
establish and implement hazard analysis and risk-based preventive
controls for human food. In the preamble to the final human preventive
controls rule (80 FR 55908), we stated that the rule is effective
November 16, 2015, and provided for compliance dates of 1 to 3 years
in most cases.<PRTPAGE P="71935"/>
</P>
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<P>In Comment 214 in the final human preventive controls final rule (80
FR 55908 at 55986 to 55987), we described comments that discuss
facilities that comply with the Grade ?A? PMO and are regulated under
the NCIMS system, and we used the term ?PMO facilities? as an
abbreviation for these facilities. As previously discussed (78 FR 3646
at 3662; January 16, 2013), the PMO is a model regulation published
and recommended by the U.S. Public Health Service/FDA for voluntary
adoption by State dairy regulatory agencies to regulate the
production, processing, storage and distribution of Grade ?A? milk and
milk products to help prevent milk-borne disease. Some comments
recommended that we make full use of the existing milk safety system
of State regulatory oversight for Grade ?A? milk and milk products
provided through the NCIMS and the food safety requirements of the
PMO. Some comments asked us to exempt PMO-regulated facilities (or the
PMO-regulated part of a PMO facility that also produces food products
not covered by the PMO) from the requirements of the rule for hazard
analysis and risk-based preventive controls, or to otherwise determine
that facilities operating in compliance with the PMO are also in
compliance with those requirements. These comments suggested we could,
as an interim step if we find it necessary, stay the application of
these requirements to PMO-regulated facilities and work with the NCIMS
cooperative program to enact any modifications to the PMO as may be
needed to warrant an exemption or comparability determination. In
response to these comments, we established a compliance date of
September 17, 2018, for ?PMO facilities? (see Response 214, 80 FR
55908 at 55987 to 55988).</P>
<HD SOURCE="HD1">II. Clarification of the Compliance Date for Facilities
Regulated Under the NCIMS System</HD>
<P>On September 10, 2015, the Office of the Federal Register made a
pre-publication copy of the final human preventive controls rule
available to the public through its procedures for advance display
(Ref. 1). Since September 10, 2015, we have provided opportunities for
stakeholders to ask questions about the rule, through webinars and
through a Web portal for submission of questions (Refs. 2 and 3). Some
PMO facilities, in addition to manufacturing, processing, packing, or
holding grade ?A? milk or milk products, manufacture, process, pack,
or hold other food subject to the final human preventive controls
rule. Some of these facilities have asked us to clarify whether the
extended compliance date for ?PMO facilities? applies only to grade
?A? milk and milk products covered by NCIMS under the PMO, or whether
the extended compliance date applies broadly to all activities
conducted by the facility (<E T="03">e.g.,</E> activities related to
other food produced at the facility).</P>
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<P>In this document, we are clarifying that the extended compliance date
of September 17, 2018, for ?PMO facilities? applies only to grade ?A?
milk and milk products covered by NCIMS under the PMO, and not to the
manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding of other food. As we
discussed in Response 214 (80 FR 55908 at 55987 to 55988), we agreed
that we should make use of the existing system of State regulatory
oversight for Grade ?A? milk and milk products provided through the
NCIMS and the food safety requirements of the PMO. We described our
reasons for deciding to extend the compliance date for ?PMO-regulated
facilities? to comply with the requirements of subparts C and G to
September 17, 2018. Those reasons related to the current provisions of
the PMO, the work already begun by NCIMS to modify the PMO to include
all of the requirements established in the final human preventive
controls rule, and complex implementation issues concerning the
interstate movement of milk and milk products and imported milk. We
explained that in establishing a compliance date of September 17,
2018, for PMO facilities, we considered: (1) The extent of revisions
that must be made to incorporate the requirements of this rule for
hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls into the PMO; (2)
the process to revise the PMO; and (3) the date at which the necessary
revisions to the PMO could begin to be made. All of these discussions
in the human preventive controls final rule related to the activities
regulated by NCIMS under the PMO.</P>
<HD SOURCE="HD1">III. Economic Analysis of Impacts</HD>
<P>We have examined the impacts of this final rule under Executive Order
12866, Executive Order 13563, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
601-612), and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104-4). Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct us to assess all costs
and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, when regulation
is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net
benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health
and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity).
We have developed a comprehensive Economic Analysis of Impacts that
assesses the impacts of this final rule (Ref. 4). We believe that this
final rule is not a significant regulatory action as defined by
Executive Order 12866.</P>
<P>The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires us to analyze regulatory
options that would minimize any significant impact of a rule on small
entities. Because this final rule is making no change to the
compliance date announced for facilities regulated under the NCIMS
system in the human preventive controls rule published on September
17, 2105, we have determined that this final rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.</P>
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<P>The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (section 202(a)) requires us
to prepare a written statement, which includes an assessment of
anticipated costs and benefits, before proposing ?any rule that
includes any Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by
State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for
inflation) in any one year.? The current threshold after adjustment
for inflation is $144 million, using the most current (2014) Implicit
Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product. This final rule would
not result in an expenditure in any year that meets or exceeds this
amount.</P>
<HD SOURCE="HD1">IV. Environmental Impact, No Significant Impact</HD>
<P>We have determined under 21 CFR 25.30(j) that this action is of a type
that does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect
on the human environment. Therefore, neither an environmental
assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required.</P>
<HD SOURCE="HD1">V. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995</HD>
<P>This final rule contains no collection of information. Therefore,
clearance by the Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 is not required.</P>
<HD SOURCE="HD1">VI. References</HD>
<P>The following references are on display in the Division of Dockets
Management (see <E T="02">ADDRESSES</E>) and are available for viewing
by interested persons between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through
Friday; they are also available electronically at <E
T="03">http://www.regulations.gov.</E> FDA has verified the Web site
addresses, as of the date this document publishes in the <E
T="04">Federal Register</E>, but Web sites are subject to change over
time. </P>
<EXTRACT>
<PRTPAGE P="71936"/>
<P>1. Office of the Federal Register, ?Current Good Manufacturing
Practice, Hazard Analysis, and Risk-Based Preventive Controls for
Human Food,? September 10, 2015. Available at <E
T="03">https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2015-21920.pdf.</E>
</P>
<P>2. FDA, ?FSMA Webinar Series: Preventive Controls for Human and
Animal Food Final Rules,? 2015. Available at <E
T="03">http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm461512.htm.</E>
</P>
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<P>3. FDA, ?Contact FDA About FSMA,? 2015. Available at <E
T="03">http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm459719.htm.</E>
</P>
<P>4. FDA, ?Current Good Manufacturing Practice, Hazard Analysis, and
Risk-Based Preventive Controls for Human Food; Clarification of
Compliance Date for Certain Food Establishments,? 2015. Available
at: <E
T="03">http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/EconomicAnalyses/default.htm.</E>
</P>
</EXTRACT>
<SIG>
<DATED>Dated: November 10, 2015.</DATED>
<NAME>Leslie Kux,</NAME>
<TITLE>Associate Commissioner for Policy.</TITLE>
</SIG>
</SUPLINF>
<FRDOC>[FR Doc. 2015-29340 Filed 11-17-15; 8:45 am]</FRDOC>
<BILCOD> BILLING CODE 4164-01-P</BILCOD>
</RULE>
6.6.2 Python Code
import re
import csv
##I have the multiple list of files because excel was giving me trouble for
making such a large .csv at the time
##Thus, I split into two groups and merged in R later.
#from ListofFiles1 import files
from ListofFiles2 import files
## create or open csv
#filename = "Rules00to06.csv" #Does not include June 25, 2003
filename = "Rules07to15.csv"
f = open(filename, "w+b")
writer = csv.writer(f)
headers=["Date","Agency","SubAgency","CFR","SignatureDate","SignatoryName","SignatoryTitle",
"RIN", "FRDOC", "EffectiveDate","ImportantDates",
"Addresses","SubjectList","AUTH","Agency2", "Action", "Summary", "FirstPage",
"LastPage", "RuleTitle"]
writer.writerow(headers)
#open the file
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#files=["FR-2000-02-29.xml"]
for file in files:
thefile=open(file)
##store lines in the file as a python list
lines=thefile.readlines()
##Find where the rules begin and end
ruleLocations=[]
ruleENDLocations=[]
for j in range(len(lines)):
if re.search("<RULE>", lines[j])!=None:
ruleLocations.append(j)
if re.search("</RULE>", lines[j])!=None:
ruleENDLocations.append(j)
##Put FR date in document
for m in range(len(ruleLocations)):
stuffIWant=[]
stuffIWant.append(file)
arule=lines[ruleLocations[m]:ruleENDLocations[m]]
##There's a problem where BILCOD, NAME, and TITLE can have multiple iterations.
##I combined these into one cell in the final document.
Items=["<AGENCY","<SUBAGY>","<CFR","<DATED>","<NAME>","<TITLE>","<RIN>"]
trial=[]
for item in Items:
for p in range(len(arule)):
if len(re.findall(item, arule[p]))!=0:
trial.append(arule[p])
if len(trial)==0:
trial.append("None")
trial2="".join(trial)
trial2=re.sub("\s{2,}","",trial2)
stuffIWant.append(trial2)
trial=[]
MultiLineItems=["<FRDOC>", "<EFFDATE","<DATES", "<ADD"]
MultiLineItemsEND=["</FRDOC>","</EFFDATE","</DATES", "</ADD"]
start=0
end=0
TF=[]
for k in range(len(MultiLineItems)):
for j in range(len(arule)):
TF.append(MultiLineItems[k] in arule[j])
if re.search(MultiLineItems[k], arule[j])!=None:
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start=j
if re.search(MultiLineItemsEND[k], arule[j])!=None:
end=j
string=arule[start:(end+1)]
##This strips out extra spacing
new_list=[]
for n in range(len(string)):
new_list.append(re.split("\s{2,}",string[n]))
new_list=[item for sublist in new_list for item in sublist]
while'' in new_list:
new_list.remove('')
stuffIWant.append(new_list)
if any(TF)==False:
stuffIWant.append("None")
TF=[]
trial=[]
for p in range(len(arule)):
if len(re.findall("<LSTSUB", arule[p]))!=0:
trial.append(arule[p+1:p+4])
if len(trial)==0:
trial.append("None")
trial=[item for sublist in trial for item in sublist]
trial2="".join(trial)
trial2=re.sub("\s{2,}","",trial2)
stuffIWant.append(trial2)
trial=[]
trial=[]
for p in range(len(arule)):
if len(re.findall('<HD SOURCE="HED">Authority:</HD>\n', arule[p]))!=0:
trial.append(arule[p+1:p+2])
if len(trial)==0:
trial.append("None")
trial=[item for sublist in trial for item in sublist]
trial2="".join(trial)
trial2=re.sub("\s{2,}","",trial2)
stuffIWant.append(trial2)
trial=[]
##get multi-line stuff where I only need the last line of the multiline
LastLineItems=["<AGY>", "<ACT>", "<SUM>"]
LastLineItemsEND=["</AGY", "</ACT>", "</SUM>"]
171
start=0 ##This will mark the start of the multi line string
end=0 ##And this will mark the end
TF=[] #This will help me tell if the line type I need is there at all.
for k in range(len(LastLineItems)):
for j in range(len(arule)):
TF.append(LastLineItems[k] in arule[j])
if re.search(LastLineItems[k], arule[j])!=None:
start=j
if re.search(LastLineItemsEND[k], arule[j])!=None:
end=j
string=re.split("\s{2,}",arule[start:end][-1])[1]
stuffIWant.append(string) ##append the last line
if any(TF)==False:
stuffIWant.append("None")
TF=[]
trial=[]
for p in range(len(arule)):
if len(re.findall('PRTPAGE P="([0-9]+)', arule[p]))!=0:
trial.append(re.findall('PRTPAGE P="([0-9]+)', arule[p]))
if len(trial)==0:
trial.extend([["None"], ["None"]])
trial=[item for sublist in trial for item in sublist]
stuffIWant.append(trial[0])
if len(trial)>1:
stuffIWant.append(trial[-1])
if len(trial)==1:
stuffIWant.append(trial[0])
trial=[]
for p in range(len(arule)):
if len(re.findall('<SUBJECT>', arule[p]))!=0:
trial.append(arule[p])
if len(trial)==0:
trial.append(" None") ##I forgot to document why I did this and don't
remember now. It comes out in the next part.
trial2=re.sub("\s{2,}","",trial[0])
stuffIWant.append(trial2)
#NewList=[]
#stuffIWant=[item for sublist in stuffIWant for item in sublist]
#for item in stuffIWant:
# if re.search('>(.*)<', item)!=None:
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# string2=(" ".join(re.findall('>(.*)<', item)))
# NewList.append(string2)
# else:
# NewList.append(item)
writer.writerow(stuffIWant)
f.close()
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